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Abstract 
 
Most Somalis aged between 18 and 30 living in Melbourne were born either in Somalia or en route 
to another country. These generation 1.5ers are described as being ‘caught in the middle’ of two 
cultures, and occupy contested identities — in the family sphere (competing parental and peer 
group expectations as well as fluctuating cultural norms), the public sphere (being raised in an 
environment where there is widespread distrust of Muslims and people who are visibly different), 
and the sphere of religious belief (many note tension between their faith and the expectations of 
mainstream Australians). Through interviews, focus groups, participant observation, community 
member profiles, and field notes, I investigated the question of how these young Somalis living in 
Melbourne express their identity. It became clear that young Somalis express their identities in a 
myriad of complex and contested ways. I found that this occurs in a complicated space where there 
are multiple competing social forces, as well as a deep engagement with Islam. The respondents 
negotiated this space with an acute awareness of how their identities are represented. This was not 
an abstract awareness, but one which permeated everyday interactions. 
 
Muslim communities across the globe are no strangers to hyperbolic representation, and Somalis 
have been characterized as violent in both academic literature and the popular media. Many reasons 
have been given to justify this characterization, from the harsh environment of Somalia, the 
nomadic tendencies of the Somalis, and perhaps most importantly, the strong clan system. The 
second question investigated was how this portrayal of Somalis as violent in both the academic 
literature and the popular media compares with their actual expression of identity. Even though I 
did not set out to dispel myths about this particular population, I found that their identity expression 
was vastly different to common representations of them: this generation of Somalis seems no more 
likely to engage in violent behaviour than the average Australian of the same age. However, when 
violence does occur, it is subject to much more scrutiny than when it occurs in a mainstream setting. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to shed new light on the nuances of the expression of identity in this group. 
It is hoped that policy makers, educators, community developers and academics take the findings 
detailed in this thesis to better inform future decisions and actions in this sphere.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
Somalia is a country with a troubled recent political history. After being colonized in the late 19th 
century by Italy and Britain, the formal colonial regions joined forces to create the Independent 
Somali Republic in 1960. Power was seized in 1969 by Mohamed Siyad Barre, who founded the 
Somali Democratic Republic. His rule lasted until 1991, when he was overthrown and civil war 
broke out. After the eruption of war, a wave of refugees fled the country. They have settled in many 
parts of the world, most notably in Sweden and greater Scandinavia, Minnesota in the United States, 
Canada and the United Kingdom. There is a small but significant population in Australia (almost 
exclusively in Melbourne and Sydney).  
I have been interested in the Somali community in Melbourne since 2010, when I started 
tutoring Community Development at Victoria University in Footscray. There were a number of 
Somali Australian students in my classes over two years, and I was struck by the fact that many of 
them were studying community development with the explicit aim of working in their community 
to improve the circumstances of Somalis living in Melbourne. They were generally very studious, 
and often took up my offers of extra assistance outside class time. Then, when I started studying 
Arabic at the University of Melbourne in 2011, I met more students, this time as peers. Again, I 
noted how hard they worked at their studies, and I met up with some Somali Australian friends for 
regular study sessions. I began to pay more attention to the way Somalia was represented in the 
mainstream media and noticed that the commonly available images of Somalia did not tally with 
my friends and students and the way they represented themselves. I wanted to know more about 
why this was the case. 
Some of the young Somalis I met with had been born outside Somalia, and many had never 
been there at all. These scattered Somali young people are part of a much broader Somali youth 
living abroad, sharing common experiences of flight and resettlement. My study focuses on 
generation 1.5 Somali Australians living in Melbourne. The term generation 1.5 refers to 
individuals who were born in one country and have resided in another country from their late 
childhood or early teen years. This means they have cultural understanding of both their country of 
birth and the place they now call home. The respondents told me they have been raised to have 
pride in their Somali heritage, despite the negative perception of Somalia in the broader community. 
As generation 1.5ers, born in one place but raised in another, they are often ‘caught in the middle’ 
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of two cultures.1 Practically, this entails translating things for their parents on a daily basis, or 
making appointments and navigating bureaucracy as their parents have difficulty understanding the 
way Australian systems work and many lack the ability to make themselves understood beyond the 
very basic English they have learnt since arrival. However, this straddling of cultures also has many 
abstract and emotional facets, which I sought to uncover.  
I argue that young Somali Australians in Melbourne occupy very contested identities. In the 
family sphere, they are members of generation 1.5 and have to battle with competing parental and 
peer group expectations, and fluctuating cultural norms. In the religious sphere, many note tension 
between their faith and the expectations of mainstream Australians. In the public sphere, they have 
been raised in an environment where there is widespread and increasing distrust of Muslims and 
people who are visibly different.  
While the term ‘hybridity’ has become popular over the last two decades or so in social 
theory, cultural theory and post-colonial studies as a method of capturing the multiplicities of 
culture and ethnicity, I have chosen not to use this term. I believe it recognises that cultures are not 
homogenous and that identity is at least partly built on difference, which is a crucial idea in this 
thesis. However the term is currently used ‘to register (positively) the ways in which identity 
formation, especially for diasporic populations, draws on and combines different elements to create 
something new’.2  There is a large array of scholarly work on the intricacies of hybridity, which is 
too complex to include in this thesis, so I have avoided the term. I also prefer to use the term 
‘contested identities’ because I believe hybridity is too often seen as an inherently positive 
celebration of fluidity and multiplicity. Noble and Taber maintain that hybridity overstates the 
agency of social actors at the expense of the determining force of social relations,3 which is an 
accurate description of the respondents’ attempts to create and inhabit their identities. The term 
‘contested identities’ better reflects the situation of young Somali generation 1.5ers in Melbourne, 
who sometimes struggle with expressing the different facets of their identities across the many 
spheres of life where they face conflicting expectations. 
While the size of the Somali community in Melbourne is not large compared to other 
Somali communities (especially in the United States, for example), there has been substantial media 
focus on Horn of Africa populations in Melbourne, and indeed on the Somali community in 
particular. Within the community I found there were mixed reactions to the media scrutiny. For 
                                                
1 I discuss the concept of generation 1.5 further in section two. Briefly, a member of generation 1.5 has 
immigrated to a new place or country before their teen years. This means they bring characteristics from their 
country of birth, but they also have formative experience in their new home, thus placing them ‘half way’ 
between first and second generation migrants. 
2 Martha Bigelow, "Researching and Educating Somali Immigrant and Refugee Youth," Language Learning 
60, no. 1 (2010): 149. 
3 Greg Noble and Paul Taber, "On being Lebanese-Australian: hybridity, essentialism and strategy among 
Arabic-speaking youth," in Arab Australians today: citizenship and belonging, ed. Ghassan Hage 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2002), 131. 
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example, one Somali community leader told me he did not mind the media focus because it drew 
attention to the Somalis in Melbourne, which in turn could highlight the work that the many 
community organisations do. He hoped this might also lead to social, multicultural, educational 
programs being developed and targeted at the Somali community. However, many of the young 
respondents felt very differently. They believed they were targeted unfairly by the media and indeed 
were profoundly affected by their representation in the media. 
The very public concern with Islam and its connection to terrorism was something they 
reported to colour mainstream perceptions of them and their families. Personally, I am fascinated by 
how these individuals construct and maintain a dynamic identity to be able to satisfy the competing 
needs of their families, peer groups, professional networks and colleagues and mainstream 
Australian counterparts. Muslims across the globe are no strangers to hyperbolic representation, but 
Somalis in particular have often been characterized as violent in both academic and popular 
contexts. Many reasons have been given to justify this characterization, from the harsh environment 
of Somalia,4 the nomadic tendencies of the Somalis,5 and perhaps most importantly, the strong clan 
system.6 Within this context, how do generation 1.5 Somalis living in Melbourne express their 
identity? How does this expression compare with the portrayal of generation 1.5 Somalis given in 
the academic literature and the popular media? 
This thesis attempts to address these two interrelated questions. By interviewing generation 
1.5 Somalis living in Melbourne, as well as some community leaders, it became clear that young 
Somalis express their identities in a myriad of complex and potentially contested ways. And this 
identity expression is in conflict with the way that they are portrayed elsewhere. The aim of this 
thesis is to shed new light on the nuances of the expression of contested identities in this group. It is 
hoped that policy makers, educators, community developers and academics take the findings 
detailed in this thesis to better inform future decisions and actions in this sphere. 
 
 
  
                                                
4 Elmi M Abdullahi. "The Role of Environmental Resource Scarcity in the Somali Political Crisis."  
Mogadishu: Somali Centre for Water and Environment with Mogadishu University, 2001. 
http://www.somwe.com/scarcity.html Accessed 22 June 2014. There is a general view that a harsh climate 
and scarcity of resources can trigger violence. See Kurt M Lietzmann and Gary D Vest "Environment & 
Security in an International Context."  Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Committee on the 
Challenges of Modern Society, 1999.  
5 Duran Bell calls it the ‘people on the desert problem’: Duran Bell. "Evolution of Middle Eastern Social 
Structures: A New Model."  Irvine, California: University of California, 2004.  
6 Noel  Mwakugu, "Clan divisions behind Somali violence," BBC, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6594647.stm Accessed 29 December 2014.; Helen Chapin Metz. " Somalia: 
A Country Study."  Washington: Federal Research Division Library of Congress, 1992.  
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Somali identity in Melbourne — a contested space 
 
I have always been fascinated by not only the multiple identities individuals and groups inhabit over 
space and time, but also the stories people tell about themselves to reinforce those identities. I think 
this is an especially interesting question in a country like Australia, which has been built on 
migration. The migration story in Australia is a living story, and it is in constant flux. Many cultures 
and worldviews jostle side-by-side in Melbourne and the expression and intersection of this cultural 
manifestation is captivating and sometimes tense to observe and take part in. In some ways, this is a 
generic story. People who arrive and settle in another place are often confronted with disadvantage, 
misunderstandings, and a struggle to have their own cultural practices widely accepted. 
I had a personal interest in the migration story in Australia, as a granddaughter of European 
refugees post-World War II, and I have often found it surprising to see the way that members of my 
own family consider newly-arrived refugees who are victims of different conflicts. It sometimes 
seems they have forgotten that they were largely welcomed into Australia and that they settled and, 
with support, were able to contribute to Australian society over many decades. Anecdotally, I have 
noted a consistent attitude of fear towards new waves of refugees, and mistrust about their motives 
within my grandparents’ peer group. In my own life, an opportunity arose to meet with and gain a 
greater understanding of a particular community in Melbourne — Somalis who fled their homeland 
after the outbreak of civil war in 1991. The resulting thesis is a fusion of my own interests in the 
identity of migrants and refugees in Australia, and my personal connections with some young 
Somali Australians through work and study. This has allowed me to examine their identity 
expression in the context of the broader migration story in Australia and to better understand how 
the very particular circumstances which affect them are representative of what I consider to be 
much more widely experienced issues. 
The people I met with were young adults like myself. Indeed, this time of life is well known 
for being a period where individuals go through great changes in their conceptions of self and the 
way in which they express this to others. However, their stories have an added layer of complexity 
because they are at the forefront of managing and negotiating identities that come from different 
places — geographical, cultural and perhaps imagined. 
One things that struck me very early on in my research (and indeed, prior to my research 
officially commencing) was just how contested the question of identity appeared to be for 
generation 1.5 Somalis. Prior to outlining my theoretical and methodological considerations (and 
well before any findings), I want to set the scene by presenting several separate isolated comments. 
These quotes all stemmed from individual interviews with a generation 1.5 Somali women, 
discussing moments when they felt like they really belonged in Australia, like they ‘felt at home’.   
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Amal: Once I got over not knowing English, my primary school years up to year 7 or 8, I 
didn’t feel any different. You know, even with my scarf, I didn’t pay any attention to it at 
all. It was just in high school when I felt myself growing apart from my parents and I 
couldn’t speak to them. And later, in year 12, people started looking, and making 
comments. 
INTERVIEW / 21.01.2014 
 
Amal implicitly covers a vast array of issues. The forging of her identity, conceiving of herself 
against the difference of her parents, the importance of language as a normalising discursive 
structure, the ‘look’ of others who started to see her in terms of ideological categories and the power 
relations in such moves. Everything here centres on the theme of identity and just how challenged 
this space is for Amal. 
 
Sumaya: Australia has the same values as I have, Islamically and culturally. It’s 
universal values. So I don’t feel like I don’t belong. It’s my home. I don’t think I’ll ever go 
back to Somalia. I know there are people who dream of going back, but I’ll never go back 
there, I don’t think it would be safe to live there.  This is my home; my grandchildren are 
going to be born here. So I feel that my identity is Australian. 
INTERVIEW / 05.05.2013 
 
Sumaya is defiant in stating that she feels Australian. This is an example of a member of generation 
1.5 who protests that she feels Australian through and through. However, she is not claiming that 
she is Australian. She also presents her identity against the backdrop of the harsh reality that for 
reasons of personal safety, she could not return to Somalia, even if she wanted to. 
 
Muna: The first time I went to Malaysia, a taxi driver asked me and I told him I’m 
Australian. That was the first thing that came out of my mouth, I didn’t really think about 
it. It just came out. And he said ‘You’re not Australian, you’re not white.’ And I 
thought…‘No, I’m not white, but I’m still Australian.’ But I didn’t say it out loud. I was 
thinking it, but I didn’t say it. As soon as he said, ‘You’re not Australian’, I jumped and 
said, ‘Oh, I’m Somali’. But in my mind, I’m not Australian, but I feel Australian and I 
belong to Australia, but the second thing that came out was I’m Somali, even though I 
don’t really believe that. But when I felt at home and felt Australia was my home was 
when I came back [from travel] and thought ‘this is where I belong.’  
INTERVIEW / 03.02.2014 
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Muna’s story again highlights how contested the question of identity is, both for members of 
generation 1.5, and in terms of others individuals’ projections of categories of identity. She 
explicitly states that she is ‘not Australian’, but that she ‘feels Australian’, thus drawing a 
distinction between these two aspects of her identity. 
 These comments were among many that had a story to tell about Somali generation 1.5 
identity in Melbourne. The way in which this group creates, maintains and expresses identity was 
one of the things that I felt most personally drawn to in setting out on this research project. 
 
 
Contemporary Islamic issues and the Australian context 
 
While it is certainly a topic of interest, it’s almost absurd to ask ‘What are contemporary Islamic 
issues?’ Any reasonable answer must be extensive, complex and detailed to be able to touch on the 
pertinent subjects. Nonetheless, many forms of media are consistently reporting on Muslims and 
Islam. These reports are overwhelmingly negative. 7  Some recurrent themes are: Islamic 
radicalization and the threat of terrorism; an Islamic war against the West; civil wars in a number of 
Muslim majority countries and the associated displacement that has occurred — refugee camps with 
tents as far as the eye can see, women and children bearing arms to protect their meagre possessions 
as they flee and the emptiness of towns that have been ransacked and looted. 
There is a constant debate around democratization in the Islamic world. Some 
commentators believe the process is underway, especially with the Arab Spring of 2011-12. Still 
others mourn that this revolution was stifled and not able to reach its potential. Whatever the 
answer, there has been a violent backlash in many Muslim majority countries, and with the birth of 
Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) movement, it seems that in some quarters, a Western war has yet again 
been declared on Islam.  
Writing for the EU, Ehteshami highlights the complexity surrounding Islam today: 
 
The Muslim world, comprising some 50 sovereign states and large minorities in many other 
countries, is a well-integrated and integral part of the modern world of states. It does, however, also 
contain a complex and intricate web of relations and forces which it periodically unleashes on the 
rest of the international system.8 
 
                                                
7 See Shahram Akbarzadeh and B  Smith. "The Representation of Muslims and Islam and the Media (The Age 
and Herald Sun)."  Melbourne: Monash University, 2005. ; Travis L. Dixon and Charlotte L. Williams, "The 
Changing Misrepresentation of Race and Crime on Network and Cable News," Journal of Communication 65, 
no. 1 (2015); Katy Sian, Ian Law, and S. Sayyid. "The Media and Muslims in the UK."  Centre for Ethnicity 
and Racism Studies: University of Leeds, 2012.  
8 Anoushivaran Ehteshami, "Making Sense of the Turmoil in the Muslim World," in From Early Warning to 
Early Action? (European Union - European External Action Service, 2008), 399. 
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Perhaps unintentionally, Ehteshami himself falls prey to the common tendency to perceive Islam as 
something ‘other’, a monolithic religion that will ‘unleash’ its forces on an unsuspecting West. 
Ehteshami goes on to state that any notion of legitimate contemporary Islamic issues is often 
overtaken by a radical minority: ‘I am often struck by how defensive the Muslim states are and how 
difficult they seem to find the struggle to defend their own interests. Little room is left for forging a 
concerted effort to defend what are regarded to be legitimate Muslim interests’.9 It is difficult to 
imagine what exactly are legitimate Muslim interests, as these will vary from region to region and 
between countries and different ethnic groups. However, the perception that a radical minority often 
takes over the stage and drowns out other interests is a common one 
Contemporary Islamic issues are covered at length in this thesis. Threads are weaved 
throughout and these issues will be returned to a number of times. However, a broad-brush 
definition that does not appreciate the turbulent, convoluted and multifarious facets of Islam today 
would only be counterproductive. Rather, a narrowing of the focus of Islamic issues in the Global 
South and, indeed, the Australian context will be helpful in setting the scene for this research. 
Muslims in Australia (and arguably those who are refugees even more so) are subjected to a 
very high level of media scrutiny and reporting. This scrutiny produces much shallow and simplistic 
reportage, with many ‘sound-bite characterizations’ of Muslims. Over the last decade, there has 
been an almost hysterical awareness of ‘boat people’ and fears about terrorism, which have been 
actively linked not only by unscrupulous media outlets, but also by the general press and by 
government ministers. Issues surrounding terrorism, radicalised Islamic youth, and concerns 
regarding Muslim assimilation seem to be on an ever-revolving news cycle. These issues are at the 
forefront of Australian politics and foreign policy and whenever things seem to have settled down, 
the merry-go-round comes full circle, recently resulting in new anti-terrorism laws and the prospect 
of banning the burqa in Federal Parliament.  
It is often forgotten in Australia that there is a largely peaceful Muslim world at our 
doorstep. Many of our closest neighbours are Islamic countries, or have significant numbers of 
Muslim inhabitants. Esposito explains: 
 
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Islam is the second largest of the world’s religions. The 1.3 
billion Muslims of the world are spread across more than fifty-six Muslim majority countries and in 
a matter of decades have become a significant presence in Europe and America, where Islam is the 
second and third largest religion, respectively. Despite its global profile, Islam in the popular 
imagination—and often in the media—still tends to be disproportionately identified with the Arab 
world or the Middle East. Yet, in fact, the vast majority of Muslims are in Asia and Africa.10 
                                                
9 Ibid. 
10 John L. Esposito, "Introduction: Islam in Asia in the Twenty-First Century," in Asian Islam in the 21st  
Century, ed. John L. Esposito, John O. Voll, and Osman Bakar (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
3. 
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Australia is firmly located in the Global South, although it sometimes appears that we struggle with 
this notion.11 Although around 75% of Australia’s foreign aid budget is spent in Asia and the 
Pacific,12 it has been argued that our media reportage and common self-perception are somewhat 
Eurocentric.13  
Muslims have been in Australia since the 1800s, the first arrivals being Afghan camel 
drivers who worked in the vast and arid desserts inland. The Ghan railway from Adelaide to Darwin 
is named in their honour. Many of these Asians (almost always called ‘Afghans’, despite their 
varied origins) settled around Alice Springs and in areas of the Northern Territory. The first mosque 
in Australia was built at Maree in South Australia in 1861.14 Under the White Australia policy, non-
European Muslim migrants were denied entry in the early 20th century. However, Muslims of 
European descent were permitted to enter the country. Interestingly, this manifestly unjust social 
policy made a distinction between different sorts of Muslims based on ethnic grounds. This saw a 
wave of Albanian Muslims arrive (the first Albanian mosque was built in Shepparton, Victoria in 
1960, which is now a regional hub for Sudanese migrants).15  
In the post-war years, the Australian government took the view that greater immigration 
would be beneficial for Australia. Under the catchphrase ‘Populate or Perish!’, it accepted millions 
of migrants and displaced persons from Europe. A policy of multiculturalism was adopted in the 
1970s, and the White Australia restrictions were finally reversed.16 This significantly broadened the 
criteria for which types of migrants would be permitted and consequently, there was an influx of 
migrants who had not been previously permitted entry to Australia. This included Lebanese 
Muslims (and Lebanese Christians), and Muslims from Africa, South East and Central Asia and 
from the Middle East. I do not suggest that Somalis are the same as Lebanese or those other Muslim 
arrivals. Indeed, they have different cultures and languages. But I do situate the recent arrival of 
Somalis in the context of the history of Islam in Australia.  
In the late 1970s, the first Vietnamese ‘boat people’ began to arrive in Australia. They were 
fleeing the war in their homeland and their arrival coincided with a period of social change and 
upheaval in Australia. There was much popular opposition to the Vietnam war, and the refugees 
                                                
11 Usha Mahajani, "Is Australia a Part of Asia?," The Australian Quarterly 36, no. 2 (1964); Fergus Hanson, 
"The Lowy Institue Poll 2010," (Australia: Lowy Institue, 2010). 
12 AusAID. "Helping the World’s Poor through Effective Aid: Australia’s Comprehensive Aid Policy 
Framework to 2015–16."  Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2012.  
13 John Hughson, "The Wogs are at it Again’: The Media Reportage of Australian Soccer ‘Riots," Football 
Studies 4, no. 1 (2001): 44. Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the 
Media  (New York: Routledge, 2014). 326-27. 
14 Australian Government. "Afghan Cameleers in Australia."  Canberra: Australian Government, 2009. 
http://www.australia.gov.au/about-australia/australian-story/afghan-cameleers Accessed 14 September 2014. 
15 Murray Mehmet. "Kurbet; The Albanian Experience."  Melbourne: Federation Square, 2009.  
16 Australian Government, "The People of Australia – Australia's Multicultural Policy," Australian 
Government, https://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/settlement-and-multicultural-
affairs/publications/the-people-of-australia-australias-multicultural-policy Accessed 6 December 2014. 
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were allowed to stay. Since then, there have been successive waves of sea-borne refugees, from 
China, Chile and most recently from Sri Lanka, Africa and the Middle East.17 It has only been in 
more recent years that significant numbers of Muslim refugees have begun to attempt the risky 
passage to Australia by boat. This has been a direct response to the conflict that has plagued 
countries like Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan for the last decade. After the September 11, 2001 attacks 
in America, the security of Australian borders became linked to terrorism (although boat arrivals 
were not linked to terrorist attacks in any way previously).18 The then Defence Minister Peter Reith 
warned that unauthorised arrival by boat could be ‘a pipeline for terrorists to come in and use your 
country as a staging post for terrorist activities’.19 While the vast majority of asylum seekers arrive 
in Australia by plane rather than boat (between 2000 and 2010, more than 95% of asylum seekers 
arrived in Australia by plane),20 this equation of boat people with terrorism has also been linked to 
Islam. 
Although the Muslim population of Australia is holding steady at around 2%,21 it receives a 
statistically disproportionate amount of media attention. Some of this attention is positive, but most 
of it is negative.22 Writing in The Australian, Greg Sheridan describes Muslim migration as a ‘huge, 
unregulated Islamic inflow’. He believes that ‘this boatpeople phenomenon is essentially a 
determined Muslim immigration’.23  
In August 2014, the Prime Minister announced a raft of new counter-terrorism measures, 
which included: 
 
• More than $600 million in additional funding over the next four years for agencies involved in 
counter-terrorism activity … This funding responds to reduced agency expenditure on counter-
terrorism since 2009 and supports new programmes to bolster monitoring and disruption activities in 
Australia and overseas; 
• Further legislative measures (in addition to those currently before Parliament) to toughen our 
national security laws. Together, these changes will strengthen our ability to arrest, monitor, 
                                                
17 Australian Government, "Information Paper - Humanitarian Program," ed. Deparment of Immigration and 
Border Protection (Canberra: Australian Government, 2013). 
18 Ibid. 
19 Nic MacLellan, "The Pacific "Non-Solution"," Pacific Journalism Review 8(2002): 147. 
20 Janet Phillips, "Asylum Seekers and Refugees: What are the Facts?," ed. Parliamentary Library of Australia 
(2013). 
21 Australian Bureau of Statistics. "Census 2011."  Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011.  During 
my conversations with various community leaders (Somali and other Muslims as well), they told me of their 
belief that many Muslims do not state their religion in the census, so the actual numbers of Muslims in 
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22 Akbarzadeh and Smith, "The Representation of Muslims and Islam and the Media (The Age and Herald 
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23 Greg Sheridan, "Policy Failure Creating a Monstrous Problem," The Australian 2013. 
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e6frg76f-1226659596004?nk=4de6cdbe93be040bb4c3e7319d115db9 Accessed 18 August 2014. 
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investigate and prosecute returning foreign fighters, prevent extremists departing and broaden the 
criteria for terrorist organisations to include those that encourage terrorist acts.24 
 
Some Australian Muslims have reported being victimised in their homes and neighbourhoods with 
the recent developments regarding Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL).25 In Melbourne’s South East, a terror 
suspect was shot dead by police on September 23, 2014. He was a Melbourne teenager who arrived 
from Afghanistan with his family in the mid 2000s. He had had his passport revoked the previous 
month by ASIO due to security concerns.26 A week later, on September 30, there were raids across 
Melbourne in a joint anti-terrorism operation conducted by the Federal Police, Victoria Police and 
the FBI. One man was charged with funding a terrorist organisation.27 It seems that there is 
mounting social, political and cultural tension between Muslim Australians and Non-Muslim 
Australians.  
 
 
The importance of understanding Islam as a force for configuring identities 
 
This thesis is concerned with the expression of generation 1.5 Somali Muslim identity in Melbourne 
and the conditions under which this identity is formed. It is also interested in the relationships 
between externally constructed representations of Somalis and the way in which they construct their 
identities themselves. In recent years, many studies have been undertaken into various aspects of 
Islam in the Australian and indeed wider Western contexts. A common theme of these studies has 
been media coverage.28 Another area of interest is the relationship between Australian democracy 
and Islam,29 and of course, terrorism.30 While considerable academic efforts have been directed to 
revealing the homogenisation of Muslim identity in dominant discourse, I believe there is a need for 
more scholarship that examines specific ethnic and cultural Muslim communities. This will help to 
                                                
24 Tony Abbott, "Media Release: New Counter-Terrorism Measures for a Safer Australia," ed. Office of the 
Prime Minister (2014). 
25 Mariam Veiszadeh, "Muslim women scared to go outdoors in climate of hate," The Age, October 11, 2014 
2014 
26 Steve Lillibuen, "Numan Haider: from teenager to terror suspect," The Age, September 25, 2014 2014 
27 Pia Akerman and John Ferguson, "Joint Police Anti-Terrorism Raids Launched in Melbourne," The 
Australian, September 30 2014. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/terror/joint-police-antiterrorism-
raids-launched-in-melbourne/story-fnpdbcmu-1227074700670 Accessed 11 May 2013. 
28 For an example of this, see Nahid Kabir, "Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Australian Media, 
2001-2005," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 26, no. 3 (2006). Also, Akbarzadeh and Smith, "The 
Representation of Muslims and Islam and the Media (The Age and Herald Sun)."and Peter Manning, 
"Australians  Imagining Islam," in Muslims and the News Media, ed. E Poole and J.E Richardson (London: 
I.B. Tauris Co, 2004). 
29 See Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason, "Tolerance, Freedom, Justice and Peace?: Britain, Australia and 
Anti-Muslim Racism since 11 September 2001," Journal of Intercultural studies 27, no. 4 (2006); Abdullah 
Saeed, Islam in Australia  (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003). 
30 Basia Spalek and Alia Imtoual, "Muslim Communities and Counter-Terror Responces: “Hard” Approaches 
to Community Engagement in the UK and Australia," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 27, no. 2 (2007).  
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avoid the continued homogenisation of Muslim identity, and contribute to a greater understanding 
of the richness and depth of cultural and religious practice. 
Over the past decade an extensive compendium of literature has been compiled from many 
intellectual spheres regarding Islamic identity. A significant portion of this research seeks to 
examine young Muslims born and raised in western contexts, the types of identities they exhibit, 
and the many and varied influences on their identity construction and manifestation.31 What these 
studies have shown most clearly is that there is a plethora of possible ways of ‘being Muslim’ and 
also that there is no one cohesive Muslim identity with which academics and social commentators 
may engage.32 
Much of the extant literature concerning Muslims living among a broader non-Muslims 
majority is focused in some way on issues surrounding the concept of identity. In a study of young 
British Muslim women, Claire Dwyer states that it is important to understand the many subject 
positions young Muslims occupy as well as the ‘extent to which their everyday lives are constituted 
in and through matrices of power embedded in intersecting discourses and material practices’.33 
While this is necessarily true of subjects in a society, Dwyer highlights the magnitude of this for 
young Muslims compared with other groups. This was very strongly supported by my research. 
One important aspect of identity for generation 1.5ers is that, as a result of rapidly 
developing technology, and the effects of globalisation, there has been a weakening of  ‘all the 
modes of controlling difference premised on territoriality’. There are myriad ways to stay 
connected, even with a country that has been in political turmoil for more than two decades.34 
Somalis in Australia can contact friends and family in Somalia using various forms of technology 
and can fly back home if desired (although they monitor the stability of the country carefully and 
are constrained by financial positions). Perhaps equally importantly, they can access international 
and local news in a language of their choice and can communicate their own news and information 
to members of their community, in Australia, in Somalia and living elsewhere around the world. 
The ease of transnational communications has allowed young Somalis to create their 
identities in Australia, but with some reinforcement from Somalia and Somalis elsewhere. It 
provides them with a direct line to the prevalent cultural, social and religious ideals in Somalia, 
despite the thousands of kilometres that separate their new home from their old home. There are 
many blogs and forums dedicated to young people’s experience of Somali life outside Somalia. 
                                                
31Ally Pregulman and Emily Burke. "Homegrown Terrorism."  Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, 2012. ; Ashlie Perrie and Binneh Minteh. "Home Grown Terrorism in the United States:  
Causes, Affiliations and Policy implications.",  Rutgers University, 2014.  
32 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Jane I. Smith, Muslim Minorities in the West: Visible and Invisible  
(California: Altamira Press, 2002). 
33Claire Dwyer, "Contested Identities: Challenging Dominant Representations of Young British Muslim 
Women," in Cool Places: Geographies of Youth Cultures, ed. T Skelton and G Valentine (London: 
Routledge, 1998). 
34 Stephen Castles, "Migration and Community Formation under Conditions of Globalization," International 
Migration Review 36, no. 4 (2002): 1157. 
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This is a relatively new phenomenon in the refugee experience, as in the past some refugees might 
go for years or even decades without any communication from their birth country. This technology 
was also often discussed in interviews and focus groups. 
Islam is often discussed as a political and religious phenomenon, but it is, of course, also a 
social phenomenon. The outward expression of Islam in society is deeply embedded in the actions 
of its practitioners. In the current complex politico-social context, it is imperative to understand why 
and how people are configuring who they are in relation to Islam to better address the issues raised. 
I chose to examine the combination of factors that contribute to young Somali identity in 
Melbourne. Beginning with their circumstances in Somalia (family, clan, wealth and political 
position). I then asked questions about their journey to Australia (motive, mode of transport, 
duration and stops along the way). Finally, I investigated their settlement in Australia and their 
experience of living in two distinct areas of metropolitan Melbourne (Heidelberg West/Preston and 
North Melbourne/Flemington). 
The research question can be separated into the following two inter-related issues: 
(i) How do generation 1.5 Somalis living in Melbourne aged between 18 and 30 express their 
identity? 
(ii) How does this compare with the representation of generation 1.5 Australian Somalis in 
both the academic literature and the popular media? 
 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
Aside from the introduction and conclusion, this thesis is divided into four main sections. I am 
certainly not the first person to think about questions of identity for young adults, issues facing 
refugees, more particularly the way that power and violence affect them, and how misrepresentation 
of minority groups occurs and is subsequently proliferated. Accordingly, the first section covers the 
theoretical terrain, providing a grounding in theories I believe are most relevant to generation 1.5 
Somalis in Melbourne.  
Firstly I cover some salient points of theories of identity. Drawing on a number of scholars, 
my core argument is that individuals may inhabit numerous, dynamic and fluid identities. 
Examination of the literature points to the many attributes of identity, and the immense importance 
that the political notion of power has in the construction and expression of identity. I also cover 
issues surrounding the conceptualisation of identity, power, discourse and ideology. Next, another 
important theoretical notion — that of social capital — is discussed. I then look at theoretical 
conceptions of violence, drawing a distinction between overt and covert violence. Finally, I outline 
the way in which these notions connect with the actors in question: Generation 1.5 Somali 
Australians in Melbourne today.  
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The second section shifts the focus away from the theoretical knowledge necessary to 
understand such complex issues, and discusses a methodological framework for doing so. These 
methodological considerations include an outline of critical narrative inquiry and the importance of 
critique in ethnographic research. I also detail my experience in obtaining ethics approval and 
discuss the limitations of the study. Next I discuss the process and logistics surrounding the 
fieldwork; my methods of interaction with the respondents (participant observation, community 
member profiles, focus groups, interviews and field notes); and conclude by providing some 
personal reflections on the process. 
The third section seeks to contextualise both Somalia and the Somali people living in 
Melbourne in order to locate my research questions. I detail specific historical and political 
circumstances and demographic information about the community in Melbourne, in order to prepare 
the reader to be able to more fully understand and appreciate the specificities of the empirical data 
to come. Accordingly, I begin by examining the ‘official’ version of Somali history, and then take a 
closer look at some contested issues. I look in detail at some of the violence and conflict that has 
occurred since independence was achieved in 1960 (in Somalia and connected with Somalis living 
abroad). I also examine the ways in which violence is often attributed to Somalis both in Somalia 
and abroad by tracing how such representations have been constructed over centuries, and the ways 
in which Somalis are represented and misrepresented in terms of violence today. Next I focus on 
those who have left Somalia, and re-settled in Australia. I contextualise the Somali migration story 
by discussing the broader phenomenon of migration to Australia. What follows is some 
demographic information regarding Somalis in Melbourne. This information helps to situate the 
specific findings from my study.  
Finally, section four comprises three chapters, which detail the findings of the study. The 
first chapter deals with overt violence that has recently taken place in Somalia and the way it has 
been interpreted by the respondents. I discuss events and situations that have affected Somalis in 
Melbourne, reflect on these, and examine whether or not they are covert forms of violence. Next I 
turn to the descriptions (in their own words) of violence that have affected generation 1.5 Somalis 
in Melbourne, and finally examine the idea of ‘radicalisation’ and the way in which generation 1.5 
Somalis conceptualise it. 
The second findings chapter focuses on Islam as part of the lived experience of my 
participants, and the way that they think of the clan system. I draw a distinction between the ways 
the respondents engage with Islam in a very practical sense (observing dietary requirements, daily 
prayers, regular worship) and the way that their knowledge of the clan system, while quite 
sophisticated, is mostly theoretical, and not part of every day practice. 
The final findings chapter firstly deals with the nature of the contested identities occupied 
by generation 1.5 Somalis in Melbourne, by highlighting the multiple (and often competing) facets 
that influence the configurations of identity expression. Next I discuss the value of education in the 
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Somali community and the perspectives of generation 1.5 on the importance of education. 
Education is something that is prized by the Somali Australian community, and consequently 
carries a great deal of expectation. Lastly, I discuss the place of women in the Somali community, 
and how this adds another compounding factor to the contested sphere that informs generation 1.5 
expressions of identity.  
In the conclusion of the thesis, I offer my own concluding reflections and recommend some 
further avenues of research. 
 
 
I  THE THEORETICAL TERRAIN  
 
Framing of identities: power, social capital and violence 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This section examines the salient points of some theories of identity. Drawing on a number of 
scholars, my core argument is that individuals may inhabit numerous, dynamic and fluid identities. 
This is in direct response to the notion that there is a stable and unified self that can be “discovered” 
through introspection. Examination of the literature points to the many attributes of identity, and the 
immense importance that the political notion of power has in the construction and expression of 
identity. Understanding various forms of power and their social manifestations, I argue, is central to 
understanding social influences on generation 1.5 Somali identity. The section thus covers 
important theoretical terrain for the research: issues sounding the conceptualisation of identity, 
power, discourse and ideology. Next, another important theoretical notion — that of social capital 
— is discussed. Another key theme of this thesis is that of violence — the ways in which it is 
understood and attributed to certain groups or individuals. Finally, I outline the way in which these 
notions connect with the actors in question: Generation 1.5 Somali Australians in Melbourne today.  
In this section, I cover a number of theoretical ideas that may, at first glance, seem slightly 
disparate. However, these ideas have all been selected in order to present a coherent and connected 
picture. As will become clear, I posit that at the centre of my schema, an individual inhabits a world 
constituted by complex and multifaceted identities. These can be broken accordingly into 
situational, social and personal identities, each with their own potentially granular categories. A 
level out from the centre, there is a world of social capital, which is effectively the 
operationalisation of a further conceptual level — that of a Foucauldian network of power relations, 
which permeate and filter through to the social capital level. Power, discourse and ideology are 
expressed through concrete examples in terms of social capital. My aim is that all of this becomes 
clearer throughout the section as I discuss this schema. 
 
 
  
  24 
Conceptualising identity in the Islamic context 
 
Scholars have been challenging and problematising the notion that individuals have one fixed and 
immutable identity for many decades now. Identity theories have traced an interesting trajectory 
over the centuries — from the pre-enlightenment notion that identity was conferred by external 
(moral) authorities, to the post-enlightenment idea that the identity was more personal and internal, 
and finally to the commonly accepted idea today that identity is, in many senses, socially 
constructed.1 There is also the extra tension between the identity an individual wishes to inhabit and 
express, and the identity, that is imposed, allowed, or conferred on that individual by others.  
In my own reading, I found John Hewitt’s work a useful starting point for conceiving of 
multiple faceted identities. Hewitt has elaborated a tri-partite definition of identity comprising of: 
situational identity, social identity, and personal identity.2 Situational identities are those which are 
predominant in face-to-face interactions with others. This concept is certainly not a new one and 
was described as early as 1937 by William Isaac Thomas. Thomas wrote that upon entering the 
presence of others, we mutually construct a definition of the situation.3 The ability to define our 
own and others’ situational identities enables us to know how to act (and how not to act). It also 
informs our expectations and interpretations of behavior, both our own, and others’.4 We reveal our 
situational identities in various ways, especially through language and appearance. This allows 
those we are interacting with to define or place us in the given social situation.5 Situational 
identities are necessarily in a state of constant flux, and are able to change rapidly in dynamic, 
interactive environments. However, according to Hewitt, some aspects of identity are more stable 
and enduring.6 Our appearance and ethnic identification are clear examples of this. 
As we move across situational identities, we define social identities for ourselves and others 
based on group memberships. These social identities remain relatively stable across different 
situational contexts. The membership groups are most often derived from ascribed characteristics 
and socially constructed categories such as gender, ethnicity, age, religion and class. While they 
provide meanings and labels that define who we are, they depend upon mutual recognition by 
                                                
1 Philip Riley, Language, Culture and Identity: An Ethnolinguistic Perspective  (London: Continuum, 2007); 
Charles Taylor, The Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989); Amelie Rorty, The Identities of Persons  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
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2 John Hewitt, Self and Society: A Symbolic Interactionist Social Psychology  (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 
2003). 98-113. 
3 William I Thomas, Primitive Behaviour  (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937). 
4 Kevin D Vryan, Patricia A Adler, and Peter Adler, "Identity," in Handbook of Symbolic Interactionism, ed. 
Larry T Reynolds and Nancy J Herman-Kinnery (New York: AltaMira Press, 2003), 368. 
5 Gregory P  Stone, "Appearance and the Self," in Human Behavior and Social Processes, ed. Arnold M Rose 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), 92. 
6John Hewitt, Dilemmas of the American Self  (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). 
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ourselves and at least some others.7 
Personal identity describes the efforts of an individual to construct and preserve an 
‘autobiography’ or ‘life story’, which helps establish a sense of difference from others.8 Erving 
Goffman explains that personal identity involves distinctive traits of individuals, including their 
name and appearance, personal history and information, personality characteristics, and their special 
place in a particular kinship network.9 Jan Stets goes a step further and demarcates personal identity 
as the identity that defines us as unique individuals.10 While the distinctions between situational, 
social, and personal identity are a useful conceptual tool, I do not mean to suggest that these forms 
of identity are mutually exclusive. In any given exchange or relationship, all three or any 
combination of these identities is relevant to the thinking and behavior of participants.11 
In a particularly influential formulation, Stuart Hall argues that we should not discuss one 
identity, but rather focus on identities because in his view, there are ‘processes that constitute and 
continuously re-form the subject’. Identities can therefore be understood as ‘temporary 
attachments’, which allow for the continual re-articulation of the self. Hall describes identities as 
‘narratives’: the ‘stories we tell about ourselves.’12 These are contingent on location (especially 
pertinent for migrants and refugees) and context and this contextuality leads Hall to describe 
identities as ‘sliding’.  
For Hall, identities are attached to more than one particular marker or classification 
(religious, ethnic, national etc…).13 Amartya Sen also deals with the importance of a singular 
method of classifying people by linking their identity to one particular marker.14 In describing the 
riots that occurred during the last years of the British Raj in Bengal, he tells the moving story of a 
man staggering into the garden where he was playing, bleeding profusely and begging for water. 
The 11-year-old Amartya yelled for his parents and the man was rushed to hospital. But it was too 
late and he could not be saved. The victim, Kader Mia was a Muslim day-labourer who had been 
stabbed to death by Hindus. His only crime was his religion. Sen describes his utter confusion at 
this horrific event. Why should people who have lived peacefully side-by-side suddenly turn on 
each other in a conflict that would kill many thousands? How could the poor day-labourer be seen 
as having only one identity — a Muslim who belonged to an ‘enemy’ community — when he 
                                                
7 Peter J  Burke, "Introduction," in Advances in Identity Theory and Research, ed. Peter J Burke, et al. (New 
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Carter, James Donald, and Judith Squires (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1995), 65-66. 
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belonged to many other communities as well? ‘For a bewildered child,’ Sen writes, ‘the violence of 
identity was extraordinarily hard to grasp. It is not particularly easy for a still bewildered elderly 
adult.’15 Similarly, Veena Das has described how violence which might have once been considered 
brutal, extraordinary and unexpected can become the norm when certain aspects of identity are 
negated or elevated.16 
In discussing the construction of Muslim identities in Mali, Brenner describes identity as ‘a 
process of naming: naming of self, naming of others, naming by others’.17 In his work there is a 
consistent emphasis on the nature of identity as ‘constructed and reconstructed by self and/or others 
through continuing actions and discourse in a political context’.18 Louis Brenner describes action 
and discourse as religiously inspired and also as motivated by social, political and economic 
systems and incentives.19 Thus, the process of ‘naming’ of both individuals and groups takes place 
against the background of the broader socio-economic context. Given the influencing factors on the 
construction and formation of identity, the investigation of the dynamics behind the labels people 
give to themselves and each other is able to provide insight into processes of social transformation. 
One major limit to Brenner’s notion of identity as ‘naming’ (which he uses chiefly due to pragmatic 
considerations) is that it does not account for the many complexities that comprise the issue of 
identity and identification, rather it presents the notion of ‘labelling’ as a working definition of the 
concept of identity.  
Yuval-Davis discusses the establishment of cultural identities by refugees in their adopted 
homelands, and the various influences that affect this in great detail. She describes how factors such 
as gender, ethnicity, class and the very fact of being a refugee are used as markers to identify where 
an individual stands in terms of the ‘grids of power relations in society’.20 Like Hall, she highlights 
the importance of the  ‘stories people tell themselves and others about who they are (and who they 
are not).’21 She believes that ‘constructions of self and identity can ... be forced on people’.22  
The definitions above have focused inward from the standpoint of individuals in terms of 
individual agency, and the power of others to label identities. Another important standpoint is that 
of defining processes or social forces — that is, the effect that the outside world has on our constant 
creation and recreation of identity. This theme is taken up shortly, but it is worth discussing the 
notion of identity construction as defined in relation to what one is not. Anthropologist Thomas 
Hylland Eriksen does not speak of identity. Rather, he terms the process ‘identification’ because 
                                                
15 Ibid., 173. 
16 Veena Das, Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary  (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2006). 
17Louis Brenner, "Constructing Muslim Identities in Mali," in Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-
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18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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identities are dynamic and exist only in relation to others.23 This idea can be taken further to the 
argument that we can only see ourselves by interpreting the words and actions of others towards us. 
That is, we see ourselves as we think others see us. Thus, the idea of self is distinctly social.24 
Numerous investigations of the role of religion in maintaining group identity and solidarity 
have been conducted, particularly in the case of migrants and refugees living in diaspora.25 Many of 
these studies examine the nexus between religion and ethnic identity. Additionally, many scholars 
have acknowledged and documented the enduring importance of religion in the preservation of 
cultural and ethnic traditions.26 Religion is understood to support the adjustment of first generation 
immigrants to a new host society, and providing a source of identity (although, often highly 
contested) for the second generation.  
Different migrant groups, undoubtedly, conceive of and integrate their religious and ethnic 
identities in distinctive ways.27 Some communities emphasize religious identity more than their 
ethnic foundation, whereas others focus on ethnic identity and use religious institutions in the main 
to preserve cultural traditions and ethnic boundaries.28 Amit-Talai proposes a ‘transnationalism’ in 
which there is a bistatal connection between the homeland identity and the host country identity that 
spans cultural, political and geographic borders.29 
Immigration itself has at times been described as a theologizing experience, as migrants and 
refugees are faced with stress, alienation, and confusion that result from their arrival in a new 
country, which in turn encourages them to an increased religiosity.30 Thus, we can see the building 
of religious institutions and the establishment of familiar social and cultural activities within them 
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as an attempt to resolve adjustment issues in the new host society.31 This can lead to a situation 
where religion assumes greater importance in the receiving country than it was granted before 
arrival. 
It has also been contended that religion is used as a marker of personal and social 
distinctiveness in a multicultural context.32 As strong religious orientation is becoming less common 
in pluralistic and secular societies, members of a particular faith group may become more conscious 
of their traditions and transmit their beliefs, values, and behaviors more resolutely.33 Religious dress 
(particularly pertinent in the case of Islam), practices, and organisational affiliations serve as 
identity markers that help to promote individual self-awareness and preserve group cohesion.34 This 
is how religious, ethnic, and national heritage is displayed and thus maintained.35  
In this way, religious expression may ease the tensions between refugees and mainstream 
society in their new homeland by acting as a clearly understood identity ‘marker’.36 It is possible 
that ethnic variation will becomes less problematic when individuals define themselves first and 
foremost in religious terms. This will enable diverse communities to be brought together through 
shared worship.37 Membership in some kind of religious organization has also been shown to have 
psychological and social benefits. These include but are not limited to: economic opportunities, 
connection to community networks, access to educational resources and a sense of peer trust and 
support.38 These benefits all reduce social isolation for migrants and refugees.39 One can posit that 
as these benefits increase, individuals will be more likely to affiliate religiously.  
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Power, discourse and ideology 
 
The formation, expression and representation of identity are intricately connected to notions of 
power. Understanding various forms of power and its manifestations is central to understanding the 
forces that inform generation 1.5 Somali identity. Many theorists have written on the notion of 
power, and its connection with identity construction.40 For many years now, the social sciences have 
looked to the work of Michel Foucault, whilst drawing on earlier influences (such as Friedrich 
Nietzsche), and later additions (such as to Slavoj Žižek) to Foucault’s work. Power is intricately 
connected with human activity. In Foucault’s words ‘Power is everywhere; not because it embraces 
everything, but because it comes from everywhere’.41  
Foucault’s discussion of power is weaved into many of his monographs. From his 
discussion of the birth of the prison in Discipline and Punish, to his research into the history of the 
notion of madness in Madness and Civilization, to his History of Sexuality and even his 
Archaeology of Knowledge, the theme of power has had a lasting effect on academia. For Foucault, 
there is no Power (capital ‘P’) in the sense of absolute, objective hierarchy. Although smaller 
hierarchies may exist, power is better characterised by a complex web of power relations. The most 
insidious form of power is not the direct power of physical domination. Rather, it is the domination 
that is achieved through the expression of normalised discourse and other discursive formations. 
 For Foucault: ‘One needs to be nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and not a 
structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a 
complex strategical situation in a particular society.’42 Similarly, domination is not ‘that solid and 
global kind of domination that one person exercises over others, or one group over another, but the 
manifold forms of domination that can be exercised within society.’43 Foucault looks for intricate 
expressions of power through insidious means.44 McHoul and Grace elucidate this further, by 
outlining that Foucault’s conception of power is intelligible in terms of the way it is expressed: 
 
Many different forms of power exist in our society: legal administrative, economic, military, and so 
forth. What they have in common is a shared reliance on certain techniques or methods of 
application, and all draw some authority by referring to scientific ‘truths’ … these techniques … like 
any other form of applied knowledge, have a history—and this is what allows for the differentiation 
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of systems of power relations. Foucault’s point is to stress that there are no necessary or universal 
forms for the exercise of power to take place: our society bears witness to the production of quite 
specific practice which characterise the ways in which power relations function within it.45 
 
For migrants, experience of the expression of power does not necessarily have to be in terms of 
domination. Small ‘p’ power is articulated in more subtle ways. They may be more explicit, such as 
working or reporting conditions on visas, or implicit, such as shopkeepers in a new country not 
understanding their accent. Discourse and power are also closely related and the entire immigration 
trajectory is laden with discursive practices and power imbued discourses. In Australia, the 
discourse surrounding the threat of radicalisation, and associations made with Islam, have resulted 
in individuals of “Islamic appearance” being harassed more by airport security than Caucasians, for 
instance.46  
Foucault covers the question of power primarily in his investigations into criminality and 
sexuality, but his critique is more general in its applicability. Processes of normalisation, occurring 
through discursive practices, result in disciplinary power and the proliferation of ‘truths’. New 
categories are created, which directly result in an ideological change of configuration in people’s 
individual identities. Disciplinary power, for Foucault, produces individuality. Power is creative. 
Difference is highlighted when there is a normalised state of affairs in society. Foucault explains 
that the notion of personality derives from the expression of power: 
 
… as power becomes more anonymous and more functional … those upon whom it is exercised tend 
to be more strongly individualized … In a system of discipline, the child is more individualized than 
the adult, the patient more than the healthy man, the madman and the delinquent more than the 
normal and the non-delinquent.47 
 
McHoul and Grace explain that ‘for Foucault, the question of subjection, and the political 
struggles associated with “identities”, constitute the most important issues of our time.’ Indeed 
although they were writing over 20 years ago, I believe that this statement is more true than ever 
and it is a foundational concept within my own research. Notions of ‘being’ and ‘subjectivity’ are 
closely connected with political practice and social life. ‘By studying subjection in terms of its 
imbrication within power relations, Foucault was unrivalled in drawing out the full political and 
historical dimensions of this philosophical concern’.48 For Foucault, the human subject is itself an 
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effect of subjection. ‘“Subjection” refers to particular, historically located, disciplinary processes 
and concepts which enable us to consider ourselves as individual subjects and which constrain us 
from thinking otherwise. These processes and concepts (or “techniques”) are what allow the subject 
to “tell the truth about itself”’.49  
The issues raised by Foucault, concerning power, discourse and identity, form a well-
established framework for examining individuals and groups of people. Social forces influence the 
way that people conceive of themselves through the discursive categories available to them and the 
discourse disseminated by many channels. Power has both a direct and indirect effect in creating 
and reinforcing certain types of subjects.  
A person’s capacity for perceiving themselves is necessarily informed by established social 
practices. However, it is difficult (or in fact counterproductive) to attempt a stratification of 
ideological expression; power is always expressed through multiple layers of relations. This is to 
say that people are always conceiving of themselves in relation to the categories available to them. 
For example, the media creates, proliferates, and reinforces notions of subjects such as ‘illegal 
immigrants’, ‘boat people, ‘queue jumpers’, and so on. This process has the potential to become a 
marker of a collective identity, in the same way that groups of marginalised individuals in the past 
have taken on board an original derogatory term and made it something to be proud of (such as 
‘Wog’, ‘Nigger’, etc.). When the media perpetuates the notion that Somali migrants are violent 
Islamic fundamentalists, a powerful and distinct category is continued. Somalis are free to decide 
whether they choose to define themselves in such terms or antithetically. However, the important 
point here is that they involuntarily consider themselves against the created category. The 
connection of Islam with terrorism is now embedded in modern Australian society; the formation of 
categories disseminates through multiple avenues and exemplifies the network of power that can 
radiate from discourses.  
Generation 1.5 Somalis in Melbourne grow up in a culture where many around them (not 
only individuals within society, but also structures of the society — media, immigration 
bureaucracy, schools, etc…) view them in terms of the categories prevalent; and if not now, then 
with the potential of becoming a certain subject with certain properties (such as radicalised). These 
conceptions do not stem from the subject a priori, nor do they cause the subject to respond in a 
certain way. They are, however, intricately tied up with the subject’s perception of the world and 
orientation within the world and how he or she is able to orient themselves with respect to the 
power relations. The subject does not grow up in a social vacuum. 
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The importance of social capital  
 
The notion of social capital has been popularised in the recent past to the extent that it often forms 
part of lay discussion regarding identity. This popularisation has blurred the boundaries somewhat 
between social capital and broader ideas of social connectedness. Social capital seems to be 
understood currently as an overwhelmingly positive force that enables social interaction and gain. 
However, conceptualising social capital in this way limits the scope of analysis. Specifically, it is 
important to emphasise the inherent power and inequality that is present in social capital as 
conceived by Pierre Bourdieu.  
Social capital is another way of describing the webs of relations that exist in society. Social 
actors produce and distribute social capital and those with greater social capital are more easily able 
to advance their own interests, while it is more difficult for those without social capital to do so. It 
is based on mutual recognition (much like identity and power are) and groups transform objective 
differences into symbolic differences and classifications. This enables the creation of symbolic 
distinctions that differentiate groups of people. It is a dynamic and fluid concept of human relations 
and this makes it very difficult to quantify and measure.  
Bourdieu defines social capital as ‘the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition’.50 This means that social capital can be found 
in any social connection or interaction with others. This is most obviously achieved through 
membership of associations, participation in the workplace and public and government institutions, 
but equally through more informal networking and interaction. It is not the same as, but intimately 
connected with class structures. After all, Bourdieu was interested in how society is reproduced and 
how the dominant classes retain their position. 
What is crucial to Bourdieu’s definition of social capital is that it is produced by social 
actors for their own benefit and distributed in unequal measure. It is therefore a means by which the 
powerful may further their own interests, often at the cost of those with less. However, it is 
important to state that while social capital is pursued for individual or mutual benefit, this pursuit is 
not always a conscious choice. It may equally arise as a result of activities engaged in by actors for 
other purposes.  
Bourdieu’s concept is profoundly linked to notions of class, and greatly emphasizes 
conflicts and the function of power (social relations that allow an actor to advance their own 
personal interests). There are three dimensions to Bourdieu’s notion of capital; economic, cultural 
and social capital. These three resources are legitimized and made effective through the mediation 
of symbolic capital. This means that overall, social capital is a resource in social struggles that are 
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played out in different arenas. Thus, the way actors experience social capital will be markedly 
different depending on their gender, age, class or ethnic background.  
One of the key foundations of Bourdieu’s sociology in general is his concept of society as a 
plurality of social fields. At the heart of each of these fields are forms of social capital, which define 
positions and potentialities of the actors in that field. 
 
The field of power is a field of forces defined by the structure of the existing balance of forces 
between forms of power, or between different species of capital. It is also simultaneously a field of 
struggles for power among the holders of different forms of power. It is a space of play and 
competition in which social agents and institutions which all possess the determinate quantity of 
specific capital … sufficient to occupy the dominant positions within their respective fields … 
confront one another in strategies aimed at preserving or transforming this balance of forces…51 
 
One important characteristic of social capital is that it is based on mutual cognition and 
recognition. It is from this basis that social capital is transformed into symbolic capital.52 Bourdieu 
argues that groups transform objective differences into symbolic differences and classifications. In 
this way, groups are able to create symbolic distinctions that differentiate them from other groups. 
For Bourdieu, it is precisely these symbolic differences, facilitated by social capital, that actualize 
and legitimate class differences. Otherwise, the social classes are simply classes on paper. 
‘Symbolic capital ... is nothing other than capital, in whatever form, when perceived by an agent 
endowed with categories of perception arising from the internalization (embodiment) of the 
structure of its distribution, i.e. when it is known and recognized as self-evident.’53 
Bourdieu’s is not the only definition of social capital. In contrast to Bourdieu’s focus on 
relations of power, Robert D. Putnam, for example, has a largely serviceable concept of social 
capital. He positions social capital as the instrument that allows a region to have a functional 
economic system and a high level of political integration.54 Putnam’s concept of social capital has 
three domains: moral obligations and norms, social values and social networks. Accrual of social 
capital, in Putnam’s view, in inherently positive, and in his conception, social capital is a force that 
permeates society and can be equally harnessed by all. This is in direct contrast to Bourdieu, who 
views social capital as instrumental in reproducing social inequality. 
For Putnam, trust is a crucial tenet in social organization and social capital. This means that 
regulation of social relations between actors is voluntary. According to Putnam, this trust creates 
reciprocity and voluntary associations, and the associations and reciprocity strengthen and create 
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more trust.55 In Putnam’s imagining of social capital, the capital is inherently self-reinforcing and 
cumulative. Putnam describes vicious circles, which are the result of distrust and individuals 
avoiding their civic duties, and thus disorder. Virtuous circles, on the other hand, are expressed in 
profound cooperation, increasing trust and civic activity.56  
I prefer to conceptualize social capital in the way that Bourdieu does. In this way, social 
capital is not something discrete that can be accumulated, rather it is a pervasive force that social 
actors are all subjected to, knowingly or unknowingly. This can have both positive and negative 
consequences for social actors. It seems that most social theorists can agree that social capital at its 
very core relates to the size and availability of networks that a social actor can access. It is ‘the 
ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social 
structures’.57 These may be qualitatively different, for example, with a large criminal, street or 
homeless network as opposed to a large ruling class. Furthermore, an essential characteristic of 
social capital is that it is relational.  
 
Whereas economic capital is in people’s bank accounts and human capital is inside their heads, 
social capital inheres in the structure of their relationships. To possess social capital, a person must 
be related to others, and it is these others, not himself, who are the actual source of his or her 
advantage.58 
 
So social capital exists only when it is shared. 
Even though social capital is accessed differently by particular social actors, it can be seen 
as a collective phenomenon. For Bourdieu, bureaucratic organization is a tool which concentrates 
social capital. It does so by converting numerous members into an institutionalized, organized 
accumulation of social capital. Thus, the establishment of a voluntary or community association is 
also an investment which aims to create networks of relations in order to accumulate social 
capital.59 
A number of studies, over the past 30 or so years, have addressed the issue of the 
measurement of social capital. For example, Ronald Inglehart led a team of sociologists to create 
the World Values Survey since 1981.60  This study examines the variables of social capital; 
including trust and membership of associations. At around this time, John Sudarsky developed an 
instrument called The Barometer of Social Capital in Colombia. This instrument was based partly 
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in the World Values Survey.61 
Considering these metrics, it is important to note that social capital has been critiqued for its 
economic view of the subject.62  It has been assimilated into the spheres of economics and 
development, and the apparent divide between the social and the economic has been problematised 
and reconceptualised.63 It has been argued that social capital can be conceived in terms of a 
Foucauldian genealogy of the social.64 In this sense, William Walters argues that social capital can 
be viewed not just ‘as a way of representing social and political space, but in terms of its possible 
constitutive effects. It is about how social capital discourse seeks to make the social field calculable 
and amenable to practices of government’.65 Social capital is thus used in ways to make society 
calculable, and consequently, governable.66 This fits with Putnam’s concept of social capital as a 
measurable, positive force. 
In the Australian context, Onyx and Bullen developed a framework to measure social 
capital for community organisations to assess themselves and their work.67 They identified a 
number of factors that contributed to building social capital, including local community 
participation, feelings of trust and safety and neighbourhood connections. Ramon Spaaij has applied 
the concept of social capital to the Somali community in Melbourne using sport as his focus. Spaaij 
highlights the distinction between bonding, bridging and linking social capital where bonding social 
capital refers to ‘social ties between persons such as relatives, kin, and close friends’. It promotes 
homogeneity and particularised trust due to its inward looking nature.68 Bridging social capital 
denotes ties between like people who are not as close, such as loose friendships and work 
colleagues. This type of capital is associated with resources that allow individuals to generate 
broader identities and reciprocity.69 Linking social capital refers to ties between people who do not 
inhabit the same social situations, such as those entirely outside a local community. This capital 
enables individuals to access a wider range of resources ‘including from formal institutions’.70 
Spaaij explains that for Melbourne Somalis, participation in an ethno-specific football club 
allows them a means to escape (even temporarily) social situations that may be fraught with tension, 
                                                
61 John Sudarsky, " Clientelism and the Failure Complex; the role of the state in the wanning of cooperatives, 
an Action-research project" (Harvard University, 1980). 
62 William Walters, "Social Capital and Political Sociology: Re-imagining Politics? ," Sociology 36, no. 2 
(2002). 
63 Ibid. 
64 Jacques Donzelot, "The Mobilization of Society," in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed. 
Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Miller Peter (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Nikolas 
Rose, "The Death of the Social? Reconfiguring the Territory of Government," Economy and Society 
25(1996). 
65 Walters, "Social Capital and Political Sociology: Re-imagining Politics? ," 388. 
66 Ibid., 378. 
67 Jenny Onyx and Paul Bullen, Measuring Social Capital in Five Communities in NSW: A Practitioner's 
Guide  (Coogee, NSW: Management Alternatives, 2005 [1997]). 
68 Ramón Spaaij, "Beyond the Playing Field: Experiences of Sport, Social Capital and Integration among 
Somalis in Australia," Ethnic and Racial Studies 35, no. 9 (2012): 1522. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 1523. 
  36 
and to be among club members with similar ethnic backgrounds. This creates a safe and relaxed 
environment for members to come together and strengthen their already established friendships. 
Many of the young people associated with the club have close friends there, and indeed, became 
involved with the club because of their friends already playing there. Their participation allows 
them to rebuild social networks that were disrupted by their experiences as refugees and the war in 
Somalia. Their social encounters at the club allow them to discuss family and work issues and help 
each other in everyday life situations.71  
The issue of bridging social capital is also addressed in Spaaij’s study of the Melbourne 
Giants club. Although the majority of the players and position-holders in the club are Somali, there 
are some players and spectators from other backgrounds (mostly other African countries such as 
Eritrea, Kenya and more). Participants in the study argue that social interaction is easier for other 
Africans in the group because they are similar in ethnicity and colour and are able to feel 
comfortable together. This is also the case with religion, with a shared Muslim identity also binding 
members of the club. This focus on perceived similarities is an important aspect of bridging social 
capital as well as bonding social capital.72  
 
 
Reading violence: considering the overt and covert dimensions of violence  
 
I now turn to an exploration of some of the conceptions of violence advanced by anthropologists, 
ethnographers and social theorists during the modern era. Both overt and covert notions of violence 
are examined. I discuss in brief the different types of violence that are expressed in response to 
particular situations and circumstances.  
Overt violence is perhaps the most obvious form of violence. It is often described as 
physical aggression, and is expressed in explicit and direct forms. Historically, physical violence 
has been widely practiced, for various reasons. Louis Knafla outlines: 
 
Violence was endemic in early modern Europe, from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean, and from the 
Urals to the British Isles. Serfs and peasants wielded knives and staffs, most gentlemen and 
merchants wore swords and/or pistols, and nobles and their numerous retainers were similarly armed. 
Even teenaged students carried knives in their schools, brawled in the streets, and operated as 
gangs.73 
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Historians argue that in Europe at least, the practice of open violence peaked in the 1600s, before 
declining greatly in the mid-seventeenth century, and then again significantly in the mid-eighteenth 
century.74 
One prominent political and philosophical commentator during the 17th century was 
Thomas Hobbes. His concept of violence had its roots in the primeval war of everyman against 
everyman. Writing in 1651 at the peak of the practice of open violence in Europe, Hobbes described 
nature as a state of war until the influence of civil society takes hold. At the time of writing, he 
noted that the savage people of America still lived in the grip of this primeval war, not yet having 
been civilised.75 For Hobbes, the state of nature is anarchy until we are collectively organised. He 
used a description of life without state organisation — ‘nasty, brutish, and short’ 76  — as 
justification for the supreme authority of the state. This Hobbesian political realism holds that once 
states are established, the individual drive for power becomes the rationale for the states’ behaviour. 
This, in turn, leads to attempts to dominate other states and individuals. Hobbes’ views have 
inspired modern neoliberal thought and often frame the way in which international relations are 
discussed.77 
Other observers have noted the civilising influence of the state, although perhaps not in 
such strident terms. Norbert Elias, for example, argued that rulers disarmed courtiers and wealthy 
classes in order to protect their own interests. Thus, violence was no longer the primary means of 
dispute resolution in early modern Europe for these classes. Elias famously argued that there has 
been a prolonged trend towards the pacification of civil society, which is linked to the phenomenon 
of state control of the mechanisms of violence and the increase in civil elements of society as 
opposed to military ones.78 Elias’ ‘civilizing process’ is particularly interesting in terms of my own 
study because of the emphasis it places on the transition from medieval to modern societies and the 
monopoly the modern state now holds on legitimate violence. According to Elias, because of this 
monopoly, commerce, urbanisation, wealth and perhaps most importantly, taxation developed and 
flourished. Taxation allowed the formation of large armies and further property and goods seizure, 
but also facilitated the development of a legal system, which could resolve disputes without 
physical violence.79  
Other authors have also noted the decline in violence in parallel with the increase in state 
control: 
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Without social support, many traditional forms of personal violence inevitably declined. At the same 
time, growth in the state’s control of violence through policing… and weapons licensing had a 
profound effect on communities, limiting opportunities for violence. Finally, with the decay of a 
popular culture grounded in violence and new expectations of social comportment enforced by the 
state’s judicial system, both group and interpersonal violence receded into the background.80 
 
However, it is difficult to apply these accounts of a decline in violence to the African 
context (apart from perhaps, the Ottoman empire’s influence in Africa). Indeed, overt expressions 
of violence in the Islamic world have been reported on and disseminated throughout the 20th and 
into the 21st century. As Rashied Omar notes; ‘In the contemporary period, Islam is frequently 
depicted as predisposed to conflict and violence’.81 While this is arguably only true of some parts of 
the Islamic world (it is worth remembering that vast numbers of Muslims reside peaceably in South 
East Asia and other places), it certainly seems to reflect the situation in Somalia. 
Nuruddin Farah is a well-respected Somali novelist who has documented the naked 
violence in Somalia, (particularly on the streets of Mogadishu) over more than three decades. In his 
fictional works, which are strongly rooted in Somali politics, he describes the gun-toting, qat-
chewing youth who are ready to extinguish human life without provocation and the comfortable, 
corrupt bureaucrats who make orders that carry no concern for civilians and their wellbeing. His 
descriptions of Somalia, while showing the anarchy and chaos present in all facets of life, also focus 
on the individuals who are able to manipulate the chaotic situation for their benefit.82  
 Farah’s work shows us just how difficult it would be difficult to apply Elias’ idea of a 
‘civilising influence’ to Somalia, as there has not been a consistent central governing system of 
organise and control citizens. Indeed, there is a vocal group of scholars and commentators who 
argue that stateless societies are highly brutal places. Writing in The New Republic, a very 
conservative American political journal, Steven Pinker states: 
 
Pre-state societies were far more violent than our own… in tribal violence, the clashes are more 
frequent, the percentage of men in the population who fight is greater, and the rates of death per 
battle are higher… If the wars of the twentieth century had killed the same proportion of the 
population that die in the wars of a typical tribal society, there would have been two billion deaths, 
not 100 million.83 
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This idea is of particular interest to me for four reasons. The first is that it seems to be an 
almost exact echo of the Hobbesian claims, which are more than 350 years old. Secondly, as 
discussed in section three, there is much to suggest that in fact Somalia in past centuries has been a 
remarkably safe place, due to the organisation and social control exerted by the clans.84  While it 
does seem that much of this social order was kept by the judicious use of violence (punishments for 
taking a life, or for theft or damage of property, for example), this is the sort of violence that 
modern states have also utilised in order to keep peace and order. Thirdly, Pinker’s assertion that 
stateless and tribal societies have higher rates of violence relies exclusively on one simple statistical 
marker: the number of deaths on the battlefield. It does not take into account the myriad other 
violence types that exist, or indeed the state sanctioned deaths of many civilians that occur every 
year. Equally, one could consider those displaced by conflict, or those who suffer the effects of 
climate change as measurable forms of violence to add to a statistical figure. Finally, Pinker refers 
to ‘pre-state societies’ that have been shaped by powerful states, rather than at a time when they 
were more autonomous and functioned quite differently. 
It is possible to think of many forms of overt violence — such as military violence, intimate 
partner and domestic violence, child sexual abuse, revolutionary violence, and armed violent 
conflict. Although there has been a shift in the study of violence towards more covert expressions of 
violence over the last century or so, the overt forms of violence remain an important dimension for 
investigating the conceptions and experiences of violence in generation 1.5 Somalis. Overt violence 
is a reality in all geographical locations and post-modern studies that attempt, even implicitly, to 
downplay the primacy and brutality of overt violence miss the mark. Indeed, I found in my research 
that many Somalis in Melbourne would not return to Somalia because of the overt violence there. 
While violence is often characterised by physical force involving injury to persons or 
property, scholars are increasingly interested in a broader use of the term, extending 
 
… beyond the overtly physical to covert, psychological, and institutional violence. In this broader 
sense racism, sexism, economic exploitation, and ethnic and religious persecution all are possible 
examples of violence; that is, all involve constraints that injure and violate persons, even if not 
always physically.85 
 
Covert expressions of violence are equally important for this thesis. In their impressive 
edited collection Violence in War and Peace, Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois offer a 
nuanced definition of violence: 
 
                                                
84 Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004). 
85 Duane L. Cady, "Violence," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Donald M. Borchert (Detroit: Macmillan 
Reference USA, 2006), 677. 
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Violence is a slippery concept—nonlinear, productive, destructive, and reproductive. It is mimetic, 
like imitative magic or homeopathy. “Like produces like,” that much we know. Violence gives birth 
to itself. So we can rightly speak of chains, spirals, and mirrors of violence—or, as we prefer—a 
continuum of violence.86 
 
While the overt forms of violence are a crucial aspect of theorisations of violence, it is clear that 
violence is a multifaceted concept, and there are dimensions to it beyond physical aggression. As 
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois describe it, ‘Violence can never be understood solely in terms of its 
physicality—force, assault, or the infliction of pain—alone. Violence also includes assaults on the 
personhood, dignity, sense of worth or value of the victim.’87 An assault on personhood may 
include violations on reproductive rights, incarceration, prohibition from wearing a preferred form 
of dress or removal of children from parents.  
Along with the explicit forms of violence described earlier, there are also many implicit or 
hidden forms of violence that are entrenched in human interaction. These include structural 
violence, which is ‘generally invisible because it is part of the routine grounds of everyday life’.88 A 
pertinent example of structural violence is the colonial racism and class relations that accompany 
the acquisition, establishment, exploitation and maintenance of a territory by a coloniser. The 
unequal relationship between the colonisers and indigenous populations allows structural violence 
to become ingrained in the interactions between the two in ways that are still being discovered and 
unravelled today. There is a great deal of scholarship that points to the continuation of this unequal 
relationship and the structural violence it engenders.89   
Additionally, because structural violence can be more difficult to identify and to rectify 
(even if class relations and poverty are visible it is not simple to address them in the way that it is 
possible to stop one individual from compromising another), it is correspondingly difficult to 
address. For example, Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois describe how the explicit physical violence of 
the apartheid regime, personified by a ‘sadistic Boer cop’ and his demonstration of torture 
techniques became a large focus of the South African Truth and Reconciliation amnesty hearings in 
Cape Town, while the deep structural violence of apartheid which forced 80% of the African 
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population to live in social institutions ‘that resembled concentration camps’ were not examined 
closely at all.90 
This kind of pervasive violence fits well with Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas. For a thinker such as 
Bourdieu, violence is everywhere, in everyday social practice. It is rendered invisible or 
‘misrecognised’ because of its constant and unremarkable presence.91  Individuals absorb the 
structures and mechanisms of the societies which they inhabit until they become part of their mental 
structures.92 This acceptance of social order (by both those who benefit from it and those who are 
disadvantaged by it) allows violence to be carried out in plain view without individuals thinking to 
question it. Similarly, there is a relationship between symbolic violence and performance of other 
types of violence as a result.  
 
You cannot cheat with the ‘law of the conservation of violence’: all violence is paid for, and, for 
example, the structural violence exerted by the financial markets, in the form of layoffs, loss of 
security, etc., is matched sooner or later in the form of suicides, crime and delinquency, drug 
addiction, alcoholism, a whole host of minor and major everyday acts of violence.93  
 
Bourdieu’s symbolic violence is perhaps best known from his work of the late 1970s. He 
used the term broadly to refer to the inherent but unrecognized violence that is maintained and 
naturalized within systems of inequality and domination. In this study, I address the way the term 
‘violence’ has been linked to a particular community group. I use the term covert violence to 
distinguish from Bourdieu’s because I am not focussing on hegemonic situations but rather on 
specific instantiations of the way that symbolic violence has been linked to generation 1.5 Somalis 
and how they experience this in Melbourne today. 
Veena Das has also devoted much work to the way that violence is an accepted part of 
everyday life, manifest in incidences such as infant mortality, hunger and starvation, disease and 
humiliation.94 She focuses on gendered forms of violence and how these intersect and interplay with 
political forms of violence. Her work engages deeply with the theoretical grounds laid out by 
scholars such as Foucault and Bourdieu, and offers rich practical examples of how the lives of so 
many are affected by these interactions.  
In conceptualising covert violence, I am trying to engage with the acute reflexivity that 
allowed radically critical thinkers such as Foucault and Bourdieu to uncover the latent relationships 
between institutions such as prisons, asylums, hospitals, concentration camps and even schools and 
the acceptable forms of violence. It is particularly interesting to view violence as more than a 
                                                
90 Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, "Introduction: Making Sense of Violence," 1-2. 
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214. 
93 Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology: 40. 
94 Das, Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary. 
  42 
simple dichotomy of victim and perpetrator. In the Foucauldian and Bourdieuian sense, it is 
something that permeates all aspects of life. When considering covert violence, I am thus trying to 
uncover the latent acts of violence in everyday interactions with family, friends and acquaintances, 
employers, the state and particularly across class and ethnicity demarcations. 
Many theorists have come to view violence differently from the way it was previously seen. 
There appears a shift in some discourse away from the primacy of overt violence and towards the 
pervasiveness of covert violence. However, the overt violence and brutality in Somalia cannot be 
ignored. Given the complex and multifaceted expressions of violence in the Somali context, I will 
treat both overt and covert forms of violence as equally important to this thesis, without attempting 
to hierarchize them. I proceed from the dual perspective: (i) that brutal and physical forms and acts 
of violence radically affect individuals and communities, especially during times of war, famine, 
and political unrest; and (ii) that violence is also interwoven into the structures of society and 
internalised and expressed in multifaceted covert ways.  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This section has discussed some of the scholarship regarding the notion of identity, and focussed on 
the suggestion that individuals may inhabit various identities in response to their environment. I 
examined the role of Islam in developing and expressing identity, and the difficulties this presents 
to Muslims living in a non-Muslim majority country. I outlined the ideas of Foucault’s ubiquitous 
‘small p’ power, along with the productive effects of discourse and ideology. Social capital was 
then presented as a lens through which to examine migrants and refugees. I also examined theories 
of violence and the way that these have developed.  
I believe the above themes are vital to understanding identity expression and the different 
forces that act upon it. Applying these notions to Somali Australians will be elucidating and may 
reveal latent aspects to both the expressions of power experiences by this group, and the 
characteristics of their constructed identities.  
The theoretical ideas covered in this section may seem slightly disparate, but it is important 
to highlight that they have all be discussed in order to present a coherent and connected picture. In 
order to be able to map and link these difficult concepts, I found it best to use my own schema, in 
terms of visualising the way different forces are exerted on social actors. At the centre, an 
individual inhabits a world constituted by complex and multifaceted identities. These can be broken 
accordingly into situational, social and personal identities. A level out from the centre, there is a 
web of social capital. Another level out, there is the Foucauldian network of power relations, which 
permeate and filter through to the social capital level. The social capital level is effectively the 
operationalisation of the conceptual level above, in which power, discourse and ideology are 
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expressed through concrete examples. The media, for instance, is one concrete expression of power 
in the realm of social capital, which in turn influences and shapes the way that individuals conceive 
of themselves.  
I am not claiming that this schema is exactly representative in an objective or hierarchical 
sense. In fact, if scholars such as Foucault and Bourdieu have taught us anything, it is that the 
individual is never at the centre of anything, but rather a small part in a complex world of powerful 
intersecting and competing social forces which are exerted to varying degrees and experienced 
qualitatively differently. In a Copernican sense, then, it is important to acknowledge that the 
primacy of the individual has been thoroughly dislodged and individuals should not be seen as the 
centre of a vast and complex universe of relations. Nevertheless, this thesis is about the way that 
individuals experience external pressures from their own particular vantage point and how these 
influence their expression of identity. In this sense, it makes sense to conceptualise these social 
forces from the perspective of the individual.  
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II  METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
  
Methodological considerations, practicalities of the methods and study design 
 
 
 
 
 
My methodological starting point 
 
In their volume Handbook of Qualitative Research, Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln and their 
contributors trace the rich history of qualitative research in its many and varied forms. Using the 
term ‘moments’, they demarcate the stages of qualitative research which have emerged at distinct 
points of history and have been influenced by the social milieu of their times. The moments have 
often been separated by periods of rupture and challenges to established views. These moments 
have not ever ‘passed’, rather they still exist today and continue to shape the methodological 
approaches that researchers take.  
Denzin and Lincoln highlight the plethora of understandings and orthodoxies within and 
across disciplines and the vast array of techniques available for collecting, analyzing and presenting 
data. They argue that in general, the neater and simpler techniques belong to previous eras rather 
than this current, ‘eighth moment’ of methodological backlash. This backlash is against the 
government-favoured quantitative, experimental (in the positivist sense) research.1 Despite the 
ruptures and changes however, the central tenet remains the engagement of the researcher with the 
researched in order to understand and elucidate something of the lived experience of the research 
participant.  
The qualitative research landscape offers many potential starting points. When I first began 
my doctoral study, I was very interested in grounded theory because of the way that the data 
generates theory with what (I thought) would be a minimum of intervention from the researcher. 
This seemed to me to be the most authentic way to come to a theoretical conclusion. I spent the first 
two years of this project working with grounded theory and it wasn’t until the conclusion of my 
interviews and part way through the data analysis that I realized grounded theory wasn’t such a 
good fit for me. 
Denzin and Lincoln posit that grounded theory was developed in the second moment (post 
Second World War to 1970), which they describe as ‘the golden age of rigorous qualitative 
analysis’. Philosophically, post-positivism is the dominant school of thought in the second 
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moment.2 In this framework, there is an ontological assumption of an external reality, and an 
epistemological assumption that it is not only illuminating to discover knowledge about it, but 
possible for an objective observer working at a remove from participants to do so.  
Grounded Theory was developed in 1967 by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss. Since that 
time it has become a leading method used in qualitative research globally over a number of 
disciplines as varied as sociology, nursing, education, cultural studies and computer and 
information science.3 Grounded Theory is a ‘mode of analysis of largely qualitative research data’.4 
It is characterised by its profoundly empirical approach to the study of social life. The theory is 
generated by the back and forth between the empirical data and the abstract ways of thinking about 
the empirical data. Emphasis is placed on a research paradigm that sees the researcher influenced by 
a minimum of preconceptions and the ability to see ‘all as data’.5  
In 1967, when Glaser and Strauss published The Discovery of Grounded Theory, they made 
their scholarly motivation quite clear, stating: ‘We would all agree that in social research generating 
theory goes hand in hand with verifying it; but many sociologists have been diverted from this 
truism in their zeal to test either existing theories or a theory that they have barely started to 
generate.’6 The book suggested a revolutionary approach in social science research: Rather than 
merely studying existing theory, researchers should be allowing new theory to emerge from data. 
Strauss and Glaser fell out rather spectacularly over their differing interpretations of grounded 
theory, with Strauss later stressing that pragmatism and symbolic interactionism are the 
philosophies that methodologically underpin his iteration of grounded theory methods.7  
While this new explanation of the methodology of grounded theory was helpful for me, it 
ultimately caused me to look deeper into symbolic interactionism which in turn, led me to narrative 
inquiry. I decided that critical narrative theory was most suited to my work, and abandoned most of 
grounded theory practice. However, two key techniques advocated by grounded theorists remained 
useful tools throughout my research. The first of these was the writing of memos, which are 
essentially a form of ‘field notes’. These written records of what the researcher was thinking while 
undertaking a grounded theory study produced many later insights. Secondly, undertaking constant 
comparative analysis of incidents did enable the inductive nature of grounded analysis as theory to 
emerge. As I had spent much time writing memos and performing constant comparative analysis, I 
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found referring back to these during my analysis to be most helpful. However, other methodologies 
became my main focus. 
 
 
Narrative theory 
 
Narrative theory has its roots in literary criticism but is now used broadly across many disciplines. 
According to Riessman8 and Mishler,9 narrative inquiry has been used in psychology, sociology, 
medicine, literature and cultural studies, amongst others. Each of these disciplines has its own 
approach to narrative inquiry, and as a result narrative inquiry has become a point of scholarly 
investigation in itself because there are contested methods for its practice.10 For instance, it is 
recognized as a particularly useful methodology in the field of health,11 where it is used, for 
example, for patients to give personal accounts of their experience with illness.12 Narrative is also 
particularly useful for studies of refugees and migrants as it is able to encapsulate the disjointed 
experiences of flight, transit and settlement. 
When using narrative inquiry, both the researcher and the participant are located as social 
actors within their own subjective worlds. They live according to the routines, rules and norms that 
are shaped by cultural and ideological norms. In the words of Byron Good: 
 
Narrative is a form in which experience is represented and recounted, in which events are presented 
as having a meaningful and coherent order, in which activities and events are described along with 
the experiences associated with them and the significance that lends them their sense for the persons 
involved.13  
 
A thorough investigation into the idea of narrative is given by Jerome Bruner. He describes 
narrative as a complex, organic construction, which grows and blossoms into ‘vineyards of 
narratology’.14 
 
We organize our experience and our memory of human happenings mainly in the form of narrative 
— stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing and not doing, and so on. Narrative is a conventional 
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form, transmitted culturally and constrained by each individual’s level of mastery… Unlike the 
constructions generated by logical and scientific procedures that can be weeded out by falsification, 
narrative constructions can only achieve “verisimilitude.” Narratives, then, are a version of reality 
whose acceptability is governed by convention and “narrative necessity” rather than by empirical 
verification and logical requiredness, although ironically we have no compunction about calling 
stories true or false.15 
 
In ‘The Narrative Construction of Reality’, Bruner sets out an exhaustive list of the features 
of narrative, which I will paraphrase here in the interests of brevity. For Bruner, narrative is 
something that occurs over human time. The events described concern particular happenings, which 
function as tokens of broader types. The people in a narrative, and the people hearing a narrative are 
motivated by their own beliefs and moral compass, in their actions and their reception of the story 
respectively. Interestingly, Bruner also places emphasis on the importance of genericness in 
narrative and highlights the recognizable genres that appear in narrative. Listeners will assimilate 
narrative on their own terms, depending on background knowledge. For Bruner, narratives continue 
to accrue and the accruals eventually create something called a ‘culture’ or ‘history’.16 
Bruner’s articulation of these features is particularly helpful in conceptualizing narrative in 
a more nuanced way. However, Bruner’s presentation misses a crucial feature of how this plays out 
in practice. When a researcher decides to use narrative theory, they ask people to tell them stories. 
The researcher then reflects on the narratives as given, and threads ideas and stories together to 
produce meaningful information. Yet this technique does not engage deeply enough with the 
possibility that other factors are influencing either (or both) the telling of the stories, and the 
interpretation of these by the researcher. Bruner’s account of narrative serves very well as a detailed 
description of the scene. Nevertheless, I feel it is missing critical reflection. A second layer of 
analysis, which has the potential to uncover latent aspects at play, can be deployed by bringing a 
critical perspective to narrative. 
 
 
Critical narrative inquiry and the importance of critique in ethnographic research 
 
There is a plethora of differing articulations and conceptualizations of what critical narrative inquiry 
represents, so a presentation of the ideas of critical narrative inquiry as I intend to embrace it is 
relevant. The approach taken in a critical narrative methodology involves the element of critique. 
Nicole Pitre et al. outline this approach: 
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A critical perspective permits an examination of human action and interaction in dialectical 
relationship with social structural constraints. The intent is to identify sources of alienation, power, 
and domination... The influences of socioculturally defined structures and ideology on human 
patterns of behavior, on thinking and reflexive practices, on personal meanings, and on verbal and 
nonverbal communication processes are considered. The underlying assumption is that history has 
and continues to shape the prescribed rules, conventions, routines, and habits that allow structures of 
power and domination to be reproduced and perpetuated within people’s symbolic world.17 
 
Pitre et al. note that ‘narratives are embedded within historical, structural, and ideological 
contexts, social discourses and power relations. Through their narratives, storytellers locate 
themselves within the conditions that influence their choices and actions as social agents’.18 Bruner 
concurs that it is naïve to study the individual as an isolated unit of analysis ‘inside his or her own 
skin’ in a cultural vacuum. Rather, we must accept the view that the human mind cannot express its 
nascent powers with the enablement of the symbolic systems of culture’.19 Narratives are always 
constructed in a complex and entangled cultural web. However, in a cyclic way, personal narrative 
histories can be thought of as small elements of a larger cultural architecture ⎯ individuals’ 
narratives feed into a collective narrative and help shape the fabric of a society. 
In light of these constraints, some narrative researchers analyze how the story was told, 
highlighting the co-construction of stories. They place emphasis on the process and context of 
storytelling events and their effect on the outcome. This may include the self-reflection of the 
researcher (such as field notes), and the immersion of the researcher in a relationship with the 
participants (such as participant observation).20 Another technique in the spirit of critique is to 
examine the stories in light of the performative agenda of the storyteller given the particular 
circumstances surrounding the narration. These researchers aim to identify how individuals 
represent themselves in particular situations, how identities are enacted and how past events are 
reconstructed within stories.21 
A critical perspective on narrative construction does not offer a guidebook of prescribed 
steps for the researcher to follow. Rather it offers a lens through which to examine the drivers and 
forces behind stories with the possibility of shedding new light on — or uncovering latent aspects of 
— the stories as they are told. Critical narrative inquiry is a mode of inquiring, or a way of 
approaching narratives through the lens of social, ideological and cultural critique. The researcher 
examines stories told to position the storytellers’ experiences within personal, symbolic, structural 
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and ideological worlds. This in turn, reveals much about how the storytellers view themselves and 
their agency in the world. The form of the data could be described as a phenomenological account 
of experience, as the researcher is collecting information subjectively. This account is thus 
necessarily predicated on epistemological preconditions, based on hermeneutic assumptions.  
This ethic of critique, which is central in how the researcher goes about interpreting stories 
and making judgments, requires critical reflection in itself. When first embarking on my fieldwork, 
I felt a strong connection with the participants, and this may have caused me to look at their 
accounts uncritically. In fact, I was more than halfway in to the fieldwork before a conversation 
with a Somali academic gave me pause to re-examine the data I’d collected. He urged me to look 
past what he called the façade of the respondents, and assured me that there were indeed great 
fractures in the relationships between parents and generation 1.5 respondents, and that these 
fractures were at risk of alienating a significant number of young people. This conversation 
encouraged me to make thorough follow-up contact with some participants and to broaden the 
scope of my participant observation.  
However, I still struggled with the idea of treating participants with suspicion, nominating 
myself as the person able to interpret their stories about their complex and sometimes fragile 
relationships with family and the broader community than they themselves are. The other dialogue 
which helped somewhat to overcome these worries was a free-ranging discussion with my 
supervisor about trusting my participants but remaining sceptical about the data I collected from 
them. In this way, this becomes less of a critique of the individual, but rather a healthy critique of 
the data they present. It is also worth noting here that this is in agreement with Hewitt’s notion of 
tri-partite identity, as discussed in section one. No individual presents the exact same identity in all 
different situations. 
The ethical considerations of this approach require that the researcher stays faithful to the 
meanings of the research participant. The participant who reads the researcher’s work will expect to 
find a rendering of their own meanings as presented during the interview.22 The surface story is seen 
to conceal a deeper reality ‘a told story conceals an untold one’.23 This does not mean to say that 
respondents are being disingenuous, merely that they, like any subject, interpret the world based on 
their own experiences and backgrounds. This is the problematized scene of interpretation for the 
researcher. It may be worth taking ‘a sceptical attitude’ in general to personal accounts because of 
the limits of the type, range and breadth of discourse accessible to the storyteller.24 Because these 
limits are constitutive, they are simply not visible to the storyteller. Our preconceptions and 
prejudices define us and limit the conditions of the possibility of our interactions as researchers.  
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This Gadamerian notion of prejudice kept surfacing throughout my research experience, 
and demanded that I look into its theoretical grounding. ‘Prejudice’ is central in the key metaphor 
given by Gadamer in Truth and Method. One of Gadamer’s contributions to the hermeneutic 
landscape is the idea that all understanding and interpretation involves a ‘fusion of horizons’. Once 
a personal student of Heidegger, Gadamer agrees that there are pre-conditions to our understanding 
and that we are constituted by our situatedness.25 Understanding always takes place on the basis of 
some pre-understanding; ‘understanding always involves projecting oneself’.26 In an almost Kantian 
transcendental move, there are, for Gadamer, certain conditions for the possibility of interpretation. 
‘A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting’.27 ‘We “throw” our fore-
conceptions into the “play” of understanding and keep revising them until we finally understand.’28 
Here, Gadamer defends the influence that traditions have on our understanding. Rather than 
deceiving or clouding our understanding, traditions actually ‘open the world to us’ and make 
understanding possible.  
The horizon represents the ‘whole historical lifeworld’ of an individual. 29  Gadamer 
describes it as ‘the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular 
vantage point’.30 Horizons are not closed or fixed — they are in constant transformation, as is the 
texture of the sky evolving throughout a day and over the course of a year. Beyond our horizon 
there could be things that are neither tangible nor intelligible to us. This represents the limits of our 
being-in-the-world, and the limits of our understanding. A fusion of horizons takes place whenever 
we come to some new understanding. When consensus on an issue is reached through discourse, 
individual opinions are broadened. Gadamer is saying that the limits of our perspective are 
constantly evolving when we come to new understandings and interpretations. This is particularly 
relevant for members of generation 1.5, as will be discussed in the findings chapters. 
The conception offered here acknowledges the cultural, social and ideological networks 
which influence an individual’s identity and personal narrative. Yet more profoundly, it 
acknowledges exactly the same conditions and constraints on the researcher who is engaging with 
an interviewee. However, this is neither seen as a hindrance nor a boon ⎯ it just is, and it is 
embraced as stories are told and gathered, and judgments and interpretations are made. The critical 
perspective recognizes these conditions as necessary to interpretation and illumination occurring 
through the interview process, and remembers the preconditions when reflecting on exchanges. This 
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extra dimension to critical narrative inquiry, as I have chosen to define it, adds a deeper 
acknowledgement of the preconditions and backgrounds (both of the subjects and the researcher) 
which demand constant reconsideration and critique. 
Josselson agrees that the Gadamerian approach is an effective way of conceptualizing the 
interview process, which provides an extra richness: 
 
Gadamer’s (1975) view of the hermeneutic project parallels what occurs in the interview. Good 
interpretation results from a fusion of horizons, through dialogue, with the text. If the primary goal of 
interpretation is not the passive reflection of what was in the speaker’s mind but the exegesis of the 
implicit meanings in the text, then the horizons brought to bear on the interpretation offer a context 
of understanding which can be enriching to theory.31  
 
Another important concept that is related in some way to Gadamer’s fusion of horizons is 
Wittgenstein’s forms of life. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein raises the notion of a 
form of life: ‘the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life’.32 The most 
commonly accepted reading of the notion is that forms of life are a type of dynamic and constantly 
shifting way of being in the world; depending on cultures, contexts and histories. Wittgenstein 
makes the elusive comment that ‘If a lion could talk, we could not understand him’.33 This aphorism 
highlights the social backdrop against which language is intelligible.  
The relevance of Wittgenstein’s idea relates to the way that people (interviewers and 
interviewees) use language to communicate and to relate to each other. Language is a form of social 
practice, and subtle yet important meanings may be shared if disparate forms of life are understood. 
However, from an ethnographic perspective, meaning may be lost if forms of life are not well 
understood and appreciated ⎯ for instance, coded meanings; slang; loaded phrases; jokes; and so 
on do not always communicate effectively when worlds are separated. The scale of Wittgenstein’s 
work is immense, and I could not hope to engage with it deeply, however I use Wittgenstein’s 
aphorism purely as a metaphor; a thinking tool to help get through complex issues. 
An example of this is the confusion that arose in an interview when I asked a participant to 
tell me about their family life at home. This young man described some 25 people living in his 
house as brothers and sisters. I was bemused and asked for more detail, and it emerged that they 
were (sometimes distant) cousins who had recently arrived and were staying between relatives’ 
houses while they looked for a permanent place to live. I had been ready to accept that Somali 
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families are much larger in size than the average Australian family, but this discussion had me 
confused for a long time before I was able to make sense of his version of ‘immediate family’. My 
form of life (or way of being in the world) was different enough from this young man to ensure that 
simple misunderstandings such as this were common.  
 
 
Generation 1.5 and the limits of language 
 
In this thesis, the group of interest represents a particular way of being in the world; a shared 
history, culture and context, which demarcates them from others. This form of life, or shared 
horizon, has been termed ‘generation 1.5’. Initially the term ‘generation 1.5’ was used by Rumbaut 
and Ima in the 1980s to describe immigrant youth who were not born in the United States. 
However, since Rumbaut and Ima’s initial use of the label, educators and researchers have used the 
name in varying ways.34  
Here is Rumbaut and Ima’s (1988) description of their target population from the first pages 
of their seminal manuscript addressing the generation 1.5: 
 
These respondents are members of what we will call the “1.5” generation: that is, they are neither 
part of the “first” generation of their parents, the responsible adults who were formed in the 
homeland, who made the fateful decision to leave it and to flee as refugees to an uncertain exile in 
the United States […] nor are the youths part of the “second” generation of children who are born in 
the U.S., and for whom the “homeland” exists as a representation consisting of parental memories 
and memorabilia, even though their ethnicity may remain well-defined. Rather, the refugee youths in 
our study constitute a distinctive cohort: they are those young people who were born in their 
countries of origin but formed in the U.S.; [. . .] they were not the main protagonists of the decision 
to leave and hence are less beholden to their parents’ attitudes [. . .]; and they are in many ways 
marginal to both the new and old worlds, for while they straddle both worlds they are in some sense 
fully part of neither of them. [. . .] Though they differ greatly from each other in cultural and social 
class origins, [. . .] they generally share a common psychohistorical location in terms of their age and 
migration status/role, and in terms of developing bicultural strategies of response and adjustment to 
that unique position which they occupy as “1.5’ers” in the interstices, as it were, of two societies and 
cultures, between the first and second generation, between being “refugees” and being “ethnics” (or 
“hyphenated Americans”).35   
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In these, the first observations where generation 1.5 was named, the key distinguishing 
characteristic of this group is their inability to identify fully with either their immigrant parents’ 
generation or their own American peers. ‘They occupied a nebulous space between two different 
cultures’.36  
 This is not to say that this is the first instance of researchers investigating such a group of 
people. Indeed, there have been countless studies of such people with almost identical descriptions, 
that do not use the term ‘generation 1.5’. In fact, one could argue that practically any description of 
migrant communities will include groups of young individuals who feel ‘caught in the middle’ 
between two cultures, as there are always children involved in migration flows.37 Nevertheless, this 
pre-existing phenomenon was named with a new term in 1988, and the concept has gained traction.  
Oudenhoven described the generation 1.5 Latino students that she studied as being ‘caught 
in the middle’.38 The members of generation 1.5 are often described as straddling the gulf between 
nations, languages, cultures, religions, and more. There is a powerful metaphor in the use of the 
verb ‘caught’ because the generation 1.5er is indeed unable to choose one side of the gulf over the 
other. Their identity is formed and held over that space and it is difficult to jump (either back and 
forth, or permanently to one side). The terminology used when describing generation 1.5 usually 
refers to their unstable and uncertain identity.39 While many studies of generation 1.5 in various 
settings and circumstances point out the negative aspects of being caught in the middle, there is also 
undoubtedly a positive side to the equation, as expressed to me by the participants. Some enjoyed 
helping their parents make sense of Australian mainstream culture. Others were proud of their 
ability to understand different ways of life. Still more believed they were lucky to speak their 
language of origin as well as their day-to-day language. 
While studies of generation 1.5 migrants have highlighted the difficulty they have in 
identifying with either their parents’ culture or the culture of their new homeland, this does not 
suggest that this question is easy to navigate for other migrants and refugees. In focussing on the 
specific challenges faced by generation 1.5ers I do not wish to imply that other individuals occupy a 
mono-culture and do not have to deal with similar issues. As I discussed in the previous section, I 
believe that all social actors occupy contested identities. And indeed, there is no monoculture that 
generation 1.5 can be positioned against. However, generation 1.5 have been identified as having 
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salient traits that position them apart from other groups. I think it is worthwhile focusing on their 
experiences as a point of interest.  
From one Wittgensteinian idea to another, it is remarkable how relevant Wittgenstein’s 
earlier ideas about the limits of language apply to Somali generation 1.5. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
Logico Philosophicus is an extremely ambitious work, which attempts to explain how 
representation of language and thought are possible. Although Wittgenstein’s early work was driven 
by a specific philosophical project — an argument for the meaning of language different to that 
found in his later work, where the aphorism regarding forms of life given earlier is found. His 
comments regarding the limits of language are thus being taken slightly out of context, and I am 
considering them in parallel with the forms of life argument presented earlier.  
This idea describes what the structure of the world must be like and how the world and 
language mirror each other. The idea is that reality has a certain logical structure. If we are going to 
have a language, then it must mirror the logical nature of world. Wittgenstein contends that there 
are certain limits in the world, and the limits of language mirror the limits of the world.40 The 
discussion of limits leads into how these are closely tied with the solipsistic world. For 
Wittgenstein, ‘The world is my world: this is made manifest in the fact that the limits of language 
(of the language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world’.41 More specifically, the 
objects in the world which I can speak of, are my own private experiences ⎯ only I am acquainted 
with the experiences of the objects that language names. Hence, ‘The limits of my language mean 
the limits of my world’.42  
Although Wittgenstein produced a vast array of philosophical ideas, I have chosen to 
engage with such aphorisms due to their ability to encapsulate important and complex ideas with 
simple metaphorical language. His ideas help organise thoughts and provide insight. Again, I have 
chosen to use this aphorism as a metaphor and a thinking tool for this project. These considerations 
play an important part in conceptualizing the lifeworld of Somali generation 1.5, and their struggle 
to be understood.  
Firstly, Somalia has a strong oral tradition in quite a radical sense. There is ample evidence 
of this in the fact that until the 1970s there was no written form of the Somali language. This 
modifies and shapes the discourse of the Somali people and likewise the possibility of written 
expression. Secondly, as many of the respondents confirmed, generation 1.5ers often speak better 
English than the Somali language. Although they all still live at home and communicate with their 
parents, aunts and uncles in Somali, they are more proficient in academic, professional and 
conversational English than the Somali language (this is despite their disrupted education and 
exposure to English quite late in life, after arrival in Australia). They are walking between two 
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forms of expression; two forms of life. This metaphor is often used and discussed in detail in the 
findings chapters. Nonetheless, it is worth highlighting the strength of the connection between this 
characteristic ascribed to generation 1.5 — their need to straddle multiple cultures and multiple 
identities — and Wittgenstein’s lifeworlds or, in Gadamerian terms, a continual fusion of multiple 
horizons.  
 
 
Ethical considerations and limitations of the approach 
 
When practicing ethnography, it is important to keep hold of the above ideas (lifeworlds, horizons 
of understanding) by recognizing that people may have a different perception of the world than the 
one that may be ascribed by the researcher. Ethnography analyses the cultures and behaviours of 
human beings from the point of view of those being studied.43 Ethnographers recognize that the 
natural world is not fixed or static, but in a state of constant flux. They also put emphasis on the 
context of the research environment and assumes the researcher will be presented with multiple and 
diverse realities.44 An example Rabinow gives of the quirks of fieldwork is that it can take place 
when the anthropologist least expects it. He describes finally fulfilling his images of social research 
— sitting with turbaned friends in an ancient walled city, notebook in hand just waiting to capture a 
cultural moment. When that moment comes, he is caught unawares by its speed and simplicity and 
the way it is taken for granted by everyone present but him. As time passes and he notes more 
significant practices, he discusses them with his friends and research subjects but these discussions 
affect his companions. They are forced to reflect on their activities and present them to the 
researcher.45 
Turning the critique back on ourselves as researchers, we may begin to wonder how much 
we give ourselves away in our everyday life. What does the language we use, the slang, and accent 
display about our social class? The varying relationships we have with others and institutions say a 
great deal about who we are and what we subscribe to. Rather than letting the voice of the 
participant shine through to illuminate the reader, the researcher is present, stage left giving notes 
and offering his/her own explanation of the stories told. I believe that there is a moderate way to 
approach the interpretation, and that is to target the self understanding, and identity enactment that 
the participant may very well be unaware of. Practically, this is achieved by ‘reading between the 
lines’, being alert to errors, inconsistencies and signs of the participant’s processes, conscious and 
unconscious. According to Packer, a worthwhile interpretation must also be able to reflect on the 
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possible reasons the participant is unaware of internal processes.46 I referred to this sense of 
scepticism earlier in this section, in terms of maintaining a balanced scepticism of the data 
presented by research subjects. This helps a researcher to maintain distance, and to hopefully read 
what is being presented in a more illuminating way.  
Ethically, the researcher must be prepared for the possible outcome that participants will 
feel demeaned and insulted by the interpretation of their stories. As Josselson explains:  
 
Researchers have not yet discovered a means of explaining to participants that they, the researchers, 
will be taking interpretive authority in the final analysis; the customary informed consent form asks 
people to consent to something that they cannot possibly understand or foresee. Adequate 
concealment of identity protects confidentiality, but does not prevent narcissistic injury.47 
 
One way I mitigated against this was to follow up with the respondents and make sure I had 
understood what they intended to convey, especially if the context of the conversation was unclear, 
or I felt they had misunderstood a question. In order to do this, I probed similar themes and 
questions with them to see if their narrative position was consistent with the data I had already 
collected. I also triangulated the research by using a broad range of research methods (such as 
community member profiles, focus groups and extended interviews, field notes and participant 
observation) in order to strengthen my ability to interpret this information.  
Ethically, I was very conscious of the possibility of presenting two faces to the participants. 
The first of a friendly interested person, and the second, a writer with an agenda who could be 
twisting words and might present a sensational version of “the truth”. But more than this, I was 
worried how I would be accepted by the community. More than a decade ago, in her 2003 thesis 
Celia McMichael argued that Somalis are often called upon to represent their community in focus 
groups for insights into migrant needs because of their circumstances of migration and cultural 
distinctiveness. She claimed that for this reason, Somalis are ‘tired of being researched’.48 I was 
worried that young people today (more than 10 years after McMichael’s study) would question the 
usefulness of my study and begrudge me the time to get to know them and their life. Therefore, 
prior to beginning my fieldwork, I was very uncertain about how many young people would be 
willing to work with me. I was especially worried that these young people, raised and educated in 
Australia would resent being studied by me, their peer in age (and often in student status). I was 
aware that in some cases the people I spoke to would be educated and working in the professional 
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sphere and I wondered why on earth they would want to share their stories, their challenges and 
their achievements with a white outsider.  
I tried as much as possible to approach all communication in the spirit of critical narrative 
inquiry, characterised by an openness and a willingness to absorb as much information as possible 
from the participant, and treating them as the expert of their own embodied experience. However, 
when entering the analysis phase of the research (a phase that was temporally and physically 
removed from the respondents) it became possible to suspend my worries about my reception 
within the community, and view the same given information through the lens of critique. Following 
the above methodology in this project led me to a deeper understanding of the issues facing the 
participants, including the way that they have been represented and misrepresented in dominant 
discourse.  
 
 
The process for gaining ethics approval 
 
In the words of Phillipe Bourgois, ‘anthropologists cannot escape seeing, feeling and empathizing 
with the people in the study’.49 Based on my own experience with this group of individuals, I could 
not agree more. In order to strengthen my own confidence and ability to interpret information I 
collected, I armed myself with as broad a range of methods as I could. These included focus groups, 
extended interviews, participant observation and community member profiles. Here, I aim to build 
on the methodological considerations given earlier and to discuss the way these informed the 
practical structuring of my study. There were pragmatic considerations for carrying out the study 
that still require elucidation.  
Bourgois also notes that ‘Anthropological fieldwork ethics do not need to be in substantial 
contradiction with commonsensical, spontaneous human ethics’.50 While I agree with this general 
statement, ethics approval is an important process in a study such as this. I was expecting to find the 
ethics approval process to be an arduous bureaucratic route, which all students wishing to work in 
the field must follow. However, instead it was an opportunity for me to refine my thoughts at an 
early stage in the project and to become clearer about what sort of people I wanted to interact with 
and how I would do this.  
The application for ethics approval was a multi-staged process involving many discussions 
with my primary supervisor, but it also gave me the opportunity to engage with other academics in 
similar fields at my university. With the help of their expertise I was able to refine not only my 
target group of respondents, but also the questions I would ask them, and the ways I would interact 
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with them. I prepared a list of interview questions for approval which would guide my semi-
structured discussions with the respondents (these can be found in Appendix B). In the end, the 
ethics process was more challenging than I expected, but it was ultimately a rewarding, educational 
process. It gave me access to a panel of experts (at the RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee) 
and the body of their experience in this area. I received approval to undertake the study using the 
following methods of interaction. 
 
 
Methods of interaction 
 
Participant observation 
 
Participant observation is considered an essential method in anthropological and ethnographic 
studies. One early example is the work of Frank Hamilton Cushing, and the four and a half years he 
spent as a participant observer with the Zuni Pueblo people in a study for the Smithsonian 
Institution's Bureau of Ethnology around 1879. During his time as a participant observer Cushing 
became involved in the customs of the people, after having learned the language and even became 
initiated into the priesthood. He was heavily criticized as having ‘gone native’ and having lost his 
objectivity because he did not publish extensively about the culture.51   
Indeed, there is a great deal of research that documents the role of the researcher as both an 
insider and an outsider.52 Participant observation is a particularly important technique in noting 
responses in discussion about culturally or personally sensitive issues. Non-verbal responses in such 
discussions are as important as verbal responses in allowing the researcher to put together a 
coherent picture of the participants’ experiences. 
According to DeWalt and DeWalt, participant observation increases the validity of a study, 
as the researcher is able to gain a better understanding of the context of the study. ‘The goal for 
design of research using participant observation as a method is to develop a holistic understanding 
of the phenomena under study that is as objective and accurate as possible given the limitations of 
the method’.53 
Harvey Russell Bernard listed five reasons arguing for the inclusion of participant 
observation specifically in cultural studies to increase the study’s validity: 
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1. It allows the researcher to collect different types of data. Doing this over a period of time 
familiarizes the researcher to the community, which facilitates involvement in sensitive activities. 
2. It helps prevent people acting in a certain way when they are aware of being observed. 
3. It helps the researcher to develop questions that make sense in the native language or are culturally 
relevant. 
4. It gives the researcher a better understanding of what is happening in the culture and validates 
interpretations of the observation. It also allows the collection of both quantitative and qualitative 
data through surveys and interviews.  
5. It is sometimes the only way to collect the right data for a study.54 
 
One very relevant limitation to participant observation in this study is that male and female 
researchers have access to different information. As DeWalt and DeWalt note, male and female 
researchers have access to different people, settings and bodies of knowledge.55 This particular 
consideration is pertinent in any study concerned with Islam and practicing Muslims. There is also a 
dichotomy here between practicing objective research, and the natural human subjectivity that no 
researcher can ignore. There is an argument to be made that researchers can use their subjectivity to 
open their minds to the worlds of their participants. According to Carl Ratner, one solution to this 
problem is to practice a wide variety of methods to ensure that the researcher’s understanding of 
what is being said matches with the understanding of the participant.56 
I conducted participant observation over a period of 24 months. This included attendance at 
sporting events, Somali festivals, meals at a Somali restaurant and regular volunteering teaching 
English at a community centre in North Melbourne. At the beginning of this study, I felt extremely 
conflicted about conducting participant observation on people I considered to be my peers. I had 
some heated discussions about this issue with my supervisors and it was not until I began to 
understand that participant observation could be conducted within the broader community rather 
than just the respondents that I began to feel more comfortable with this method. 
Merriam has described participant observation a ‘schizophrenic activity’ for the 
researcher,57 because of the need to participate in the research setting, but not so fully that the 
researcher loses sight of the research goal and forgets to analyse what is happening around them. 
For various reasons, I always felt aware of my position as researcher. One of the strongest factors 
for me was physical appearance. I have fair skin and light coloured hair, and do not wear hijab as all 
the female respondents did. I was very aware of our physical difference, even in situations where 
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some of those physical differences were being minimised, such as trying on traditional Somali dress 
for a party, or when outside in cold weather and covering myself accordingly. Additionally, I was 
always very aware of my gratitude to be included in cultural events and celebrations, which kept me 
at a remove from my participants. 
In addition to conducting participant observation in person, I also used social media and 
accessed Internet forums for young Somalis across the world. This is a form of digital ethnography, 
also termed ‘netnography’ — an online cousin of ethnography.58 In this way, I checked the ideas the 
young people had been discussing in interviews and focus groups against a broader but still targeted 
backdrop of discussion and debate. While accessing these forums, I was struck by the fact that I was 
practicing a kind of participant observation, although the people being observed were not aware of 
it. I felt that I was accessing some very intimate details at times, despite the fact that these sites are 
freely available and the content is public. 
 
 
Community member profiles 
 
This method is based on a technique developed by Mulligan and Nadarajah in their comprehensive 
reporting on the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka and India. They explain that community member 
profiles are ‘based on short interviews that can be turned into concise narratives’.59 As part of their 
longitudinal fieldwork which observed the community responses to the disaster, they utilised a 
number of different tools to paint a holistic picture of community life:  
 
The study included a random ‘community life’ survey, the collection of ‘community member 
profiles’ (which focused on post-tsunami experiences), the collection of relevant local stories and the 
conduct of lengthy semi-structured interviews with tsunami survivors and a wide range of people 
working in relief and recovery projects and programmes. Demographic data, accounts of local 
history and other reports and stories were collected in order to construct a ‘social profile’ of each 
case-study community to make sure that the researchers could properly contextualize their findings.60 
 
I felt that this was an excellent technique for me due to its ability to capture a broad range of data in 
a short period of time. It is especially useful as a complementary method along with interviews and 
focus groups, because (as Mulligan and Nadarajah explain above) it is instrumental in allowing the 
researcher to contextualise the data collected. As I have previously described, I felt a strong need to 
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portray the research subjects honestly and authentically and I was able to use the community 
member profiles as a framework to locate the findings from the longer interviews. 
Additionally, the community member profiles allowed me to collect data in a more 
quantitative way for a study which is more qualitative. These profiles informed my analysis of data 
by providing a kind of nuanced lens to examine my findings. They also provided a broader range of 
data than I could have hoped to achieve using only in-depth interviews due to time constraints. As 
Mulligan and Nadarajah explain, while these profiles do not offer the richness of data that can be 
obtained from interviews and focus groups, they are relatively easy to complete and it is possible to 
collect them in substantial numbers. They can be considered as a ‘qualitative form of sampling’.61 
I compiled 45 community member profiles. I present these data in section three. These 
profiles gave me basic data like year of birth, number of years lived in Australia and family size. 
The profiles were based on short snapshot interviews with Somalis and were not confined to those 
respondents who met my criteria for interviews. These profiles were invaluable to me in forming a 
base layer of quantitative data to refer to. They also allowed me to choose the respondents from a 
broader range of individuals. They were also a useful as a tool for me to gauge an individual’s 
willingness to be further interviewed and an ideal first step in establishing a rapport with suitable 
candidates.  
 
 
Focus groups 
 
Focus groups are structured, guided conversations with the purpose of data-collection.62 Originally 
described as a ‘focussed interview’, they were initially used mostly in the field of marketing. 
However, a new academic interest in focus groups developed in the beginning of the 1980s, and 
now they are used as a tool across a wide variety of fields, including education, communication 
studies, political sciences and health sciences.63 
Stewart and Shamdasani categorize seven advantages that focus group interviews offer over 
other methodological approaches. These are: the ability to gather data quickly and economically; 
the direct interaction with respondents; the ability to collect data in the words of respondents; the 
process of respondents reacting to each other; flexibility in setting and type of respondent; 
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suitability for illiterate people and children and the ease with which results can be understood.64 I 
found that most of these advantages manifested over the course of my study, particularly those that 
concerned the flexibility and direct contact with the respondents. 
Erminia Colucci, writing in 2008, pointed out that even though scholars have acknowledged 
the utility of the focus group in cross-cultural research, and research with ethnic minorities, it is yet 
to be widely adopted in these fields. She posited that this may be because of a lack of confidence of 
researchers and the lengthy planning required to use this method in ethnoculturally different 
populations.65 Colucci asserts that in using focus groups in a cross-cultural research situation, some 
scholars have neglected to ‘explicitly express sampling criteria’, especially where ‘culture’ is 
concerned.66 She describes how in her PhD study which compared the cultural meanings and social 
representations of youth suicide in Italy, India and Australia, she required participants to be at least 
second generation in their home country. While this does not ensure that all participants will have 
exactly the same cultural understanding and symbols, it is a way of narrowing the sample to achieve 
more consistent data. Similarly, the participants of my study were generation 1.5 Somalis who have 
arrived in Australia as a result of fleeing the Somali civil war and continued unrest. 
The focus group technique is a tool for observing ideas in a relatively homogenous group 
context. A culturally homogenous group can create an environment in which participants feel at 
ease and able to express their views.67 Phan and Fitzgerald agree that the focus group should be 
homogenous enough to allow free discussion, however, they add that the group must also be 
heterogeneous enough to provide a range of perspectives.68 While my focus groups were obviously 
ethnically and culturally homogenous (even taking into account the young people’s varying 
circumstances and experiences), it was difficult to ensure heterogeneity given the age of the 
participants and the relatively small size of the Somali community in Melbourne. In order to 
mitigate against these issues, I used the focus groups to encourage ease of conversation, and I relied 
on my in-depth interviews to provide the participants an opportunity to express views that may not 
have been accepted in the group setting.  
Returning to the perennial dilemma in cross-cultural research; the emic and etic position of 
the researcher is especially relevant in a focus group situation. While there are certainly advantages 
and disadvantages to both positions, it is often recommended that the focus group moderator be of 
the same ethnicity as the respondents in order to enhance relations and increase the participants’ 
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willingness to respond.69 In my study, it was not possible to have a moderator of Somali ethnic 
background. Nevertheless, the Somali community in Melbourne is rather contained and close-knit, 
and I had a sense that because my participants noted my outsider status, they believed I would have 
less opportunity to compromise their confidentiality within the small community. 
In this study, the primary benefits of using the focus group method were the process of 
respondents reacting to each other (and indeed, the respondents putting each other at ease) and the 
ability to collect data in the words of respondents. This data informed the individual interviews 
which followed. Five focus groups were conducted with groups of between four and seven people 
in offices, community centres, schools and cafes. They took between 90 minutes and two hours and 
I used cues from the group to determine when it was time to end the session. In one focus group, I 
had to call the discussion to a close after two and a half hours because I was starting to struggle to 
take all the information in. This was with a group of women aged in their 40s-60s who were parents 
of generation 1.5 children and had very strong opinions about their sons and daughters. 
Something I had not anticipated was that the groups became all male or all female. In 
mixed gender discussions, both the men and women were reluctant to discuss personal issues, such 
as girlfriends/boyfriends and expectations for men and women in and out of the home. Omar made 
similar findings in his 2011 PhD on Somali youth in Melbourne and Minnesota, and indeed, was 
convinced then to only interact with young men in order not to disrupt the free-flow of conversation 
he enjoyed with them.70  
Colucci describes how certain interactions which seem obvious are fraught with difficulty 
for the participants. In her research in India, she found that the participants were inclined to agree 
with each other and to turn to the moderator very frequently, expecting her to control the discussion. 
She proposes that this could be because she had higher education status than her participants.71 
Interestingly, I felt the same way in my focus groups with the young men. As many of them were 
doing apprenticeships, and had voiced their difficulty in justifying their choices (as opposed to 
university study) to their families (especially female members), education status could be one 
reason for this. Additionally, I found that their English expression was not as rich as the women’s, 
so they may have been looking for guidance with language. Another possible explanation is that 
they were keeping me at a distance as is appropriate within Islamic culture for interactions between 
males and females. 
One aspect of the focus groups which was very enjoyable was my chance to observe the 
group dynamic as the subjects up for discussion shifted and changed. At times, it seemed that the 
groups had forgotten I was in the room with them, although I had a sense that the discussion topics 
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were somewhat new for the participants, and not topics they discussed often with each other. In 
particular, they enjoyed comparing their childhood memories and notes on how their families 
operated both culturally/religiously and socially. There was a lot of gentle mocking and teasing 
about adherence to, or lack of, culture. 
The focus groups showed me very clearly that I needed to approach this research as a 
polylogue in the spirit of Edith Sizoo’s imagining.72 Rather than assuming that I was entering into a 
dialogue and collecting data from another party, I began to understand that there are many 
perspectives to consider, rather than the researcher and the participant. The level of vocal 
disagreement about some topics was strong evidence for this fact. I see this fluidity as a reflection 
the numerous (sometimes competing) facets of identity that an individual struggles to integrate in 
everyday life. This was a continuous, refreshing reminder that the identity theories, which I had 
been plotting and examining for so long, do have very real application. Perhaps the best way for me 
to realise that was to be in a room full of rowdy young people, wishing to make their voices and 
opinions heard.  
One difficulty I encountered in the focus group setting was the loss of control I had over the 
discussion and the way that the more dominant personalities tended to take over the group and 
cause the more passive members to either lose interest or make it more difficult for them to 
contribute. I worked very hard to engage all members of the group equally, though of course that 
was not always possible. I also noticed that some of the shyer group participants at times looked as 
though they wanted to contribute something to the conversation but were either cut off, or seemed 
unwilling to express an opposing view to the more dominant participants. 
The focus groups allowed me to interview a range of young people efficiently, and they 
also helped the men feel comfortable in speaking with me. Additionally, the data I collected from 
the focus groups informed my questions to those respondents who volunteered to take part in in-
depth interviews.  
 
 
Extended interviews 
 
In ethnographic research individual in-depth interviews are used as a method to carry out intensive 
research, generally with a smaller number of people due to the time it takes to engage with 
individuals. Having engaged in a number of focus group discussions and completed some months of 
participant observation and collected numerous community member profiles, I decided to use semi-
structured interviews as equivalent to guided conversations and encourage the respondents to speak 
at length on the topics they chose. 
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According to Cohen et al., there is a wide variety of interview models discussed in method 
and methodology literature.73 However, a qualitative interview seeks to describe and understand the 
meanings of central themes of the subjects’ worlds. It seeks to cover a factual level, and then a more 
abstract meaning level, though this can present significant challenges.74 Martyn Denscombe draws 
attention to the multiple biases that may affect the interviewee based on their perception of the 
interviewer — the interviewer effect. ‘In particular, the sex, the age, and the ethnic origins of the 
interviewer have a bearing on the amount of information people are willing to divulge and their 
honesty about what they reveal’.75 As this is something that is impossible to change, it seems that 
the best thing a researcher can do is to be aware of the possibility for different types of bias and the 
different situations and manners in which they may arise. 
I had a set of 29 questions (See Appendix B) for each interview, which focused on 
memories of life in Somalia, the journey to Australia and settlement in Melbourne. I found that the 
interviews, while covering additional ground encompassed by the interview questions, generally 
followed the chronological order as designated by the questions. Although I covered the same 
questions with all respondents, and most interviews took around one hour to complete, there were 
some that took much longer due to the participant’s willingness to share additional information and 
tell additional stories. Additionally, due to some young men’s unwillingness to be interviewed 
individually, I made a compromise and carried out extended interviews in groups of two when 
required. 
The Community Member Profiles identified people who would be interested in taking part 
in focus groups. The focus groups then identified those who were willing to participate in longer 
individual interviews. If a participant was willing, I conducted one or two repeat interviews with the 
same individual. Some of these young people recommended siblings or friends to speak with me as 
well. 
In order to avoid prompting the interviewees and the potentially misleading data that can 
result,76 I often used a technique where I repeated a word of the participant’s answer to a previous 
question to encourage them to elaborate on their response. For example: 
 
Subject: Faith is very important to my family. 
Me: Your family? 
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Subject: Extended family, cousins etc… We just call all our relatives family, not like in 
Australia where it’s the mum, the dad, and two kids. 
 
I made sure that all of my questions were open ended, and I gave a copy of the questions to the 
respondents at the beginning of the interviews to make sure they felt comfortable answering the 
questions. I made a decision to do this after applying for ethics approval, in order to give the 
participants as much information as possible before commencing the interviews. I recorded all 
interviews bar two young men who did not want to be recorded. 
 
 
Field notes 
 
For some scholars, field notes are the very essence of a study: ‘Thus they emphasize writing 
detailed field notes close to their field observations, mining these notes systematically through 
qualitative coding techniques, and producing “grounded” analyses tied closely and specifically to 
the original field note corpus’.77 Still others believe that it is best to become fully immersed in a 
culture, and that taking field notes may cause the deeper, more intuitive experience of being 
immersed in that culture to be lost.78 
I chose to use field notes as a kind of personal journal, often completing them on public 
transport after attending cultural, sporting or social events or interviews and focus group sessions. I 
did not want to give too much weight to my own, reconstructed version of events because: 
 
To put it bluntly, fieldnotes are gnomic, shorthand reconstructions of events, observations, and 
conversations that took place in the field. They are composed well after the fact as inexact notes to 
oneself and represent simply one of many levels of textualization set off by experience. To 
disentangle the interpretive procedures at work as one moves across levels is problematic to say the 
least… Little wonder that fieldnotes are the secret papers of social research.79  
 
I recorded detailed field notes. At first, I thought that these could be memos as is the practice in 
Grounded Theory, but I found that I was not relying on them in the same way as is advocated in 
Grounded Theory. I preferred to use them as a complementary method rather than have a singular 
focus on the collection of field notes. 
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Emerson et al. describe two practical methods for taking field notes.80 They are not 
mutually exclusive, simply two approaches to the compilation of notes. The first approach involves 
taking notes only on things that strike the researcher as particularly salient. The second involves 
taking comprehensive field notes about everything the researcher observes during a particular 
period of time. I decided to adhere to the first technique and only make notes when something 
struck me as particularly relevant or interesting. This was obviously extremely subjective, and 
indeed, varied from interaction to interaction. 
One of the main reasons I decided to make notes only about the salient happenings, was my 
awareness of being observed myself. I did not want to appear to be busily documenting everything 
around me for fear of influencing my participants’ behavior. Another reason was that in using field 
notes as a complementary method to my other methods, I was confident of having built sufficient 
understanding of the Somali community in Melbourne to accurately note which happenings were 
salient and worthy of documentation. As Wolfinger puts it, ‘Ethnographers frequently choose to 
record a particular observation because it stands out.’81 I was able to take preliminary notes in the 
field as advocated by Goffman82 and Emerson et al.,83 and then use these often handwritten notes to 
structure my lengthier, typed field notes upon leaving the field. I made very short notes as I was 
aware of my audience. 
The nature of participant observation ensured that my field notes were a somewhat messy, 
loose collection of writing. Some were handwritten on the back of whatever paper was to hand 
some typed and some quick jottings intended to jolt my memory later. I found that these shorthand 
notes provoked a different reaction in me than the more comprehensive notes I had taken while in 
the field, as long term memory and short term memory throw up some different interpretation of 
events (especially if I had been informed by further participant interaction in between times). I 
believe this is because in writing the shorthand notes, I was not able to analyse a research situation 
as I was immersed in it and was forced to wait until I had left the field in order to engage in 
personal reflection. In general, I avoided explicit analysis during the fieldwork stage, however, I 
had established some roots within the Somali community and continued to have contact with some 
friends and to teach English once a week. It was difficult for me to consciously stop being ‘in the 
field’. 
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Establishing connections 
 
I have some personal connections to young Somalis in Melbourne thanks to my time studying 
Arabic at the University of Melbourne, and my work as a tutor in Development Studies and in the 
administrative area of international student settlement at Victoria University. I discussed my idea of 
researching generation 1.5 Somali Australians with relevant friends and acquaintances to gauge 
their reaction before commencing. Their reactions were generally positive, with one close Somali 
friend saying ‘it will be good for someone to pay us some positive attention and not just put a nasty 
story in the paper’.  
I was introduced to some people of influence and community leaders via my contacts and 
these people kindly agreed to help me connect with young Somalis who would fit my research 
profile. I began to realise that it would not be realistic for me to tackle the entire Somali community 
within Melbourne, given the broad spread of the settlement. So I decided to concentrate on two 
areas: the greater areas of Heidelberg West and North Melbourne/Flemington.  
At first, I was directed to speak with a community leader in West Heidelberg by a number 
of my friends. They spoke with each other at length about this, and eventually nominated a man 
called Mohammed in his late 30s to introduce me to this leader. I attended my first meeting with 
him in the Heidelberg mall in May 2012, accompanied by Mohammed.  
I was conscious of the fact that this meeting was about me asking permission to conduct my 
project within the Somali community in West Heidelberg, and also of the great respect with which 
this man was regarded. We met in a café he owns in The Mall in West Heidelberg. He was 
welcoming but quite reserved and I felt very young and inexperienced in his presence. I explained 
to him what I intended to do and the sort of people I was interested in interviewing and was 
somewhat surprised when he asked to see further documentation from the university and to meet 
with my supervisor. (It is worth noting that this community leader also holds a PhD, and so was 
perhaps more familiar with academic administrative processes than most people are.)  
I invited my primary supervisor to a meeting with him shortly after. This meeting was 
characterized by a sense of caution and respect on the part of all present. My supervisor Yaso 
Nadarajah explained that she has a great deal of experience working with different community 
groups and spoke about some of her recent work in Papua New Guinea where she worked with 
elders to deepen the experience of reciprocity and sharing of mutually beneficial knowledge. I felt 
somewhat left out of this meeting, but tried to see it as an opportunity for my study to be validated 
by a powerful figure within the community. I was also conscious that this meeting might constitute 
the feeling of being ignored when a researcher ‘enters the field’, as noted by Clifford Geertz.84 I 
wanted to make clear that I had done preliminary research and had some grounding within the 
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community, however I had not expected the level of protocol that was required in order for me to be 
granted access to the community. This meeting with Yaso was also in some ways an extension of a 
cultural protocol with one elder from the community and another from the academic world. I 
believe it engendered a recognition of mutual responsibility and respect. 
I had a sense of great respect for the gatekeeping, which protects community members, and 
also my first glimmer of understanding that the Somali Australian community in Melbourne has 
been researched and studied before. I knew I had to ‘prove myself’ in order to proceed. Indeed, this 
was also true in other regions of Melbourne and similar meetings also took place in Preston and 
North Melbourne. At these meetings, my supervisor was not required, and I had a feeling that I had 
passed the first test, and the first community leader has vouched for me to his peers. During these 
meetings I was conscious of being more reserved than is my natural personality, in order to show 
respect and not to speak out of turn with these respected elders. The meetings began with a 
discussion about what I intended to achieve and why I was interested in this particular topic.  
On all three occasions, I had a strong sense that my focus on generation 1.5 was of interest. 
All three leaders remarked that there have been some issues between the younger generations and 
their parents and grandparents in Melbourne and that it would be valuable to have a greater 
understanding of the dynamics between generations. In North Melbourne, the community leader I 
spoke to was a woman who is extremely active in the cultural life of Somalis living in the area. She 
impressed upon me the importance of educating young people in the ways of their heritage and 
culture in order to avoid ‘problems with crime and the law’. In her eyes, it was vital to keep 
community and cultural links strong, and this was why she was eager for me to proceed with my 
study — to bring greater understanding about how the generation 1.5ers see themselves and their 
place in the world, in the context of the complex and often contested (and contesting) expectations 
they face from different quarters. 
These discussions were quite lengthy, and afterward, the community leaders facilitated my 
introduction to some young people. I had a strong sense that after attending these meetings, I had 
been granted permission to continue with my study, as the leaders were gatekeepers for their 
community in a very protective sense. Invariably, some of the young people I was introduced to 
were more interested in being involved than others and were much more willing to be in frequent 
contact with me. These people became my key informants85 and I relied on them heavily to contact 
further participants and vouch for me personally.  
These key informants were very generous with their time and all participated in in-depth 
interviews with me on more than one occasion. They would also organize times and locations for 
interviews and focus groups. I am very grateful to these individuals in particular, because without 
them it would have been very difficult for me to gain access to so many young people in a relatively 
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short space of time. The fact that they encouraged their peers to let me speak to them enabled me to 
meet a much broader sample of Somali youth than would have been possible otherwise. Thanks to 
the key informants, I was able to secure a point of entry into the community when I knew only a 
few people. They served as my initial contacts, however I was later able to rely on a referral 
snowball sample technique.86  
I conducted in-depth interviews with a total of 24 respondents (12 in North 
Melbourne/Flemington and 12 in Heidelberg West). In addition to this, I held focus groups, 
discussions and interviews with 15 community members including parents, young people, 
professionals and older people (the older people needed translation by the younger members of the 
group). I also kept in regular contact with two social workers in the areas where I conducted the 
study. I was able to meet with a public defender at Victoria Legal aid who had experience defending 
young Somali offenders (all male). 
Much of my data was gathered through extended focus groups and extended interviews. In 
addition to being particularly suited to this type of project it is also a link to the Somali oral culture. 
As I discuss in section three, the Somali language was not written down until the 1970s, and there is 
a strong culture of lengthy group discussion, (which is seemingly at odds with the ‘culture of 
violence’ that has been ascribed to Somalis, and interrogated in section three) both to impart 
information and to resolve issues.87 Additionally, the fieldwork was carried out at a pace that ebbed 
and flowed according to the needs of the participants.  
Islam was a constant consideration during the course of the research, with frequent pauses 
during discussions so that respondents could pray. Almost all fieldwork halted during Ramadan, 
which in 2013 fell between July 9 and August 7. In 2014, Ramadan fell between June 29 and July 
27. During these periods of fasting and prayer I communicated only via email with the respondents 
to organise future dates or exchange greetings. Every participant was a practicing Muslim (with 
various levels of observance) and Islam was a crucial part of their social and cultural lives and their 
sense of self. All the women wore headscarves as is common in the Somali community in 
Melbourne. All the men also dressed modestly. For example, they did not wear any singlets or low-
hanging trousers. 
All of the participants arrived in Australia after the eruption of the civil war in Somalia in 
1991. Most arrived with their families via the Humanitarian and Refugee program and some were 
nominated for family visas by relatives who had already settled in Australia. They were from varied 
backgrounds in Somalia, although most were from urban rather than rural areas. Celia McMichael 
describes the odd practice whereby researchers document the lives of immigrants after they have 
crossed borders without focusing on the forces that led them to flee their homeland. She asked here 
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participants to talk about their previous lives in Somalia, their flight and their arrival in Australia.88 
Similarly, I have taken the view that my participants are informed by their physical, cultural and 
historic pasts and that it is important to find out about their lives in Somalia and their journey to 
Australia as well as their settlement here.  
 
 
Data analysis methodology 
 
Bourgois notes in his ethnography research into heroin addicts and crack smokers in San Francisco 
that ‘ending an ethnographic project often feels like a betrayal of friendship’, and it can be difficult 
to ‘leave the field’.89 I too found it difficult to move from data collection to interpretation and 
reporting. There was a ‘line in the sand’ where I stopped collecting more data, but before outlining 
my methodology for analysis the data, it is important to explain that the process of collating data 
began well before I finished collecting it. Qualitative data analysis is a fluid, reflective and iterative 
process that already starts as data are being collected, rather than after data collection has ceased.90 
In fact, the process of collecting and analysing qualitative data has been described as as much ‘art’ 
as science, or as a ‘dance’, in the words of William Miller and Benjamin Crabtree.91 
 Over almost three years, I documented around 80,000 words of raw material. For each 
interview or focus group session, I initially transcribed the session word for word. I did not set out 
to focus on certain themes, and indeed many themes that I was not expecting to emerge did in due 
course. As I was transcribing the data, themes emerged iteratively. At the same time, I was 
documenting countless field notes and reflections on participant observation I was carrying out. I 
started to use NVIVO software, but ultimately found that I was able to conceptually extract the 
dominant themes through a process of sifting, sorting and identifying key themes and collating them 
accordingly, without the aid of this program. Perhaps this was due to the relatively small number of 
interviews I conducted. Even though the amount of raw material I collected was large, I developed 
such intimate relationships with people that I felt I knew the issues deeply without the aid of a 
computer program. I can see, however, that if I had expanded the sample size, and especially the 
size of the research team, then such software would be necessary.  
 I coded the interview transcripts with around 40 different categories. Over time, I began to 
see overlapping categories and was able to collapse these into 11 distinct re-emerging themes. Once 
I had extracted key themes, I began collating all of the other notes I had made into categories. It was 
satisfying to see conceptual links occur in the most unexpected of ways. Similar stories kept 
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emerging, and reinforcing the importance of the themes I had identified. Again, this was a time-
consuming and iterative process, resulting in the themes outlined in the three findings chapters. 
 Finally, when reporting data in the findings chapters, I date the material and refer to the 
type of data collected, as ‘INT’ (for Individual Interviews) GROUP INT for those extended 
interviews that comprised only two young men, ‘FG’ (for Focus Group), ‘FN’ (for Field Note), and 
‘PO’ (for a reflection on Participant Observation). As already mentioned, Community Member 
Profiles were an important starting point for deciding which avenues to follow in the research, and 
some of this data will be presented graphically in section three. In order to maintain confidentiality, 
I developed codenames for all research participants. I explained that they would not be referred to 
by their own names, and the young people were pleased about this.  
 
 
Reflections on the process  
 
When I first commenced drawing up this research project, I envisaged meeting a select group of 
Somali young people and interviewing them at length on many different occasions. I believed that 
collecting their life histories would be the most thorough way to come to understand the Somali 
generation 1.5 living in Melbourne today. As Mulligan and Nadarajah put it: 
 
Life histories, or personal biographies, are a particular kind of story and they can be relevant to a 
wide range of research interests. However, they involve considerable time and effort because there is 
much to cover and the written account is likely to pass through numerous exchanges between the 
“subject” and the author(s).92 
 
I was sure that the best way to collect accurate and authentic data was through engagement 
with my subjects’ life stories. I planned on meeting young people at community events (football, 
Somali Independence day celebrations, the Somali book fair amongst others) and striking up a 
relationship with them over time that would allow me to instigate the painstaking process of 
collecting life stories. I was looking forward to really getting inside their heads and I believed that 
time and trust would ultimately all but remove the barriers between us as researcher and respondent.  
In order to begin this process, I started to attend community events as described above. I 
was also given access to some young people by community leaders. Although I hadn’t planned it, 
the meetings with young people fell into a pattern of a focus group, which ended with an invitation 
from me to meet again individually for one or more longer and more comprehensive interviews.  
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Unsurprisingly, these invitations were rarely taken up. I had been diligent in collecting data to form 
my ‘community member profiles’ and I ended up with 45 of these documents. I consoled myself 
that this data was also useful to be able to make quantitative statements but I was disappointed that 
Somali young people weren’t throwing themselves at me to tell me their stories. After all, I believed 
my research would benefit them. I began to understand that my original timelines had been wildly 
optimistic and that I would need to re-evaluate the logistics of the entire project.  
Events in my personal life also conspired to make this abundantly clear to me after my 
husband was severely burnt in a freak accident. He was in hospital and then at home under my care 
for about six months before he was able to live as before and during this time I took leave from 
study and did not have any contact at all with the Somali community. 
I was extremely nervous about returning to study and worried that my hard-won 
relationships would be in tatters. It took a couple of days of steeling myself to call my friends and 
contacts. But I was met with genuine empathy and compassion and I believe that this difficult event 
in my life actually helped to connect me to my research subjects who had previously been keeping 
me at length. I don’t know if this was simply due to the time that had elapsed between our meetings. 
Perhaps they had evaluated the experience and decided independently that it was a worthwhile 
project to give their time and stories to. Or perhaps my return after my husband’s injury offered 
proof to them that I really cared about the project and the broader Somali community in Melbourne. 
Perhaps they simply felt sorry for me and were more inclined to help me after learning that I had 
experienced hardship and needed to care for my family. I did have a sense that in sharing my very 
personal story, I had demystified the role of the researcher or inquirer and that they felt more 
comfortable relating to me at a personal level. Whatever the reason, after returning from my leave, I 
was able to enjoy a much closer relationship with the respondents.  
The initial focus groups with all participants were relaxed and easy, however, even after my 
return to research, I still found that the young men were more reluctant than the women to be 
interviewed individually. I had anticipated that I would be able to strike up a rapport more easily 
with the young women, but I had also assumed that because all the participants were mostly raised 
in Australia they would be more open with me than their parents’ generation for example. While my 
experience did show this to be the case (some of the older generation viewed me with suspicion at 
first, even after being introduced by people of influence), I learned that the young people’s exposure 
to an Australian way of life certainly did not erase cultural and religious expectations.  
After conducting group discussions and switching the recorder off, I was always invited to 
stay and chat with the participants. This led to many more hours of informal conversation. During 
the discussions in general, I took on the role of a moderator,93 often only interrupting a lively 
discussion to move on to new points of interest or to bring a debate to a close when I felt it had been 
                                                
93 David L. Morgan, Focus Groups as Qualitative Research, 2nd Edition ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
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covered comprehensively. This was an interesting position to be in, as the young people sometimes 
appealed to me to restore order when conversations became heated or too lively to follow any more. 
I felt that they had elevated me to this moderator position without me seeking it out. 
To ensure anonymity of the respondents (in line with my Ethics Approval), I gave all the 
respondents codenames. Any time a given name appears in the thesis, it is a codename. Only four 
young men were comfortable enough to take part in more detailed individual interviews in the end. 
Two did not want to be recorded. In these cases, I made extensive notes after the interview, and 
have flagged these reconstructed quotes as they appear in the findings chapters. The other young 
men were happy to return to a more intimate group interview scenario with two participants. The 
young men were much less comfortable discussing gender related subjects, such as marriage and 
girlfriend-boyfriend relationships. I believe this is due to the Islamic teaching that non-related 
women and men should have a restricted relationship both in the public and private spheres.  
As previously described, my experience mirrors almost exactly the experience of Yusuf 
Sheikh Omar in his PhD study completed in 2011.  
 
At first, the research plan aimed at keeping the balance between female and male participants but 
during the pilot project in stage one, it was evident that girls were not comfortable discussing some 
matters related to gender relationships with me while boys did not mind. Islam teaches that interactions 
between men and women who are not related, should be restricted in both the public and private 
spheres… These gender divisions made it difficult for the researcher to discuss a range of issues with 
young women. For example, during the pilot interviews, the young women were reluctant to discuss 
issues on gender relationships particularly boyfriend–girlfriend relationships while young men were 
open about discussing these relationships. However, I did take the opportunity to conduct several focus 
groups with young women and in this context they were happy to discuss a range of issues. In that 
sense, they were an invaluable resource for the study.94 
 
Although I conducted my fieldwork in Suburban Melbourne, in areas that (I had thought) 
were familiar to me rather than in some exotic locale, I was surprised at just how foreign and 
unfamiliar the worlds of the subjects were to me, despite having lived much of my adult life in the 
metropolitan areas of Melbourne. This showed me very clearly that we can inhabit a world and 
think we know it well. But others inhabit the same world, and experience it vastly differently. 
 
                                                
94 Omar, "Integration from Youth Perspectives: A Comparative Study of Young Somali Men in Melbourne 
and Minneapolis," 84. 
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III CONTEXTUALISING SOMALIA AND SOMALIS IN MELBOURNE  
    
(a) Somali history, contested issues, and representations of violence  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This section contextualises Somalia and the experience of Somalis in Melbourne. I look at Somali 
history, and cover several contested issues. This leads on to an important elucidation of the ways in 
which Somalis have been represented as violent in academic and popular discourse. Next I 
interrogate representations and misrepresentations of actual violent acts perpetrated by Somalis (or 
members of Somali-affiliated groups). It seems that violence is a characteristic often attributed to 
Somalis both in Somalia and abroad. I give some examples of how representations of Somalis have 
been constructed over the past two centuries, and the ways in which Somalis are represented and 
misrepresented in terms of violence today.  
 
 
Contextualising Somalia 
 
Ghassan Dibbeh has claimed that ‘Today, Somalia is considered to constitute a modern form of 
anarchy’.1 As Celia McMichael describes it: ‘Over more than a century, various accounts and 
depictions of Somalia have built a cumulative image of the country as inhospitable, hot, largely 
arid, peopled by needy and violent primitives and racked by conflict’.2 In describing the country, its 
geography, people, religion and culture, this section gives some examples of how such a perception 
has been created and maintained over many decades. A brief history of Somalia is thus the aim 
here.  
Somalia is located in the easternmost part of the Horn of Africa. It borders the Gulf of Aden 
and the Indian Ocean, as well as 2385km of land boundaries (with Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti).3 
It is comprised principally of desert and Somalis recognise four seasons (two rainy and two dry). 
The rainy seasons represent a reprieve after months of drought in the dry seasons. During the wet 
                                                
1 Ghassan Dibeh, "Resources, Conflict and State Fragility: Iraq and Somalia," in Fragile States: Causes, 
Costs and Responses, ed. Wim Naude, Amelia ASantos-Paulino, and Mark McGillivray (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 82. 
2 McMichael, "Memory and Resettlement: Somali Women in Melbourne and Emotional Wellbeing," 59. 
3 Central Intelligence Agency, "Somalia," in The World Factbook (Langley, Virginia: Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2015). 
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season, the rural population flourishes, with abundant supplies of food and only limited care 
required for the animals. Many social functions are conducted during this season. Due to its very 
harsh environment, climate is the primary factor in much of Somali life. For the large nomadic 
population, the timing and amount of rainfall are crucial determinants of the adequacy of grazing 
and the prospects of relative prosperity. Starvation can occur during droughts.4  
Somali exports include livestock and bananas, and other crops such as sugar cane, maize 
and sorghum. Industry is focused on processing agricultural products. While the country is thought 
to be relatively rich in mineral resources including lead, gold, zircon, coal and uranium, these are 
not fully exploited.5 In fact, Somalia is one of Africa’s poorest countries and remains profoundly 
dependent on foreign aid. It has suffered recently from drought, flooding, famine and high foreign 
debt, in addition to the effects of the long-running civil war. 
Somalia’s 2015 population is estimated to be around 10.5 million, however this estimate is 
complicated due to the large number of nomads as well as refugee movement from Somalia.6 
Current population growth is estimated at 1.83% per annum.7 Since the onset of the civil war, many 
have relocated to urban areas. Although statistical information on urbanisation is scarce, current 
estimates place the rate of urbanisation in Somalia at 4.06% per annum; and the estimate of the 
current urbanised population being 39.6%.8 The estimated population of the capital of Somalia, 
Mogadishu, which has been a thriving urban centre since the 16th century, is currently 2.138 
million. The next largest city is Hargeysa, with a much smaller population of 760,000. 9 
 
 
A brief ‘official’ history of Somalia 
 
The Somalia we know today has a very short history. It was created in Mogadishu on the first of 
July 1960 when the previously Italian administered territory of Somalia achieved independence and 
merged with the formerly British protectorate which had become independent just four days 
earlier.10 However, it goes without saying that the history of the region and the Somali people is 
much longer. 
The Kingdom of Punt, as described in ancient Egyptian writings, was probably located in 
the area of Somalia’s northern and eastern coastlines. Trading routes were established in these areas 
between the 7th and 10th centuries AD. Somali nomads had lived in the interior of these areas since 
                                                
4 Chapin Metz, " Somalia: A Country Study," 59. 
5 Edmund Wright, A Dictionary of World History, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
6 Central Intelligence Agency, "Somalia." 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 79; Edward A Alpers, East Africa and the Indian Ocean  (Markus Wiener Publishers, 2009). 
10 Leland Conley Barrows, "Somalia," in Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern world, ed. Peter N. Stearns 
(Oxford Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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this time. As Somalis migrated east and south, they expelled or absorbed the Oromo pastoralists and 
Bantu farming peoples and took over coastal towns that had belonged to the Swahili people of East 
Africa including Mogadishu.11  
There are varied theories about the beginnings of Islam in Somalia. It is thought that early 
in the Prophet’s ministry, a band of persecuted Muslims fled across the Red Sea into the Horn of 
Africa with the Prophet’s encouragement. There the Muslims were afforded protection by the 
Ethiopian negus (king). Alternatively, Islam could have come to Somalia via contacts with Persian 
and Arab merchants and seamen who founded settlements along the Somali coast more than one 
thousand years ago.12 These, and other accounts, seem equally plausible.  
Today the Somali people occupy the republic created in 1960, and also the Hawd and 
Ogaden regions of eastern Ethiopia, southern Djibouti, and north-eastern Kenya.  Until the colonial 
period of the 1840s, the Somali people had never formed a single political unit. Rather, their 
organization was based on clan and region. With the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the late 19th century, 
Somali borders were drawn up with European interests as the primary concern.13 Even so, according 
to the Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern World, Somali homogeneity is reinforced by a 
‘profound adherence to Islam’.14 I will return to this notion of a homogenous Somali society later in 
this section, as it is a controversial theme. 
 
 
Colonial involvement 
 
There has been a long history of colonial involvement in Somalia, much of it concerned with the 
territorial ambitions of both the colonisers and the indigenous population. At the turn of the 16th 
century, Somali armies marched under the leadership of Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (with 
Ottoman support) and invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia). They destroyed many historic buildings, 
churches and manuscripts during this campaign. The use of firearms, which were only seldom 
available in Ethiopia at that time contributed to the conquest of significant territories.15 Ethiopia was 
saved by the arrival of Portuguese expedition led by Cristovao de Gama. Some claim that the 
Portuguese had responded to a call for help from their fellow Christians.16 Hostilities continued for 
the remainder of the century. This likely influenced the forming of a close relationship between the 
Somalis and the Ottomans, which subsequently kept the geopolitical tensions high in the area. 
                                                
11 Ibid. 
12 Chapin Metz, " Somalia: A Country Study," 96. 
13 Jennifer Hyndman, "A Post-Cold War Geography of Forced Migration in Kenya and Somalia," The 
Professional Geographer 51, no. 1 (1999). 
14 Barrows, "Somalia." 
15 Richard Pankhurst, The Ethiopians: A History  (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1998). 90. 
16 Edgar Prestage, The Portuguese Pioneers (London: A & C Black Ltd., 1933). 
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Centuries later, both British and Italian colonial involvement with Somalia was 
commercially motivated, with the British garrison at Aden establishing relations with northern 
Somali coastal towns in order to secure a reliable source of meat. Italian involvement in Somalia 
began in 1888 when an Italian political figure, Vincenzo Filonardi, leased several coastal towns 
from the Sultan of Zanzibar. When his companies failed, the Italian state assumed control in 1905.17 
The French controlled what is now Djibouti, where there are still people with Somali ethnic origins 
living today.  
Colonial intervention in the early to mid 19th century contributed significantly to the drastic 
alteration of the political, cultural and economic Somali context. The country was considered to be 
strategically valuable, but with limited economic potential.18 Colonial powers did develop some 
infrastructure, such as the Franco-Ethiopian railway, and ports in coastal towns. The colonial 
division of Somalia has had long-lasting effects, perhaps chiefly in the contested borders. 
Interestingly, when the Italians occupied Ethiopia (briefly) in 1935-1936, they attached the 
ethnically Somali regions of Ogaden and Hawd to the colonial Somali province. However, when 
England restored Ethiopia’s independence, they re-established the borders with Ethiopia, further 
dividing ethnic Somalis. This territorial confusion and ambition has marked Somali political history 
indelibly, with conflicts such as the 1977-78 attack on Ethiopia weakening the regime of 
Muhammad Siyad Barre, and leading to a decade of instability before the eventual outbreak of civil 
war in 1991. 
 
 
Post-Independence 
 
The period immediately after the achievement of independence in 1960 was one of relative peace, 
with the political system still largely defined by lineage. 19  However, clan-based political 
fragmentation escalated, as dozens of clan-based parties formed.20 This point is illustrated by the 
fact that at the 1969 elections (nine years after independence was achieved), there were 64 parties 
contesting to represent a population of less than four million. Samatar has argued that these parties 
represented clan lines rather than political ideologies.21  
Leland Barrows names the weak and uneven economic development of the country during 
this period, the divisive nature of clan society, and the irredentism resulting from the large numbers 
                                                
17 Barrows, "Somalia." 
18 Ahmed Samatar, The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia  (Wisconsin: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1989). 
19 Mark Bradbury, The Somali Conflict: Prospects for peace  (London: Oxfam, 1993). 
20 Catherine Besteman, Unraveling Somalia: Race, Violence and the Legacy of Slavery  (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999). 12. 
21 Ahmed Samatar, Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality (London: Institue for African Alternatives Zed 
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of Somalis living outside the borders, as accumulating problems which eventually led to the 
assassination of the president, Abdirashid Ali Shermarka and a coup d'état by the army chief of 
staff, General Muhammad Siyad Barre on 21 October 1969.22 
One of Siyad Barre’s great aims appears to have been to foster a sense of nationalist 
sentiment through ‘scientific socialism’. Some of his policies were very forward thinking, such as 
those which allowed women greater rights and outlawed female infibulation. 23  In order to 
encourage greater loyalty to the law and state, Barre created government bodies to punish disloyalty 
under the National Security Laws of 1970.24 Some examples of ‘disloyalty’ were tribalism and lack 
of revolutionary zeal.25 Some who spoke out against the regime were publicly executed.26 There 
was initially a great deal of support for Siyad Barre, but he was ultimately unable to provide a 
solution to Somalia’s chronic political instability. According to Besteman, Somalis remained 
divided along lineage lines, despite his efforts at unification.27 
In 1970, President Muhammad Siyad Barre declared Somalia a socialist state, greatly 
strengthening relations with the USSR. In 1977, with the help of Soviet arms, Somalia attempted to 
seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, but was defeated. The tables turned when the USSR switched 
its allegiance to Ethiopia, based on the socialist orientation of the new Ethiopian administration.28 
This has been described as a proxy battleground in the Cold War. Following this, Somalia improved 
its relations with its Arab neighbours and the United States, completing the turnaround between 
global powers. 
Barre’s regime was weakened considerably by his territorial ambitions regarding Ethiopia, 
and with the increasing corruption, coupled with a terrible drought inland, a group of local clan 
leaders finally deposed Siyad Barre in 1991. British Somaliland also seceded from Somalia at this 
time. The clans could not agree on a replacement leader and the ensuing power struggle between 
warlords Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed killed and wounded thousands of 
civilians. Some claim that Somalia has been without an effective central government since this 
time.29  
 
 
  
                                                
22 Barrows, "Somalia." 
23 Besteman, Unraveling Somalia: Race, Violence and the Legacy of Slavery: 13. 
24 Ibid., 12. 
25 Lewis, A modern history of the Somali: 212. 
26 Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, "Somalia: From finest to failed state," Africa Review, 28 September 2010. 
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28 Jan Palmowski, A Dictionary of Contemporary World HIstory, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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Civil War and Anarchy 
 
Since the outbreak of war in 1991, Somalia has witnessed intense conflict between insurgent 
groups, with refugees fleeing advancing fronts from many directions. By 1992, some six million 
people were facing starvation and the UN deployed troops against rival warlords throughout the 
country. In the face of warlords’ opposition, international agencies tried to alleviate the suffering.30 
Following this immediate anarchy, there were considerable efforts to unite Somalia. Somali factions 
participated in conferences in neighbouring countries and elsewhere under the auspices of the UN 
and the African Union. Attempts at unification came close to success in 2002, although the new 
president and parliament (elected and convened in Kenya) were prevented from moving to 
Mogadishu by hostile factions. 
There has followed a string of transitional governments, with many rounds of peace talks 
and multiple international interventions. The Transitional Federal Government was established in 
2004, regaining the South of Somalia by 2006 from the Islamic Courts Union. Conflict continued to 
escalate, with the administration’s Prime Minister narrowly avoiding death in an attack in 2005. The 
Islamic Courts Union then splintered into various radical groups, most notably Al Shabaab (the 
youth). These groups have since been fighting the Somali government for control of the country and 
Al Shabaab has become a powerful insurgent group. 
In 2011, Somalia again suffered a major famine, and a mass exodus of its people in search 
of food. The civil war has continued, with brief periods of respite for over two decades. In August 
2014, Operation Indian Ocean was launched to target the remaining insurgent pockets in the 
country.31 Al Shabaab has been steadily moving forces up towards Mogadishu and the absence of 
authority has led to Somali pirates becoming a major threat in the area and prompted a further 
exodus of those Somali citizens able to escape the country. In January 2014 the UNHCR estimated 
that a total of 1,121,738 refugees and 35,472 asylum seekers had fled Somalia.32 These refugees 
have scattered mainly throughout neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia. Many made 
their way north by sea across the Gulf of Aden to Yemen. Some refugees have headed for Europe, 
with the UK hosting a sizeable population, and others have traveled as far afield as Australia. It is 
worth highlighting that the population of Somalia as in the 1970s stood at around 4 million. Even 
with an increase in population over the past 40 years, the combined total of refugees and asylum 
seekers as calculated by the UNHCR represents a significant proportion of this population. The 
population living abroad is crucial in keeping the Somali economy afloat: ‘From abroad, the Somali 
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diaspora is estimated to send home between US$750 million and US$1 billion annually’.33 
However, there have been questions raised about the trajectory and final destination of that 
money.34  
 
 
Contested issues in Somali history 
 
I have presented a brief historical narrative above. However, many of the issues alluded to deserve 
more detailed and complex analysis, especially due to considerable dissent among historians and 
Somali scholars. This section looks at some of the more contested issues in the history of Somalia. 
Lewis points out that because the Somali language was not written until 1972, Somalia 
possesses an ‘unusually rich oral literature’.35 Partly because of this, there is scant documented 
evidence available for examining Somali history pre-19th century.  By no means does this mean that 
there is not a long tradition of Somali history ripe for historical scholarship.  In fact, many post-
colonial scholars note that the lack of documented historical sources does not render historiography 
futile. Indeed, ignoring other modes of history can produce skewed historical narratives.36 However, 
Besteman writes that there are only a few descriptions of Somalia pre 1800, and these come from 
early Islamic and Portuguese travellers and concern the coastal towns. ‘For the interior, we must 
rely primarily on oral traditions and narratives.’37  
Early documented history concerns the arrival of slaves into Somalia from the 17th century. 
 
In general, these sources reveal that Somalis acquired slaves for a variety of purposes during 
different historical periods: urban coastal families had used slaves in the Benaadir textile industry for 
hundreds of years; rural families obtained slaves for tending livestock, as concubines, and in 
increasingly large numbers for agricultural labor during the commercial boom of the nineteenth 
century.38 
 
The explorer Ibn Battuta arrived in the 14th century to coastal towns producing raw 
materials and cloth. He was amazed to find port cities that might almost be called merchant 
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republics, and recorded the following impressions: ‘Mogadishu is a very large town. The people are 
merchants and very rich. They own large herds of camels…and also sheep. Here they manufacture 
the textiles called after the name of the town; these are of superior quality and are exported to Egypt 
and other places.’39 
Somalis were safe from being enslaved as they were part of the Islamic world and there is a 
religious tenet that free Muslims cannot be enslaved.40 Slavery of other groups would continue well 
into the 20th century, despite the fact that the Italian colonial government issued three ordinances 
outlawing slavery.41  
 
 
Islam in Somalia 
 
The history of commercial and intellectual contact between the inhabitants of the Arabian and 
Somali coasts may help explain the Somalis’ close connection with the Prophet Muhammad.42 The 
Somali clans claim descent (though distant and mythical) from noble Arab ancestors, even 
including the prophet Muhammad.43  
Despite the much earlier Muslim settlement in Somalia, large-scale conversion of the 
Somalis arguably did not take place until the 11th, 12th, and 13th centuries with the arrival of 
powerful Muslim patriarchs, in particular the renowned Sheikh Daarood Jabarti and Sheikh Isaaq. 
Darood was married to Doombira Dir, the daughter of a local patriarch. This union gave rise to the 
alliance that forms the largest clan-family in Somalia, the Daarood. Sheikh Isaaq founded the large 
Isaaq clan-family in northern Somalia.44 Chapin Metz asserts that in addition to the clan system of 
lineages, the Arabian sheikhs introduced the patriarchal ethos and patrilineal genealogy typical of 
Semitic societies into Somalia.45 This genealogy would gradually replace the indigenous Somali 
social organization. As a result, Islam is inextricably linked to genealogy in Somalia. 
Islam is often characterised by a close relationship between faith and the state.46 In the case 
of Somalia, where an already powerful kinship organisation structure existed, Islam was made 
compatible with the existing social structure. The Somali have maintained their disparate kinship 
groups, even within the unifying force of Islam. Lewis points out that Islam in Somalia has long 
been associated with the brotherhoods ‘which express the Sufi, or mystical view of the Muslim 
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faith’. Sufism is more readily accepted in some Muslim countries than others, (it is decried as 
heresy by the Saudi Arabian Wahhabis47). It emphasizes a personal relationship with God while also 
exalting ‘the charismatic powers of saints’. Thus, it is ‘particularly well adapted to the Somali clan 
system in which clan ancestors readily become transposed into Muslim saints’.48 So we can see that 
Islam and the clan system are intricately tied together, and have influenced each other for many 
centuries.  
The vast majority of Somalis today are Sunni Muslims (Sufism is still practised within the 
broader context of Sunni Muslims). Many scholars believe that Islam is a distinguishing factor of 
great importance for the Somali.49 It has been invoked to explain a supposed sense of singularity 
among Somalis. According to Chapin Metz, their loyalty to Islam ‘reinforces distinctions that set 
Somalis apart from their immediate African neighbours, most of whom are Christians… or 
adherents of indigenous African faiths’.50 
Chapin Metz argues that Somalis have modified Islam to their particular social and physical 
environment, for example, merging Islam with the clan system as described earlier. She notes that 
elements of traditional knowledge were used in astronomical interpretations, which were 
traditionally used to determine seasonal changes and times for migration.51 This astronomy is now 
also used in Somalia to set the dates of rituals which are specifically Somali. Certain types of illness 
(including tuberculosis and pneumonia) are also attributed to spirit possession by folk religion 
practitioners and believers. Somalis still actively engage in pre-Islamic rituals including a collective 
rain-making ritual practised in the south. According to the Pew Research Center’s 2012 Global 
Religious Affiliation report, less than 0.1% of Somalis identified as believers in ‘folk religion’.52 
However, the report acknowledges that it is very difficult to collect data on folk religionists due to 
the lack of official recognition of folk religions and the blurred boundaries between official 
religions and folk religions, meaning that elements of both may be practised concurrently.53 The 
report stipulates that in Sub Saharan Africa, ‘many of those who indicate that they are committed to 
the practice of Christianity and Islam also incorporate elements of African traditional religions into 
their lives’.54  
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The importance of clans 
 
In 1961, Ian Lewis described Somali society as consisting of six patrilineal clan-families formed by 
the descendants of mythical Arabic ancestors who arrived in Somalia 25-35 generations ago. He 
explained that each clan-family encompassed a set of patrilineally related clans, subclans, sub 
subclans and lineages.55 Since Lewis’ seminal account of Somali Pastoral society, much attention 
has been focussed on the segmentary lineage, the pastoral lifestyle and the strength of Islam in 
Somalia.56 According to Lewis, kinship pervades all aspect of Somali life; personal, political, 
cultural and religious. Likeness has been drawn between the six clan-families and the ‘Old 
Testament version of the tribal segmentation of the children of Israel’.57 
The pastoral nomadic clan-families comprise the Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye and Darood. The Dir 
are concentrated in the West, the Isaaq in the central northern and eastern regions and the Darood 
can be found further east. The Hawiye live mainly in the south. These clans are nomadic and 
traditionally spend much of the year in transit, however, they remain within their broader area of 
land. The agricultural clan-families comprise the Digil and Rahanwayn. These clans reside in the 
South of Somalia. Lewis estimated that not more than an eighth of the total Somali population are 
sedentary cultivators (although there has been rapid urbanisation in Somalia since independence). 
‘The Dir family are generally regarded as having the oldest Somali heritage’. 58  From this 
information, it can be seen that the clan system is not purely a locality or class-based system. While 
the pastoral nomads do move around, they are based within certain regions and move between 
known points. Although the agricultural clans are not given the same status as the nomadic clans, 
this may be a result of the arrival of many agricultural labourers as slaves from the 17th century. 
Muhammad Farah Aidid, the de-facto leader of Somalia from 1991 to 1993, describes clans 
in this way: ‘The very fact that this social structure has been continuing for thousands of years 
without much change despite colonial rule and an oppressive military regime under Siad Barre 
shows its strength, utility, and capability to solve the various problems and exigencies of their 
difficult life.’59 Indeed, other scholars have pointed out how uniquely suited the clan system is to 
the particular challenges and requirements of living in Somalia. For example, Ken Menkhaus 
explains that ‘the law and order Somalia enjoyed prior to the 1980s — and Somalia was 
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unquestionably one of the safest places in Africa — was a reflection of the social contract more 
than the capacity of the police (or of a central government)’.60  
However, it appears that Somalia has also been divided along kinship lines. The clan 
system has existed within Somalia for much longer than any form of centralised government, and 
the two governance systems have not co-existed peacefully. One reason given for Siyad Barre’s 
nationalist campaign of the late 1970s was to abolish distinctions based on social inequality to 
remove the master-slave distinction.61 The campaign aimed to draw the clans together under one 
national flag. In this quest for unification, tribalism was condemned as the most serious impediment 
to national unity. Siyad Barre denounced it as a ‘disease’ obstructing development not only in 
Somalia, but also throughout the developing world. Harsh punishments were meted out to those 
who were practising activities that amounted to tribalism.62 This campaign was a sustained attempt 
to unite Somalia, however, it was ultimately unsuccessful. It has been argued that the very idea of 
an organised state is anathema to Somali society because the nomadic system is ‘essentially 
anarchic’.63 This claim is somewhat controversial, and goes against Menkaus’ description of a 
social contract and the order that prevailed before the civil war. However, the importance of 
nomadic kinship relations in the organisation of Somali society cannot be denied. 
Drawing on psychological explanations of personal and national characteristics, Lewis 
emphasizes the way that the physical conditions in Somalia have influenced the character of the 
Somali people: ‘In the harsh struggle for survival which is a nomad’s lot, suspicion is the natural 
attitude towards those with whom one competes for access to scarce pasture and water. This 
defence mechanism is extended to all contexts of social interaction and hence becomes a national 
characteristic.’64 It is important to remember that Lewis, while formidable in his contributions to the 
study of Somalia, was writing over half a century ago. Nevertheless, according to Lewis, the clans 
were ‘driven by the poverty of their resources to intense competition for access to water and 
grazing’, which are matters of life and death in the desert.65 Despite this controversial explanation 
of the way Somalis are pitted against each other in a struggle for survival, it seems that the clans 
have been able to maintain a kind of fragmented stability across the country, even if they did 
maintain the stability with violent methods. Unification attempts, on the other hand, have led to 
more direct conflict. I believe this shows just how fragmented the social landscape of Somalia is. 
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Social Stratification 
 
The clans are said to originate with a single male ancestor. ‘Ethnic Somalis are united by language, 
culture, devotion to Islam, and to a common ancestor… the mythical founding father, Samaale or 
Samaal’.66 Bernhard Helander also makes reference to a ‘mythical level of ancestry’.67 This seems 
to be intimately linked with Somali-Muslim heritage. Besteman points out that despite the laws 
prohibiting the use of terms to distinguish ethnic groups, the Gosha of Southern Somalia are 
labelled by many such terms (including boon- person of low status, addoon-slave and jareer- rough 
hair texture) Jareer denotes those who are of ‘African’ and thus slave ancestry as opposed to the 
mythical Arabic ancestry of Somalis.68 While Lewis argues that the distinction between slaves and 
the noble classes is clear in northern Somalia,69 Besteman adds that in the south, the distinctions 
have become more blurred due to a wider variety of commoner groups. 70  Chapin Metz 
acknowledges the ‘recognized social inequalities, sometimes marked by physical appearance owing 
to intermarriage’.71 
According to Chapin Metz, some texts refer to these two mainly agriculturist clans of Digil 
and Rahanwaywn as Saab (ignoble). This term is widely acknowledged to be derogatory.72 Saab 
was designated to those who pursued certain disdained occupations. The Samaal felt that the Saab 
had lowered themselves by their reliance on agriculture and their willingness to absorb foreigners 
into their clan. Hesse calls this ‘borderline xenophobia’.73 Certainly, it is arguable that southern 
Somalis suffered more at the hands of colonisers, and then at the hands of their own government: 
The southern (agricultural) Somalis residing in the valleys of the Juba and Shabeele rivers have had 
their lands removed and taken over by colonial plantations, while they themselves were forced to 
work for colonial labour schemes. They then lost their rights to their land through Barre’s socialist 
nationalization laws and suffered through the Cold War militarization of Somalia. During the civil 
war, the southern lands especially were sites of massacres, and in the more recent famines of the 
2000s, the southerners again suffered disproportionately compared to their northern counterparts.74 
This highlights the absence of Somali homogeneity and the social stratification that is so 
significant to Somali history. Some attribute this stratification directly to the clan system. 
According to Besteman, the social organization of Somali society lends itself to conceptions of 
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inferiority through the ‘investment of notions of lineal purity in the clan structure’.75 While Somali 
clans are fiercely egalitarian with regard to leadership and political control, they contain divisions 
of unequal status. The primary division between those of lower castes and the ‘pure blooded’ clan 
members is that the lower castes are not able to claim (regardless of whether there is any truth to the 
claim or not) direct lineal descent from the clan’s founding ancestor.  
The nomadic castes trace their line back to a common mythical level of ancestry. In 
general, members of a clan family can often trace their genealogy back some thirty generations to a 
common ancestor.76 Some of my participants described reciting these generations in Australia and 
family competitions to see who could remember the most generations. Others told me that it had 
little relevance to their family, and they had not understood its significance until much later in life. 
Besteman argues that a significant number of Somalis have Arab-Persian or slavery 
heritage.77 These minority groups have been politically under-represented and were victimized 
during the civil war. The presence of these groups is both a challenge to the segmentary lineage 
model and evidence of the widespread social stratification within Somalia. 
 
 
The influence of Siyad Barre 
 
The regime of Siyad Barre is generally reviled among Somalis today, and there is no doubt that it 
led to the civil war and the ensuing conflict and chaos. However, it was a period of immense social 
and cultural change in Somalia and as such, deserves closer attention. When he came to power in 
1969, Barre set out to change the fabric of Somali society radically. Socialism was swirling through 
Africa in the phase of de-colonisation and Barre employed his own particular version of ‘Scientific 
Socialism’ in order to achieve his aims. This severely curtailed the operation of the clan system and 
in fact was a transition to anti-tribalism altogether. Barre aimed to achieve a sense of national unity 
and a Pan-Somalism.78 
There was a conflict between the government’s desire to modernise and unify the country 
and the pre-existing clan way of life. In order to suppress traditional clan activities, Barre forbade 
such activities as diya (blood compensation) and instigated a state controlled death penalty. The 
government also began to provide money for funeral expenses of those that died in towns with no 
family members to curb the rural clan dependence. There was also a state sponsored program to 
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urbanise the country and relocate nomads. Even the traditional greeting of ina adeer (cousin) was 
replaced by jaalle (friend, comrade) to minimise the connotations of kinship.79 
Barre also instigated positive change during his leadership. One of the clearest examples of 
this is his push to create a national written language. Up to this point, there had been no indigenous 
written language and because the colonial activities had required northern Somalis to use English 
and the southern Somalis to use Italian, there were serious communication issues within the 
country. Illiteracy rates were very high so the task that confronted the government was daunting. 
The government created a written language using the Roman alphabet, and instigated an intensive 
literacy campaign. Following a year of teaching in the urban areas, more than 30,000 students were 
sent into the country to pass on their knowledge to the nomadic Somalis.80 This had a positive effect 
on the pan-national sentiment of Somalis and also increased efficiency of the civil services. The 
literacy rate had also reached 60% by the late 1970s.81 
In addition to the campaign to eradicate illiteracy, Barre adopted educational policies which 
focussed on an expanded and accessible technical education system and the development of higher 
education options in Somalia. Tertiary-level courses available in the capital Mogadishu, included 
law, teaching, agriculture, economics, engineering and medicine. By the early 1980s, considerable 
progress had been made towards Barre’s ambitious educational goals. All schools were nationalized 
and there were four levels of education. However, the progress was not uniform. Girls and children 
from nomadic groups still often only completed three or four years of the eight-year primary 
curriculum and enrolments beyond primary school continued to be low in the late 1980s. Likewise, 
the education reforms were not as successful in reaching the rural population, where despite 
enormous efforts on the part of the government to restructure the school system in order to 
encourage further study, there were high levels of secondary and technical school drop out rates.82 
The collapse of the Somali state and the subsequent civil war altered Somali life 
immensely. This has been particularly devastating in the area of education, where an entire 
generation has missed one of the most prized opportunities of childhood.83 The education system in 
Somalia broke down entirely between 1987 and 1991.84 Many adult Somalis had access to a 
reasonable level of education, promoted by a culture of pride surrounding the school system, with a 
select class of older Somalis also being able to access British and Italian schools. However anyone 
born in the 1970s or 1980s in Somalia had a partial or disrupted education at best, with a complete 
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halt to schooling post 1991. This disruption has a marked effect on Somali migrants and refugees 
living outside their homeland because, as Lee Cassanelli and Farah Sheikh Abdikadir observe: 
‘whilst primary school enrolment levels in Somalia were reported by UNICEF in 2006 to have 
stayed very low since 1990, the Somalis who were better educated, including many teachers, were 
the ones who were able to leave refugee camps for Australia, the US and Europe since then.’85 
 
 
Imagined Somali Unity 
 
Despite the relative ethnic and religious homogeneity in Somalia, as previously discussed, it is hard 
to overstate the challenges to Somali national unity. As with many African nations which were 
carved up in the 1880s by invading colonial powers, the borders on the map do not correlate with 
indigenous alliances and distributions. In fact, the Somali flag has a star with five points, which 
represent the various places where there has traditionally been a concentration of Somali 
inhabitants. These include The British and Italian Somalilands (now the Somalia of most maps). 
The other three points stand for Djibouti, the northeast corner of Kenya and the contested Ogaden 
region in Ethiopia.  
In the words of Hyndman: ‘The imagined pan-Somali nation has never corresponded to the 
colonial nor post-colonial borders of the country’.86 The rift between colonial and ethnic borders has 
resulted in conflict and violence, especially in Kenya where there is a large population of ethnic 
Somalis. Tension between the Kenyan government and this population is high, and ‘surveillance 
and expulsion of Somalis by the Kenyan government remains current practice’.87 There are also 
attacks being carried out in Kenya by Al Shabaab in retaliation for this mistreatment. 
According to Barrows, Somali efforts to form a nation state have been hampered by the 
legacy of the European partition of Africa, the empire building activities of Ethiopia and the 
segmentation resulting from Somali clanship. Territorially, at least, Somalia has long been a 
contested concept, even among Somalis.88 Evidence for this is the disputed ownership of the 
Ogaden valley of Ethiopia, where many ethnic Somalis reside. This has been a source of conflict 
within Somalia and between Somalia and neighbouring countries for centuries. It has been argued 
that the fact that the Somalia depicted in most maps still exists owes a great deal to international 
organisations such as the United Nations, the Arab League and the African Union.89 Indeed, the 
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state borders as they appear on a map do not represent the spread of ethnic Somalis at all 
accurately.90 
As described, the Somali prize their Arabian connections and value those traditions, which 
proclaim their descent from noble Arabian lineages and from the family of the Prophet.91 The 
Somali language is also clear evidence of this contact, containing a considerable number of Arabic 
loan-words. Arabic itself is sufficiently widely known to be regarded almost as a second language. 
Besteman argues that ex-slaves arriving in Somalia ‘adopted clan affiliations as an aspect of 
personal identity, to negotiate social relations, and to build kinship networks’.92 This reflects the 
fact that clans are a form of social capital in Somalia, an issue that will be revisited many times 
throughout this thesis. She claims that by the 1970s, mid Gosha valley villagers (largely comprised 
of descendants of slaves) spoke only Somali dialects, practiced Islam and shared Somali cultural 
values. This ‘Somalization’ of slave descendants gave the impression that Somalia was 
linguistically, culturally and religiously united.93 It also problematizes the popular conception of 
clans as ancient bloodlines, and highlights the flexibility of this social construct. 
 
 
Violence in the geopolitical Somali context 
 
While the origin and reasons for the continuing violence in Somalia are complex and multi-faceted, 
some with their roots seemingly in ancient practices, others no doubt encouraged by colonial and 
modern interests, it is clear that violence and conflict have been common in Somalia since 
independence. Resistance to Siyad Barre’s regime grew during the 1980s, until the army was 
struggling to control numerous armed rebel groups across the country. The opposition groups 
managed to overthrow Barre in 1991. In the resulting power vacuum, there were many factions 
competing for dominance. The original political motives at play in overthrowing an oppressive 
regime that favoured one clan became somewhat muddied when conflicts within sub-clans 
emerged. The country sank into a two-year-long period dominated by roving banditry. In the years 
that followed, clan affiliation became a sine qua non for individuals to be spared from violence.94 In 
a strong rebuttal of Siyad Barre’s regime, during this period there was a push for decentralisation, 
along with a return to a reimagined customary or tribal law.95  
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There has been much written about the role of the state in preventing, reducing and 
controlling violence. How much this applies to Somalia, which has been (and remains) a pawn in a 
much larger global development, and where state development was pushed through exceedingly 
quickly to serve other ends, is debatable. Additionally, this discussion does not allow for the forced 
development that was present for the short time that Somalia had a functioning central government 
under Siyad Barre during the 1970s and 1980s. During this time, radical social reform, which 
explicitly tried to overrule and render the clans and other ancient cultural traditions unnecessary was 
pursued at an alarming rate. There was corruption and nepotism and these ultimately rendered the 
government unstable enough to be overthrown. Since that time, there has been no effective state 
control of the use of violence.  
There have been international interventions in Somalia since well before the formalised 
Italian and British colonisation. Ferguson writes that ‘accepted wisdom even now holds that 
“primitive” cultures are typically at war and that the primary military effect of contact with the 
West is the suppression of ongoing combat’.96 However, it has been suggested that on the contrary, 
the west is not supressing ongoing combat, but rather encouraging it, even among groups that were 
previously peaceful. According to Ferguson, ‘many, perhaps most, recorded wars involving tribal 
peoples can be directly attributed to the circumstances of Western contact’.97 
Ferguson argues that the violence occurred both as a result of Europeans encouraging 
conflict to serve their own purposes,98 and with the influx of previously unknown materials (such as 
the steel used in weapons), which quickly became indispensable to the tribal people.99 He describes 
a long history of colonisers inventing or inflating certain primitive and violent characteristics in 
order to further their own territorial ambitions, beginning in the mid 16th century and continuing to 
the 20th century.100  For example, for many centuries, tribal people all over the world were 
characterised as cannibals as part of the ‘often racist othering of non-western cultures under colonial 
rule’. It has been pointed out that claims of cannibalism are inherently unreliable because Spanish 
royal proclamations made in 1503 permitted the use of cannibals as slaves.101  There is also a great 
deal of emerging scholarship concerning the global south, which critiques dominant discourses. 
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This scholarship emphasises the global north’s need to perceive their colonies as ‘other’ and doing 
this by categorising them as inferior.102 
Colonial violence has no doubt shaped generations of Somalis. Compagnon points to the 
extreme violence used by colonisers in the 19th century to ‘pacify’ the Horn [of Africa], in particular 
by the Italians.103 Following the colonial period, Somalia has been engaged in conflict with its 
neighbours over territory disputes, with international occupying forces (some described as 
‘peacekeeping forces’) and has witnessed total state breakdown and all the accompanying confusion 
and unrest. The short-lived government created by Siyad Barre was marked by corruption and use 
of state subjugation techniques. He also showed increasing favouritism to his own clan family and 
‘concentrated power and resources within his own clan and sub-clan family, manipulating 
Somalia’s clan system to his own ends’.104 
Additionally, while scholars such as Pinker and others 105  have ascribed violence to 
statelessness, Siyad Barre’s scientific socialism project during the 70s had as one of its main aims 
the effort to create a high degree of centralised control. This effort was ultimately unsuccessful. 
Barre was also capable of using violence to subjugate and control in the name of advancing the 
Somali state.106 The violence deployed by Barre could be argued to be representative of an attempt 
to create a pacified and developed state, in line with Max Weber’s notion of monopoly on 
violence.107  
It is difficult to fit a linear conception of development and a reduction in violence to 
Somalia. For example, in considering the pacification argument, the clan system proves difficult to 
assimilate. It also prevents a simple hierarchy from developing, as envisaged in the creation of the 
state. This may in fact contribute to engendering violence. It has been argued that hierarchy plays a 
strong role in preventing violence because of the lack of ambiguity regarding dominance.108 The 
clans to some extent disallow the clean hierarchy of the state and there are constant struggles for 
dominance without the allegiance to a head of state that seems to be necessary in other conceptions 
of how violence has been reduced and controlled elsewhere. This can be seen in the brief period 
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where Somalia was united under Siyad Barre. Although there were most certainly compounding 
factors, such as the international political circumstances and interventions, Barre’s rule was 
ultimately cut short by clan conflict. 
In the context of the Somali civil war, Lidwien Kapteijns describes how episodes of clan 
cleansing (a term she uses to echo the well understood ‘ethnic cleansing’) were carried out, and how 
the testimony of civilian survivors of the clan cleansing campaign reveals that they were hunted 
down intentionally because of their group identity and ‘even by name by people who knew them 
well — precisely by people who knew them well’.109 This echoes testimony given by survivors of 
the Rwandan and Yugoslav genocides.110 As an illustration of how identity uniquely categorises 
individuals, this is a particularly interesting case because in times of peace, individuals are able to 
move from one clan to another – women change clans when they marry,111 and men and women 
may also change clans to secure grazing rights.112 However, during the civil war, the clan identity of 
individual Somalis was seen as fixed, immutable, and enough reason for them to be murdered. 
Kapteijns paints a picture of a shrewd and manipulative elite (the warlords) who are able to 
direct and orchestrate violence at will in order to eliminate any alternative to war and warlord 
domination.113 According to this picture, it is not merely inevitable enactment of ancient tribal 
allegiances that ensures the continuation of violence, but the clever manipulations of individuals 
with vested interests in continuing the violence. This illustrates the danger with ideological 
discourse — that false ideologies (or, at least, reductive and over-simplistic ones) become 
consolidated and permeate the identities of the individuals or collective.  
 
 
The dominant representation of Somalis as violent in discourse 
 
The earlier theoretical discussion of different types of violence (both implicit and explicit forms) in 
section one is important in terms of understanding the ways in which Somalis have come to be 
represented as violent. It is not difficult to find examples of such representation in the case of 
Somalia. Indeed, Somalis have been represented as violent in the dominant academic discourse for 
more than a century. Regardless of the veracity of whether Somalis are a ‘violent people’, the idea 
has emerged, evolved and pervaded both outsiders’ perceptions of Somalis and their own 
perceptions of themselves. This process seems to cycle into a positive-feedback loop: the sense of 
togetherness and shared identity which fosters such extreme violence and barbarity in a select group 
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does so through the othering of people from within and people outside the particular group 
projecting perceptions onto the group. Or, as Sen puts it: ‘Within-group solidarity can help to feed 
between-group discord’.114 Here, we begin to understand how violence begets more violence.115 
There is no doubt that the dominant representation of Somalia has been as an unusually 
violent and anarchic place. It is described as a bloody and dangerous nation, even by scholars who 
are traditionally seen as sympathetic to Somali interests. Lewis, for example, describes the Somali 
expansion northwards up to the 19th century as dominant in the history of the Horn of Africa. This 
migration was accomplished at great cost to other resident populations, involving ‘considerable 
displacements of other populations, and the Somali sphere was only extended by dint of continuous 
war and bloodshed’.116  
The western view of Somalia is encapsulated in the 2001 film about an American military 
operation: Black Hawk Down. The film highlights the camaraderie and suffering of the American 
troops and their ethical decisions to leave no man behind. Somalis are depicted only as part of a 
shadowy background. Their brutality is paraded in the film with all the violence they wreak on the 
Americans being finely detailed. In contrast, the violence against the Somalis is shown in soft focus, 
from a distance. They are indistinct figures who crumple quickly under American fire.  In this film, 
Somalia functions merely as a foil to portray the American ‘good guys’ and their tribulations in 
their interaction with the primitive and savage Somalis. While Hollywood is by no means an 
authoritative source of knowledge of African politics, the views presented in these movies are 
widely disseminated, and for some, may be the only representation of Somalia available. 
In analysing the representation of Somalis as violent in discourse, I began to extract the 
main ways in which this violence is expressed and attributed to Somalis. Below I outline the four 
main categories I found that such descriptions of Somalis fall under. These are violence arising 
from (i) a personal characteristic, (ii) the clan system, (iii) their harsh environment, and (iv) due to 
outside intervention. I want to make it clear that the views outlined below are not my personal 
views. Rather, they are arguments that have been advanced as evidence that Somalis and Somalia 
are violent, and are thus essential to understanding the reflections made on these pervading 
representations by generation 1.5 Somalis in Melbourne. 
 
 
(i) A personal characteristic 
 
In 1894, Richard Burton, the great British explorer and geographer described the Somali thus: 
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In mind the Somal (sic) are peculiar as in body. They are a people of most susceptible character, and 
withal uncommonly hard to please … They have the levity and instability of the negro character; 
light-minded as the Abyssinians … constant in nothing but inconsistency—soft, merry and 
affectionate souls, they pass without any apparent transition into a state of fury when they are 
capable of terrible atrocities.117 
 
Close to a century later, the humanitarian and historian Louis Fitzgibbon called them the ‘Irish of 
Africa’: ‘they are extremely generous yet fierce and war-like simultaneously…they are people to be 
reckoned with, as history has clearly revealed’.118 
More recently, a conservative online journal has described Somalis thus: ‘Somalis are a 
primitive, nomadic people who normally practice polygamy, wife-beating, and female genital 
mutilation…In addition to Somali youth’s fondness for Islamist murder and mayhem, ordinary 
crime is appealing as well. Areas of large Somali population are stuck with worsening gang 
problems’.119 
It is crucial to remember that (as in the case above) the commentary on violence in Somalia 
has often portrayed the country as peopled by backward and ignorant thugs, who are enacting 
ancient forms of violence. Mantzikos puts it thus: 
 
Somalia continues to be a country that inspires images violence, chaos, disorder, and abject poverty. 
For the past two decades, various clans and subclans have been deadlocked in a violent struggle for 
power and dominance. The lethal use of force has become the culture in resolving disputes between 
rival clans, groups, and governments.120 
 
This is a shallow analysis, which fails to consider colonisation, independence, Somalia’s 
interactions with its neighbours and Western interventions.  
Popular accounts of nations, cultures and peoples are often riddled with attempts to explain 
behaviours by ascribing certain characteristics or traits, as the quotes above show. While this is a 
tempting thing to do in terms of trying to understand people and events, it has major pitfalls. 
Perhaps chief among these is the tendency to psychologise groups of people and assume they must 
all be the same, based on the time, place and circumstances of their birth, and to miss the many 
examples of heterogeneity that occur in what people prefer to conceive of as a homogenous group.  
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The second description I extracted was violence arising from the clan system, which relates 
to this very issue — the tendency scholars and other commentators have to make broad assumptions 
about Somalis based on the clan system. 
 
 
(ii) The clan system 
 
The clan system is perhaps the most often cited reason for the violence in Somalia. During the 
Somali civil war, the international reportage implied that the clan system was at the root of many if 
not all Somalia’s problems. The reports drew on the idea that Somalia was continuing to act out 
primitive ancestral rivalries.121  
 
… the American media and some academic accounts of Somalia’s collapse presented Somalia’s 
destruction as having been almost inevitable. The model of the tensions inherent to this kind of 
genealogically based system provided an explanation built-in conflict, making Somali social 
structure appear fundamentally divisive and resistant to state-building efforts.122 
 
In a pertinent example of the above, Helen Chapin Metz, writing for the Library of the 
United States Congress, describes the clans as follows: 
 
Genealogy constitutes the heart of the Somali social system, It is the basis of the collective Somali 
inclination toward internal fission and internecine conflict, as well as of the Somalis’ sense of being 
distinct- a consciousness of otherness that borders on xenophobia.123 
 
Chapin Metz argues that the social division of clans is to blame for the Somalis’ predisposition to 
internal conflict. In addition, she believes that this division allows Somalis to assume themselves to 
be different from others, to the point of extreme prejudice to others. 
 It is difficult to find comprehensive explanations in scholarly writing for the continuing 
conflict in Somalia. For example, Besteman argues that over the past several generations a social 
order emerged in Somalia that was less primitive and rooted in principles other than the segmented 
lineage, however she fails to elaborate on this new social order, or explain where its principles are 
rooted. 124  
More recently, reports on Somalia have focussed on the clan divisions and how they lead to 
an inescapable cycle of violence. One BBC reporter notes that it is clan divisions behind Somali 
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violence.125 However, BBC’s Somali affairs analyst points out that ‘Somalia's neighbours and the 
wider international community are exploiting clan divisions to their own ends’.126 
A prominent Somali blogger, Jaylani Abdalla believes that ‘…the primitive and blind 
Somali tribes claim kinship association and number in the millions without any possibility of opting 
out from this murderous large gang group’.127 This is not the first time that clans have been likened 
to gangs.128 Abdalla urges young Somalis to ‘break the status quo and challenge this primitive and 
useless culture of allegiance to an extended tribe by blood association, where you are required to 
spill blood for a wrong cause’.129 Some of the young people I spoke to adopted similar language, 
although they were careful to point out that clans can also offer positive connections to their 
members. 
Appadurai has pointed out that anthropologists often develop ‘theoretical metonyms’ about 
places that come represent the fundamental and critical aspect of any given area.130 This observation 
is aptly illustrated by Somalia and its reputation. Some oft-quoted reasons for Somalia’s troubles 
are: clan warfare, environmental scarcity and some kind of inherent Somali violence. These 
arguments have become accepted as fact and reported verbatim in many and varied forms of 
media.131 
Not all scholars believe the clan system is at the root of Somali violence, however. 
According to Menkhaus, ‘Somali political culture features a very prominent and elaborate role for 
conflict management, in large measure because precolonial Somalia was a stateless, decentralized, 
nomadic society in which conflict between clans over pasture and wells was endemic’.132 These 
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were necessary because of the ‘chronic violence in this anarchic pastoral setting’. 133  While 
Menkhaus describes in detail some of the traditional negotiation and peacekeeping mechanisms 
practiced in Somalia, he goes on to say that they were only partially successful, and that 
‘precolonial Somalia was rife with armed convicts and long-running blood feuds’.134 Menkhaus 
equates statelessness with conflict and violence and plays down the ability of traditional 
mechanisms to promote order and security but then goes on to describe how the high compensation 
price sought by the wronged parties was a deterrent as the costs were borne by clan members, so 
peer pressure to observe social contracts was very high.135  
Tripodi notes that while clanism is very strong, it did not cause the failure of the Somali 
republic in the 1990s. Instead, he points to the corruption that has been present in Somali 
leadership.136 Interestingly, Tripodi states that as a result of the kleptocracy and inefficiency post-
independence in Somalia, a sense of scepticism and disillusionment was generated among the 
people and that as a consequence, ‘the Somali population considered the army to be the only 
institution able to guarantee the unity of Somalia’.137  
 
 
(iii) Their harsh environment 
 
Somalis have also been represented as violent due to the harshness of their climate and the need for 
competition to secure scant resources. In the words of Lewis, ‘it must be appreciated that the 
nomadic Somali are a warlike people, driven by the poverty of their resources to intense 
competition for access to water and grazing.’138 Besteman and Cassanelli similarly note that ‘at the 
heart of the ongoing crisis’ in southern Somalia, is a constant ‘struggle for resources’.139 
 In discussing the recent famine situation in Somalia, Menkhaus outlines the volatile 
farming context in Somalia. ‘This is a part of the world that is more susceptible to extreme 
variations in seasonal rainfall than almost anywhere in the world. One in every five years there is an 
extreme drought; one in every five years there is an extreme flood’.140 Menkhaus notes that 
historically, Somalis have developed agricultural ‘coping mechanisms’ to deal with this 
environment, but these ‘have been overloaded in recent decades by a wide range of factors’. 
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One only has to glance at Kaplan’s oft-quoted article ‘The Coming Anarchy’ where he 
argues that overpopulation coupled with environmental scarcity, crime and disease are ‘rapidly 
destroying the social fabric of our planet’ cited to support the idea that environmental scarcity is at 
the root of Somalia’s problems.141  There have been other reports of the need to control resources as 
a factor in Somali violence, not only in the precolonial times, but also more recently:  
 
For some 16 months, from December 1990 to March 1992, when the United Nations eventually 
brokered a ceasefire, there was almost continuous warfare in the south as clans fought for control of 
resources, especially land and water. As many as 25,000 civilians died in the first four months of 
fighting in Mogadishu alone.142  
 
Indeed, there is a significant body of scholarship on environmental degradation as a cause of 
war,143most particularly where ecological change such as drought has caused immense poverty (as 
in the case of Somalia and also Sudan144). This scholarship is relevant, and sometimes convincing in 
the case of Somalia. However other reasons have been posited for Somalia’s decline.  
 
 
(iv) Outside interventions 
 
There are two ways that outside interventions are used to explain violence in Somalia. The first 
relies on a historical narrative which emphasizes the way Somalia’s circumstances have affected the 
psychology of Somalis over the last few centuries. For example, Besteman highlights the 
importance of slavery in the formation of a Somali ‘national characteristic’.145 She suggests that the 
many migrational movements, coupled with the expansion of Somalia over 500 years ago and the 
penetration of Islam and Arab Muslims have left an indelible mark on the Somali national character, 
and that the Somali are predisposed to violence, having seen it play out before them over the course 
of many centuries.  
We can apply this theory to more recent times as well: As Somalia has been involved in 
many recent violent conflicts, it now has a core of trained militants who fought in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.146 Generations of Somalis have been exposed to violence and trauma as a result of external 
interventions among other things. Parenti suggests that the Somali people may be predisposed to 
violence as a result of their experiences: ‘Societies, like people, deal with new challenges in ways 
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that are conditioned by the traumas of their past. Thus, damaged societies, like damaged people, 
often respond to new crises in ways that are irrational, shortsighted, and self-destructive’.147  
The second way that outside interventions are claimed to have contributed to Somali 
violence relies on the way external interventions have disrupted the economic balance of the 
country. The evidence from Somalia suggests that economic interests are significant in the 
perpetuation of the civil war and some recent authors underline this point.148 Ken Menkhaus in 
particular, has consistently documented and described the political situation in Somalia over the last 
three decades. He believes that it is in the interests of some key players to draw out the conflict for 
as long as possible: 
 
When one considers the evidence of the past decade in Somalia in light of the political economy of 
war theory, several things become clearer. First, there is an impressive but shrinking set of actors 
whose interests are served by protracted conflict and lawlessness, and who appear to actively and 
successfully promote both.149 
 
Similarly David Keen emphasises that war may well be the continuation of economics by 
other means.150 Small but influential groups thus come to have an economic interest in prolonged 
conflict. Commentators holding this viewpoint affirm that it can be misleading to associate war with 
complete collapse or breakdown of an economy — although it may certainly skew the development 
of an economy. It also challenges the notion that it is Somalis’ primitive violence which has caused 
and prolonged the conflict. Rather, there may be very nuanced economic motivation for certain 
parties to prolong the conflict for personal benefit. Despite the competing interests, Dibbeh argues 
that there has been ‘economic progress despite the destruction of all public infrastructure such as 
electricity production, the spread of violence and more importantly, the absence of central 
government or even a central bank’.151 
Outside interventions have certainly contributed to the growth of Al Shabaab, which is one 
of the most sophisticated Islamist groups within Somalia today. It is described as a ‘clan-based 
insurgent and terrorist group’ by the United States National Counter Terrorism Center.152 Within 
Somalia, after decades of suffering at the hands of various governments, international task-forces 
and various clan councils, the perception of the group is considerably more complex. Al Shabaab is 
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considered in Somalia to be  ‘both the instigator of ongoing conflict and also the most viable means 
to peace’.153 Mitchell Sipus describes how in Kenya, there is financial and ideological support for 
Al Shabaab. In East Leigh, Nairobi, where there is a large Somali population, Al Shabaab is active 
in its investment in mosques, school programs and local business. While not everyone in the Somali 
community in East Leigh supports Al Shabaab, they are too wary to reveal their allegiance. This 
creates a climate of mistrust and fear. Some believe in Al Shabaab’s aggressive vision for a unified 
Islamic state, others simply hope that Al Shabaab offers an end to the seemingly endless violence 
Somalia has already suffered.154 
 
I wish to draw attention here to a thread that runs through the categories above, namely the 
tendency of many authors to ascribe certain psychological characteristics to bodies of people. 
Characteristics may be ascribed due to factors such as physical environment, exposure to violent 
conflict or the implementation of cultural systems of identification and exchange. I do not dismiss 
these ideas, as it is clear that people develop strategies and mechanisms to cope with whatever 
circumstances they face. However I believe that any reductionist temptation to ascribe traits to 
groups of people must be examined critically, as it has historically often resulted in racist 
interpretations of cultures and peoples.155 One author who has examined this in relation to Somalia 
is Daniel Compagnon, who points out that after the collapse of the few remaining state institutions 
in 1991, criminal, sexual and personal revenge violence was rife. The ‘pathological behaviour’ of 
individuals was not necessarily politically or clan-motivated:  
 
Yet, given the clan structure of the Somali society, then the last effective ideological and practical 
frame of reference that remained for most people once the state and all modern institutions had 
collapsed, it was difficult to see any such violence as “private”—i.e. disconnected from clan-based 
factional politics. The picture was so blurred that the violence of clan conflicts has been 
overemphasized—thus pointing at the “exceptionality” of the Somali case.156  
 
During the civil war, violence and lawlessness was rife in Somalia. This is characteristic of political 
anarchy in most ‘failed states’. However, in the case of Somalia, it is very easy for commentators to 
attribute this to the existing clan structure as an explanation for all deviant behaviour. ‘Somalis 
became cartoon-like images of primordial man: unable to break out of their destructive spiral of 
ancient clan rivalries, loyalties, and bloodshed.’157  
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Interrogating representations and misrepresentations of violence 
 
I now turn to examining the representation of violent acts committed outside Somalia by Somali 
individuals and those affiliated with Somali groups. I do not evaluate the representations or the 
accuracy of the reporting. Rather, I wish to present typical examples of the way that Somalis are 
represented (especially by the media) when violent acts do occur. While the violence within 
Somalia has been well documented so far, this section looks at violence carried out by Somalis in 
Australia and internationally. There has been much concern about ‘home-grown terrorism’ and 
‘ethnic violence’ in Western countries, and I provide some examples of this phenomenon below.  
The media perform a central role in shaping the way society as a whole sees different 
groups. This can influence attitudes towards these groups, affect their civil rights and even influence 
government policy towards them. This in turn may influence the relationship between individual 
members of those groups and the wider society.158 Other authors have noted ‘the tendency of media 
coverage to position ethnic minorities as problematic others to a white, normative self.159 In March 
2009, the Australian Human Rights Commission released a report regarding African Australians’ 
experiences of rights and access to key services. One finding of this paper concerned media debates 
focusing on ‘the numbers, “integration potential” and settlement needs of African Australians’. 
According to the report, the Australian media ‘usually focuses on crime or on political commentary 
about African Australians — and has often been negative or critical, and sometimes misleading’.160 
The following examples relate to violence which has been ascribed to Somalis in Australia. I argue 
that Australian Somalis have been misrepresented through the use of false or misleading statistics 
which is illustrated by the cases below. 
Writing in the Herald Sun in 2008, journalist Liam Houlihan claimed that in the twelve 
months to June 2007, 283 Somali born people committed a crime. Using 2006 census population 
data, this equates to roughly 1 in 9.161 His article provoked a public outcry, and much attention was 
directed to ‘ethnic crime’ in the following days. However, as Media Watch pointed out two weeks 
later, the journalist made a serious mistake in his reading of the crime results released by Victoria 
Police. He counted the number of offences committed by member of the Somali born population 
rather than the distinct number of offenders. If a Somali born person was alleged to have committed 
three offences, in his reading of the statistics, this counted as three separate offenders. Using the 
statistics correctly, we can see that only 115 alleged offenders were Somali born. This is not 1 in 9, 
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rather 1 in 23.162 This number, while still greater than, is significantly closer to the 1 in 31 offenders 
in the Australian born community as reported by Mr Houlihan.163 
In 2012, there was widespread anger from the African community when Victoria Police 
released ethnic crime statistics. These purported to show that Sudanese and Somali-born Victorians 
were about five times more likely to commit a crime than other Victorians.164 ‘The police statistics 
show the rate of offending among the Sudanese community is 7109.1 per 100,000, while for Somali 
people it is 6141.8 per 100,000. The figure for the wider community is 1301.0 per 100,000’.165 At a 
forum organised by African youth representatives and attended by members of Victoria Police, the 
youth challenged the decision to release the statistics and argued that they were ‘incomplete’. At the 
forum, the police representative also conceded that there may be instances of false identification by 
criminals contributing to the high statistics, and that because of community attitudes, Africans may 
be blamed for crimes they did not commit.166  
However, the 2013/2014 crime statistics released by Victoria Police show that the crime 
rate per 100,000 population was 7489.5.167 This is, in fact, higher than the rates of crime attributed 
to Sudanese and Somali born Victorians in 2012. It is not known how the police arrived at the 2012 
statistics, although their Official Release states that all the data contained comes from the LEAP 
database.168 Notwithstanding the challenges made by the community regarding the accuracy and 
legitimacy of the statistics (and my own concerns regarding the way the statistics were calculated), 
it is important to emphasise the productive element of reporting statistics in this way (as detailed in 
section one).  
Young Muslims have been increasingly represented in the media as having the potential to 
become radicalised. One highly charged area of concern in Australia is the risk of young people 
becoming attracted to the ideology of the Islamic State (ISIL). In April 2015, a Somali-born 
Australian was killed while fighting for ISIL. Sharky Jama had been a successful model for over 
two years, and was well liked and respected within the Melbourne Somali community when he 
decided to travel to Syria.169 His death was reported in the context of growing numbers of Jihadis 
leaving Australia to fight in Syria and other places. However, relatively few media outlets followed 
the story and reported on the response from within the Somali community in Melbourne. Sharky’s 
father, Dada Jama, said he would speak out with the Somali community and pass on the message to 
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‘look after their kids’.170 Community leaders have spoken about forming groups against extremism 
within the Somali community in Melbourne and have urged the government to closely scrutinise the 
plans of any Australians travelling to areas where ISIL is known to operate.171  
A 2015 report released by the Lowy Institute says that the previous Abbott government’s 
‘troubled relations’ with Australian Muslim communities hampered efforts to prevent radicalisation 
and that the significant numbers of Australians fighting in Iraq and Syria represent ‘a serious 
national security threat’.172 The same report points out that while there was a surge in numbers of 
Australians joining Al Shabaab following the Ethiopian invasion, this appears to have dissipated 
‘following the disruption of a support network in Melbourne and Al Shabaab’s dramatically 
reduced popularity in the Somali diaspora’. 173  The prominence of the perceived threat of 
radicalization in Australia is not supported by the Lowy institute’s findings. The increased media 
attention on radicalization and those ‘at risk’ is not confined to Australia. For example, Travis 
Dixon has documented the way that terrorism is reported extensively over the last decade in 
America. Using the UCLA Communication Studies Digital News Archive, he sampled 146 cable 
and network news programs aired between 2008 and 2012 to find that Muslims were greatly over 
reported as terrorists compared to other groups of people who committed terror offences.174 
Internationally, there has been increasing attention on international terror attacks, including 
those carried out by Al Shabaab. Kenya is the most frequent target for Al Shabaab operations, after 
the deployment of Kenyan troops in the African Union Mission to Somalia. Recent attacks include 
the 2013 Westgate shopping mall attack, and the 2014 Nairobi bus bombings, Gikomba bombings, 
Mpeketoni attacks and Lamu attacks. There has been widespread criticism of the Kenyan 
government’s response to these attacks, which has included mass arrests of the local Somali 
population. Diplomats and analysts argue that this will create greater divisions and fuel dissent, 
making radicalization more likely.175 
Many believe that Al Shabaab has infiltrated Kenya and young Kenyans are being recruited 
to carry out attacks. There is a large and marginalised Somali-born population in Kenya. In a 
parallel to the situation in Australia, newspaper reports have noted that ‘a huge population of 
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disillusioned youth is vulnerable to radicalisation and recruitment’.176 There are widespread feelings 
of disenfranchisement and vulnerability with the Kenyan-Somalis living in the north claiming to be 
viewed ‘with suspicion and as lesser citizens’ by the government and fellow Kenyans, and also 
‘targeted indiscriminately by security forces in terrorism related crackdowns’.177 
In addition to terrorist activity in Kenya, there has been a recent surge in piracy off the 
Somali coast. This has declined since 2012, however it remains a threat, and was a high-profile 
news item between 2008-2013. 
 
Besides state collapse and terrorist threats, Somalia has got other problem areas that have attracted 
international actors. Piracy rose in 2008 by 200 per cent from 2007. Besides hijacking vessels 
heading west from Asia across the Gulf of Aden to reach Europe, Somali pirates took, in September 
2008, 30 hostages on a French luxury yacht who were released for a ransom of about $2 million.178  
 
Reports have described the pirates as ranging from very young and inexperienced, to older 
and part of a more cohesive group. They are often under the influence of the stimulant qat, which 
makes them edgy and unpredictable.179 The instances of Somali piracy have declined rapidly over 
the last few years. This is due in part to an upsurge in the successful capture and prosecution of 
pirates as part of an international effort to halt the hijackings,180 and to the increasing ability of ships 
passing through the area to organise and defend themselves.181 
There are now firm links between the pirates and Al Shabaab182 although these links are not 
yet fully understood. It is claimed that between 20 and 50% of the ransom money pirates collect is 
given to Al Shabaab.183 Pirates also operate out of ports that are controlled by Al Shabaab. They pay 
rent in cash, or in arms that they have seized.184 
While there has been significant reportage around the danger of Somali piracy, there has 
been far less analysis of the development and rise in piracy off the coast of Somalia. In fact, it has 
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been posited that some young Somali men have been forced into piracy by the disappearance of 
fishing livelihood of local Somalis due to illegal trawling and dumping of toxic materials off the 
Somali coast.185  While the gangs originated in order to protect their waters and their livelihoods, 
some argue that they quickly became aware that piracy was a much more lucrative profession.186 
 
 
Concluding Reflections 
 
I have devoted this section so far to an exploration of relevant issues concerning Somalia and 
Somali people. This chapter has given some contextual detail on the physical, social and political 
setting of Somalia. This history is important to understand, not only because of the myriad 
developments in recent times, but also because it is a highly contested history, which is by no 
means ancient and forgotten. I believe that these contested issues remain important to Somalis 
living in Melbourne today. This section also discussed the dominant representation of Somalis and 
how Somalia has been described as an inherently violent place. I extracted four main ways in which 
Somalis have been represented as violent in discourse: because of an inherent personal 
characteristic, clan divisions, the harsh environment and outside interventions.  
In considering violence in the Somali context, both overt and covert forms of violence are 
relevant. Somalia remains a place where there is physical brutality as well as deep-rooted structural 
violence. However the representation of this violence must be problematized and questioned. I gave 
some examples of the way that violent acts perpetrated by Somalis in Australia and internationally 
are represented (or misrepresented), especially by the media, along with a brief critique of the 
possible reasons for and intentions of this violence. 
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III CONTEXTUALISING SOMALIA AND SOMALIS IN MELBOURNE  
    
(b) The Melbourne Somali community 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I offer some demographic information regarding Somalis in Melbourne, both from 
census data and from my own research. This information helps to situate the findings of my study. 
Some broad sample characteristics from my data are extracted and presented, before several issues 
of significance for Somalis in Melbourne are briefly sketched. This chapter prepares the reader for 
the findings chapter to follow. 
 
 
The phenomenon of Muslim migration to Australia 
 
Human history has been characterised by the movement of people from one part of the world to 
another, from the initial migration of homo sapiens out of East Africa, to the movements of the 
present day. These patterns of relocation have varied widely, from migrations in the period of early 
sedentary agriculture (around 10,000 BCE) to the movements around the Mediterranean 
Mesopotamian and Roman worlds, to the far-reaching phenomenon of Western colonisation 
through successive waves, and finally, the aftermath of decolonisation in the recent past. The most 
recent era of migration arguably began in the 1950s with the wave of decolonisation sweeping 
across many previously colonial territories.187 
After the Second World War the global driver of migration was essentially the Western 
demand for labour.188 Flows of people moved largely from the South to the North (from developing 
countries to more developed countries), attracted by the prospects of better living standards. Other 
migrants from former colonies moved to countries like Britain, France and The Netherlands. 
Circumstances were different in North America and Oceania, where labourers were required to 
support economic development but also to strengthen populations. Indeed, in both the years 1949 
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and 1950, approximately 150,000 people migrated to Australia, bringing the total migration to 
Australia in the post-war years to around half a million people.189  
At the time, migrants moved on a permanent basis and those who were deemed to posses 
the right characteristics enjoyed broad political rights. In Australia, European migrants were 
preferred, with as many British as possible, because other newcomers would bring ‘imported’ 
cultures that were different from locally produced ‘Australian’ cultures.190  However, by the 1960s, 
the need for immigration had broadened the eligibility of those allowed to enter the country. Many 
European Muslims, mainly Turks, took advantage of these opportunities to seek a new life and 
home in Australia. There was an agreement between the Turkish and Australian governments 
between 1967 and 1971 under which approximately 10,000 Turkish citizens settled in Australia.191 
In the 1970s, many Lebanese citizens also settled in Australia, with Lebanon becoming one of the 
top 10 countries of origin for the overseas-born population in Australia by the 1981 census.192 This 
is not to suggest that the waves of Muslims that arrived in the 1960s and 1970s were the same as 
those who followed in later decades. Indeed, it must be said that Turkish and Lebanese Muslims 
were (and remain) characteristically distinct from Muslims from Africa or South-East Asia (for 
example). Nevertheless, this is the first example of significant numbers of Muslims migrating to 
Australia. 
Muslims in Australia have a rich and lengthy history that is thought to pre-date European 
settlement. Some of Australia’s earliest visitors were Muslim, from the east Indonesian archipelago. 
They are thought to have made contact with mainland Australia as early as the 16th and 17th 
centuries. Along with the general increase of Australia’s population following the Second World 
War, the Muslim population also increased significantly. This was largely due to the post–war 
economic boom, which created new employment opportunities. While Melbourne’s diversity had 
until recently, been largely Europe-based, a significant wave of migrants from south-east and 
northern Asia arrived throughout the 1970s. In the last three decades, many Muslims have migrated 
to Australia under refugee or humanitarian programs. 
Recent decades have seen upheaval across broad swathes of the Muslim world. Conflict and 
tensions remain high in many areas and the result of this has been extraordinary levels of 
displacement. Following the U.S. military occupation of Iraq, the country continues to face large-
scale displacement and pressing humanitarian needs.  Millions of Iraqis have fled their homes and 
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are living in increasingly desperate circumstances.193 Similarly, the ethnic violence in Darfur and 
South Sudan has displaced millions.194 In Palestine, it is estimated that there are up to 7.2 million 
displaced as a result of the ongoing diplomatic stalemate in the region.195 More recently, floods 
have caused further devastation and displacement in Pakistan, a country that hosts significant 
numbers of Afghani refugees. In 2010 the Brookings Institution calculated that there were nine to 
ten million refugees in the Muslim world and at least 14 million internally displaced people.196 With 
the current Syrian refugee crisis, this has increased considerably. 
At the 2011 Census there were more than 476,291 Muslims in Australia, of whom 
292,925 were born here.197 This is rapid growth from the 2006 census, when there were only 
340,000 Muslims in Australia, with 128,904 born here.198 However, there is currently a great deal of 
misunderstanding about Australia’s Muslim communities. As Janet Phillips notes, Muslim 
Australians are not a homogenous group as some media reports might lead us to believe, but make 
up a small, culturally diverse section of Australian society.199 Australia’s Muslim communities are 
now predominantly concentrated in Sydney and Melbourne. Since the 1970s, Muslim communities 
have developed many mosques, Islamic schools and cultural and religious organizations.  
 
 
The Melbourne Somali population 
 
Somalis constitute one of the largest African refugee populations currently living in Australia. In 
2006 the Census recorded that there were 4,314 Somalis living in Australia and the last census in 
2011 saw that number increase by a third.200 The first Somali arrivals in Australia took place in the 
late 1980s when the regime in Somalia began to oppress and attack its opposition in the North. This 
displacement accelerated after the total collapse of the Barre government in 1991 and the beginning 
of the civil war.201 During this chaotic period, food scarcity due to the drought and the political 
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upheaval prompted many more Somalis to leave the country. This movement continued well into 
the 2000s.202  
Victoria has the highest number of Somali inhabitants (almost 54% of the Australian total) 
and large numbers of them have settled in the inner north and western suburbs of Melbourne. Many 
of the Somalis that have immigrated to Australia are from urban backgrounds; most from the 
capital, Mogadishu.203 This is particularly pertinent to later discussions on kinship and education. 
The vast majority of Somali migrants in Melbourne arrived as refugees under the humanitarian 
program and because of the civil war, many Somalis have lived in other countries en route to 
Australia.204  
In my research design, I stipulated that I would interview Somali young people aged 
between 18 and 30. As previously stated, this age group encompasses those who arrived in 
Australia at a young age after the start of the civil war. I was aware that many of the Somalis who 
currently reside in Melbourne came to Australia via other countries. My preliminary research 
revealed that many members of the Somali community living in Melbourne have also lived in a 
country neighbouring Somalia (such as Eritrea, Ethiopia or Kenya).  This was often in refugee 
camps where there was very limited access to schooling facilities so their first exposure to any 
system of education was in Australia, often at a relatively advanced age (up to ten or eleven years 
old). 
I assumed the respondents would still be living with their immediate families and this 
turned out to be correct. Somalis traditionally have large families (between five and ten children is 
common) and the children usually do not leave the family home until they are married.  
The 2011 census data was my primary source of quantitative data.205 
 
Table 1: Somali demographics (2011 Census) 
 Born in Somalia Speak Somali Somali ancestry 
Number of people in 2011 Census 3064 5613 5254 
As percentage of total Victorian 
population 
0.0572 0.105 0.0981 
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I was surprised (in Table 1) to see that the number of people who identified as having Somali 
ancestry was in fact lower than the number who indicated that they speak Somali, but more on this 
later.  
The next step was to determine where the highest concentration of Somalis resided. I 
already knew of several key suburbs or areas, but statistical data informed where I focussed the 
study. Census data from 2011 indicate that Somalis in Melbourne reside around four main areas. 
These are Heidelberg West greater area, the North Melbourne/Flemington greater area, the inner 
North East (Carlton, Collingwood and Fitzroy), and the inner West, most notably, Braybrook (see 
Tables 2, 3 and 4). 
My initial contacts in the Somali community had already noted that the Heidelberg West 
and the North Melbourne/Flemington areas were ‘hotspots’ of community activity. The ABS data 
justified my selection of these two areas as focus areas for the study. In West Heidelberg alone, 
9.39% of the suburb speaks Somali, while North Melbourne and Flemington are also well 
represented. As a proportion of all who speak Somali in Melbourne, if one includes the surrounding 
suburbs as well, the Heidelberg West and North Melbourne/Flemington areas account for over 40% 
of this group. A similar story can be told by looking at the number of people from these areas who 
were born in Somalia — 39.59% can be accounted for in these two greater suburb areas. The final 
column in all three tables shows just how small the Somali population is relative to the whole 
Victorian population. 
One final thing I did with the data was to determine the number of people who had Somali 
ancestry for each suburb area, and to look at what proportion of these people were born in Somalia 
as opposed to Australia (see Table 4).  
Collating this information for the two target suburb areas, it can be determined that in 
Heidelberg West wider area, 50.0% of people with Somali ancestry were born in Somalia, and 
17.3% were born in a location other than Australia (presumably in transit to Australia). In the North 
Melbourne/Flemington area, these figures are 46.6% born in Somalia and 15.8% born outside 
Australia. It is clear then, that these two localities are good target areas for studying generation 1.5 
Somalis. 
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Table 2: Number of people who speak Somali language by suburb (2011 Census) 
 
Suburb/area Somali language 
spoken 
(Number) 
As percentage 
of Suburb 
population 
(%) 
As percentage of 
all who speak 
Somali in Victoria 
(%) 
As percentage of 
total Victorian 
population (%) 
Heidelberg West 
Reservoir 
Heidelberg Heights 
Preston 
Bellfield (Banyule) 
500 
267 
186 
151 
53 
9.39 
0.560 
2.91 
0.505 
3.06 
8.91 
4.76 
3.31 
2.69 
0.944 
0.0094 
0.0050 
0.0035 
0.0028 
0.00099 
North Melbourne 
Flemington 
Ascot Vale 
Kensington 
453 
361 
152 
145 
3.85 
4.79 
1.13 
1.49 
8.07 
6.43 
2.71 
2.58 
0.0084 
0.0067 
0.0028 
0.0027 
Carlton 
Collingwood 
Fitzroy 
392 
121 
106 
2.90 
1.87 
1.12 
6.98 
2.16 
1.89 
0.0073 
0.0023 
0.0020 
Braybrook 229 2.80 4.08 0.0043 
 
Table 3: Number of people who were born in Somalia by suburb (2011 Census) 
Suburb/area Somalia as 
Birthplace 
(Number) 
As percentage of 
Suburb 
population (%) 
As percentage of 
all were born in 
Somalia (%) 
As percentage of 
total Victorian 
population (%) 
Heidelberg West 
Reservoir 
Heidelberg Heights 
Preston 
Bellfield (Banyule) 
272 
148 
92 
94 
42 
5.11 
0.311 
1.44 
0.314 
2.43 
8.88 
4.83 
3.00 
3.01 
1.37 
0.0051 
0.0028 
0.0017 
0.0018 
0.00078 
North Melbourne 
Flemington 
Ascot Vale 
Kensington 
224 
179 
91 
70 
1.91 
2.38 
0.675 
0.721 
7.31 
5.94 
2.97 
2.28 
0.0042 
0.0033 
0.0017 
0.0013 
Carlton 
Collingwood 
Fitzroy 
177 
60 
57 
1.31 
0.927 
0.604 
5.78 
1.96 
1.86 
0.0033 
0.0011 
0.0011 
Braybrook 122 1.49 3.98 0.0028 
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Table 4: Number of people who had Somali ancestry by suburb (2011 Census) 
 *Of those with Somali ancestry 
Suburb/area Total with 
Somali ancestry 
(Number) 
Birthplace as 
Somalia 
(Number / %) 
Birthplace as 
Australia 
(Number / %) 
Birthplace 
Elsewhere 
(Number / %) 
Heidelberg West 
Reservoir 
Heidelberg Heights 
Preston 
Bellfield (Banyule) 
438 
223 
198 
147 
51 
219 (50.0%) 
118 (52.9%) 
82 (41.4%) 
73 (49.7%) 
37 (72.5%) 
154 (35.1%) 
48 (21.5%) 
80 (40.4%) 
55 (37.4%) 
8 (15.7%) 
65 (14.8%) 
57 (25.6%) 
36 (18.2%) 
19 (12.9%) 
6 (11.8%) 
North Melbourne 
Flemington 
Ascot Vale 
Kensington 
406 
333 
117 
109 
179 (44.1%) 
149 (44.7%) 
68 (58.1%) 
54 (49.5%) 
161 (39.7%) 
129 (38.7%) 
34 (29.1%) 
39 (35.8%) 
66 (16.3%) 
55 (16.5%) 
15 (12.8%) 
16 (14.7%) 
Carlton 
Collingwood 
Fitzroy 
374 
107 
100 
157 (42.0%) 
51 (47.7%) 
53 (53.0%) 
146 (39.0%) 
28 (26.2%) 
24 (24.0%) 
17 (19.0%) 
28 (26.2%) 
23 (23%) 
Braybrook 222 106 (47.7%) 78 (35.1%) 38 (17.1%) 
*Percentage figures may not add to 100 due to rounding to 3 significant figures. 
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The sample 
 
I collected some basic data on a sample population of 45 people, using community member profiles. 
I describe community member profiles as a method in detail in section two, but I present the data 
here to give more detail about the Somali population in Melbourne — particularly the people that I 
met in the course of my study.  
 I made an effort to speak with roughly even numbers of men and women. Out of the sample 
of 45, 23 were women and 22 were men (as shown in Figure 1). Figure 2 shows that the entire 
sample population speaks Somali at home. In general, it was the younger people who spoke Somali 
and English (especially between siblings), whereas the older people usually spoke only Somali at 
home.  
 
Figure 1: Gender distribution of Sample (N=45)   
 
 
Figure 2: Language spoken at home of Sample (N=45) 
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The oldest people I met were in their 60s. The are still playing a relatively active part in cultural life 
as I met them at cultural events, festivals and community meetings. The youngest people were in 
their late teens and early 20s. All of them had finished high school, and many were studying at 
tertiary level. The people I spoke with were born between 1949 and 1996. 
As Figure 3 shows, the entire sample population was born outside Australia. The people 
born in Kenya were likely to have been born in a refugee camp. Some of those in Ethiopia were 
perhaps born in the contested Ogaden region.  
 
Figure 3: Country of birth of Sample (N=45) 
 
 
The vast majority of people within the sample arrived in Australia around 15 to 20 years ago. This 
coincides with the outbreak of civil war in Somalia in 1991, and the years it took for many to go 
through refugee status certification processes. This period of time was often spent in camps in 
Ethiopia or Kenya. The longest period of time someone had resided in Australia was 24 years; the 
shortest was 6 years. 
Figure 4 shows that the family size of my sample was significantly larger than the 
Australian norm. The most common number of children per couple in Australia is two,206 while for 
my sample, it was five. In general, the older people had the largest families, and the younger people 
had smaller families. I defined family size as immediate family — if someone had children, this 
included their partner and their children; if they did not have children, then this figure included their 
siblings and parents. This was a distinction I was careful to make, as it is culturally normal for 
Somalis to think of families as extended family groups. For this reason, I also did not use the term 
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‘household size’ to avoid confusion by including relatives who were staying for a short period 
(perhaps between jobs, between houses, or settling into a new area).  
Interestingly, none of the respondents lived alone, or with friends or colleagues in a share-
house situation. They were either living at home with their parents, or they had moved out with a 
spouse and had children of their own. The smallest family size (in Figure 6) is four, and there were 
three instances of this. These were young Somali born people who had moved out of their parents’ 
home with a spouse, and had only two children. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Family size of Sample (N=45) 
 
 
 
Figure 5 shows that the respondents are clustered broadly in the suburbs mentioned earlier in Tables 
2, 3 and 4. Of this initial sample of 45, 70% lived in one of my two broad focus areas (39% in the 
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Figure 5: Current suburb of Sample (N=45) 
 
 
 Figure 6 shows that every member of the sample has some form of educational attainment. 
According to a 2012 report by the OECD, approximately 41% of women and 35% of men aged 
between 25 and 64 in Australia have attained tertiary education.207 The numbers in figure 6 are 
similar, with a slightly higher proportion of my sample population having tertiary education 
attainment. The majority of the respondents who had only attained primary school education were 
aged above 50. At the time these people were attending primary school, the education system in 
Somalia had not yet been overhauled (which happened post-independence). At this time, Somalia 
was much less urbanised and subsequently it’s likely that at least some of these people lived rurally 
at a significant distance from high schools, and were not able to attend. 
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Figure 6: Educational Attainment of Sample by Gender, Family Size and Year of Birth (N=45) 
 
 
The other interesting thing to note about Figure 6 is that of the sample, more females had attained 
university level qualifications than males. In fact, this indicates that a greater proportion of the 
females who attended high school went on to attain tertiary level qualifications. Secondly, by 
plotting this data by family size, this shows that in general, those with larger families had lower 
levels of educational attainment.  
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Figure 7: Maternal Educational Attainment (N=45)  
 
Figure 8: Paternal Educational Attainment (N=45) 
 
 
Figures 7 and 8 show that while 9% of respondents reported that their mothers had received no 
formal education, all of their fathers had attained at least primary school level. Interestingly, the 
level of both maternal and paternal primary school attainment was around equal at roughly one 
third, although I did not stipulate whether their parents had finished primary school, as the school 
systems varied widely across Somalia in that time. While more fathers than mothers had received 
high school education, the reverse was true for tertiary education. Of the mothers who had attended 
high school, a greater proportion had gone on to university level study, as compared with the 
fathers. So, in fact, from the sample, more mothers had attained tertiary level education, despite 
significantly more fathers achieving primary school and high school education. 
Figure 9 shows the breakdown of employment status for the sample. The sample is very 
small, and the interpretation of this data is complex. However, two trends did emerge. The first was 
that older people in the sample were most often unemployed (perhaps corresponding to their low 
levels of education attainment and difficulty with English).  
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Figure 9: Employment Status of Sample (N=45) 
 
  
Another trend was that women with young children were much more likely to be unemployed, 
regardless of educational attainment. Many of my female participants told me they would like to 
leave the workforce for the purpose of having children and raising them to school age. They were 
very clear that they would return to work at this point. 
 
 
Somalis in Melbourne: significant issues 
 
There is no doubt that Muslim migrants and refugees settling in Australia have encountered their 
own particular challenges. Their disrupted circumstances can be compounded upon arrival in 
Australia, where some culture, language and social norms are quite different.208 Likewise, the 
methods and patterns of adjustment have varied from those previously seen in migrants in Australia. 
For example, a study by Clyne and Kipp showed that in the face of racism, Arabic speakers fell 
back on their language, perceiving it as an asset, rather than avoiding their community language as 
Chinese speakers do.209  
It is clear that there are many structural constraints and conditions confronting migrants and 
refugees in their new environment that shape the kinds of family arrangements, roles, and 
orientations that emerge among them. So do the norms and values they encounter in their new 
homes. Moreover, immigrants are not passive individuals who are merely acted upon by external 
forces. They play an active role in reconstructing and redefining family life. Indeed, members of the 
family, by virtue of their gender and generation, have differing interests so that women (and men) 
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and young people (and older people) often try to fashion family patterns in ways that improve their 
positions and further their aims.210 
The displacement of Muslims has affected their ethnic, cultural and religious practices in 
their host countries for a number of reasons; for example, in the way that sex and age ratios affect 
family patterns in the composition of migrant groups. Foner notes that if men greatly outnumber 
women, this can lead to women having more power in relationships.211 Large numbers of older 
people can also affect family dynamics as they may watch children while parents are working. They 
may also provide the strongest representation of pre-migration beliefs and practices within families. 
This was supported by evidence from the respondents. When older individuals are absent from a 
community, men may be forced to take a more active role in household responsibilities because 
there are fewer adults within households.212  
Migrants are also exposed to different customs, religions and political ideals. This is 
apparent in many areas, perhaps most strongly in male-female relations and the question of gender 
roles and the relationship between younger generations and their parents and grandparents. Women 
are more enthusiastic than men to endorse values that enhance women’s position and young people 
also generally enjoy their new freedoms, which their parents may resist. 213  Furthermore, 
government assistance, if provided, can allow individuals to be more independent. In general, 
earnings and entitlements translate into greater autonomy and power. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
women are often more receptive to notions of gender equality than men.214 
The Refugee Council of Australia has identified the following common issues affecting 
African refugee settlement in Australia: 
 
• challenges in gaining sufficient settlement support; 
• the impact of trauma on resettlement; 
• the financial burden of repaying travel loans 
• supporting family members still in Africa; 
• the struggle to reunite split families; 
• learning English and adjusting to schooling and tertiary education in Australia; 
• finding secure employment, including recognition of qualifications of past work experience; and 
• accessing health services.215 
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These issues were all touched on by the respondents. In addition, they reported that standing out 
from ‘Anglo Australians’ was problematic. In Australia, Somali migrants are of special interest for 
a number of reasons: Because of their physical features, Somalis are ‘highly visible and are 
potential victims of racism’. This is further intensified by their faith, in particular for women, who 
will usually be identified as Muslims by their dress.216  
According to the Banyule Community Health Service Somali Research Project (conducted 
in 2005), the majority of Somalis in Banyule (this local council area includes West Heidelberg and 
surrounds) have come from large towns or cities in Somalia, which would indicate that adult 
Somalis arriving in Victoria during the first wave of refugee intake were urban Somalis most likely 
to have benefited from Barre’s educational policies and programs.217 At the 2001 Census, nearly 
half of Victoria’s Somali population was under 25 years old. This means that half the 2001 Somali 
population living in Victoria was part of the generation of Somalis who were under the age of 14 in 
1990, when the school system ceased to exist. The remaining half fell either into the category of 
Somalis who had the opportunity under the Barre regime to access to a University level education, 
or who were over 35 and may have received an education under the British or Italian education 
system.218  
Somali language and culture are strongly oriented to spoken language. Until the 1970s, 
northern Somali education was conducted in English and Latin script became the official script of 
the Somali language. This means that in Somalia, anyone born prior to 1950 had very little chance 
of becoming literate in their own language, and attaining literacy in another language would also 
have been difficult. Nevertheless, there were some educated Somalis who did speak and write 
English and Italian, as the Italian and British colonial authorities had established a schooling system 
and set their own curriculum. This was, however, only available to a very select minority, who often 
trained as interpreters, and worked mainly as administrative assistants. There also must have been 
merchants who were able to communicate in different languages (Arabic, Swahili for example) as 
the port in the Gulf of Aden was a commercial hub. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find reports of 
such experiences, due to what Pavla Miller has noted as the tendency of historical accounts to 
define education in terms of a narrow scope.219 There is a tendency in educational histories to ignore 
(or forget) educational experiences that fall outside this scope, such as female experiences, 
experiences of the poor or less wealthy, and experiences of educational enrichment that falls outside 
the context of mass schooling.  
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 However, it is only a small portion of the total population that would have had access to 
these educational experiences. Thus, the majority of Somalis born before 1960 arriving in Australia 
would not have had access to education beyond primary school level. This tallied with what the 
respondents told me about their grandparents’ education attainment and the way they pressured 
their children and grandchildren to obtain a good education, as they had been unable to.  
Somalis (particularly the urban dwellers who migrated to Australia) value education highly, 
and aspirations to attain a university education and a professional career are high among in the 
community in Australia. However, there is a lack of understanding of the breadth of education and 
training options available to in Australia, which often leads to conflict between parents and children 
who are making educational choices their parents do not endorse. This has been noted previously by 
Keating and Simons: 
 
Inter generational communication on the issue of VET is often fraught within the Somali community, 
with young Somali people undertaking VET study often unable to communicate to family members 
that their choices are realistic … amongst the Somali community, apprenticeships are generally not 
highly regarded.220 
 
As Martha Bigelow points out in her work in the United States, education is highly esteemed among 
Somali youth. It is described as the most valued piece of cultural capital for the Somali youth in her 
work. According to Bigelow, this is because education allows Somalis living abroad to fulfill the 
‘cultural expectation to financially help family members in the United States or still in Somalia, 
Ethiopia, or Kenya’.221 
The importance the Somali community places on education was a big feature of my 
fieldwork. The young people described the expectations their parents have of them, and their 
sometimes unrealistic hopes about which sort of profession their children will enter. Keating and 
Simons’ research regarding VET education was also very well supported by my research, with 
many young men especially explaining that the previous generation had little understanding of the 
scope of the VET system in Australia and also saw little value in practical training such as 
apprenticeships. The young people all agreed that there were a select group of professions which 
were most favoured (perhaps predictably, doctor and lawyer were often raised), and that there were 
other professions which were disappointing to Somali parents. 
Interestingly, all of the young women I conducted extended interviews or focus groups with 
were either working, or studying with the idea of gaining employment later. Some ridiculed the 
notion that they should stay at home and not work. Although they plan to take a break from working 
when they have children, they were certain that they would return to work when their children 
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began school. This complexity in gender identities has been noted in other African communities in 
Australia.222 
Another significant issue raised by the respondents was their status as refugees. With the 
political disruption of the past two decades, the UNHCR estimates that there are 1.5 million 
internally displaced Somalis along with hundreds of thousands across the continent of Africa and 
around the globe.223 These refugees have experiences that set them apart from voluntary migrants. 
By definition, the circumstances that lead to a refugee experience disrupt the ‘home country’ in 
some way — personal and societal upheavals go hand in hand. For example, refugees often have to 
overcome unique obstacles to maintain contact with family members left behind or scattered around 
the globe.224 
For refugees, sending societies intentionally or unintentionally create barriers to 
transnational ties. If the sending society is in disarray, as is the case in Somalia, formal 
communication networks are jeopardized. The ongoing circumstances of sending societies will 
influence refugee transnationalism. For example, the difficulty of maintaining close ties with family 
in the sending society may make it easier to reject pre-migration beliefs because individuals in the 
sending society are exercising less surveillance and informal social control.225 In my study, this was 
more true for the parents of the respondents, as the young people tended to keep in regular contact 
with relatives and friends in Somalia via social media. 
Somali refugees have commonly sought refuge in neighbouring countries. Camps in Kenya 
and Ethiopia have provided a temporary haven for the majority of displaced Somalis, but small 
numbers have also gone to Yemen, Djibouti, Tanzania and Egypt. Some have resettled in European 
countries and North America, as well as Australia. The respondents described how many people 
have lost contact with family and friends in the context of this scattering. Somali immigrants to 
Australia include a relatively high proportion of women with their children, whose husbands and 
other male relatives have often died or are missing.226 These families may be separated from family 
support and structures that they would normally rely on in Somalia. They have also experienced 
relatively high levels of trauma, deprivation and distress, and may be suffering the effects of such 
experiences. There are relatively few older males, who traditionally play a significant role in the 
development of male adolescents and young men.227 This means that community structures to 
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support cultural maintenance or the negotiation of new values have to be created in Australia at the 
same time as settlement is occurring.  
It is important to highlight here, as McGown does,228 that while migrants and refugees are 
undoubtedly influenced by the host country’s values, customs, religion and social norms, this 
process is dynamic and mutual. Arriving populations also change the host country when they are 
absorbed. As Julian Burnside described in a 2013 speech about refugees in Australia: It would be 
difficult to imagine Melbourne today without cappuccino and lattes. However, in the past, the 
Italian immigrants bringing these novelties to our shores were marginalized and victims of racism 
for their cultural differences.229 Now, Melbourne is justifiably proud of its cafe culture, and the 
delicacies that can be obtained all over the city. When I asked the respondents if something similar 
could happen with Somali (and in general, African) refugees, they were circumspect. They didn’t 
believe that their culture could have such a positive influence in Australia, because of the small 
numbers of African migrants in Australia and because the differences in culture were just too great.  
This supports McGown’s thesis that the further apart the receiving and arriving cultures are, 
the harder it is for them to integrate and become comfortable with each other.230 Again, the visible 
difference of Somalis must be considered. Their dark skin, their conservative dress and their 
religious identity mark them as different immediately. It has been noted that religious identity in 
particular, can be a barrier to settlement if a refugee feels that their religion is threatened.231 Indeed, 
unfavourable reception of this facet of identity can lead to increased religiosity. Moghissi, writing 
about identity formation, states: ‘In the case of diasporas of Islamic cultures… the formation of a 
collective identity, or diasporic consciousness and solidarity, is more often a response to an 
inhospitable climate in the host societies than an expression of cultural nostalgia’.232 This process 
can be either positive or negative and this depends on the response of the host society. He gives the 
example of schools being open and tolerant of religious dress and prayer at school as a means to 
encouraging greater integration, while an unreceptive and closed society can create a greater 
religious conservatism ‘than that which was actually experienced … in the home country’.233 
According to McGown, ‘political cultures that allow ethnic or religious minorities to 
participate in society’s transactions — without disadvantaging them for their ethnic or religious 
affiliation — will ease the process of cultural weaving for immigrants’.234 It has been argued that 
those people who flee persecution from Muslim majority countries have often been targeted for 
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their liberal views, and in fact are not usually religiously conservative. However, upon arrival in an 
unreceptive host country, they adopt a more religious identity as a means of protection and 
solidarity with others in a similar situation.235 This view was supported by the respondents, who 
explained that their parents held tightly to their religion as marker of identity and that religion had 
become more important to them in Australia than it was at home in Somalia. 
 
 
A response by the community to these challenges  
 
I now briefly describe one particular strategy I believe is employed by the Somali community in 
Melbourne to face the above-mentioned issues. I argue that they have developed a strong collective 
identity (based as discussed above on shared religious and cultural practices) to support each other 
in a sometimes-hostile environment.  
Here, I wish to briefly discuss some field notes made after my interviews and participant 
observation regarding the fact that the Somalis seemed to have a distinct sense of self, and a habit of 
setting themselves apart, both from other minority groups such as other refugees and migrants, and 
from mainstream Australians. This has been noted by other authors,236 and also particularly in the 
Australian context.237 Specifically in relation to education, there appears to be a Somali belief that 
they prize education above other migrant and refugee groups in Australia.  
The idea that Somalis set themselves apart from others was a common one in different 
types of academic literature. It was conveyed to me by many of the respondents in mostly positive 
ways throughout the course of my fieldwork. For example, some members of the older generations 
prided themselves on their success in Australia, despite their extreme disadvantage at the time of 
arrival. The younger people told me often that while they had other Muslim friends, there were 
cultural differences between them, and it was often easier to maintain friendships with other 
Somalis. The women in particular distinguished the strength and pride of Somali women as 
something that set them apart. 
While teaching English in North Melbourne, I noted that the older Somali men who 
congregate at the community centre there seemed to keep themselves apart from other community 
centre users. This took me some time to realise, however I began to arrive 10-15 minutes before the 
English class began in order to observe the people making use of the facilities. These were almost 
all men at that particular time of day, with roughly one third being Vietnamese, one third South 
American (particularly Chilean and Argentinian) and the rest made up of Somalis and other migrant 
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groups. I noted that while some of the other men played cards and had discussions in imperfect 
English, the Somalis preferred to speak their own language and keep to themselves. I did not 
witness any hostility, rather a polite distance between the groups. This could be because of language 
and communication difficulties, and also because the Somalis are likely to be much more recent 
arrivals than those Vietnamese and South Americans who largely arrived in Australia in the 1970s. 
I spoke about this with an experienced social worker in the area and her opinion was 
different. She explained that while other migrant groups established connections within their own 
ethnic community first, and then branched out and began to interact with other groups, the Somalis 
she has worked with have been less likely to seek connections with non-Somalis. She argued that 
they are remarkably self-contained and do not see a need or benefit to expanding their relationships 
beyond their immediate circle. This idea was reinforced by an experience I had while visiting a 
group of older women at a home in the flats in North Melbourne. There are diverse ethnicities 
represented in this building, and it had been selected as a site that could be improved by increased 
social interaction between residents. To this end, a social organisation had set up some regular 
events. These were intended to be relaxed, with a variety of food and some planned activities. The 
activities were designed to keep the residents coming back to the next event.  
For example, one week there was a photo station set up and the residents were invited to 
have their pictures taken. They would need to return the following week to collect them and take 
part in the next stage of the activities. While there were large numbers of residents attending these 
parties, it was notable that Somalis were underrepresented. I learned this by speaking with the social 
workers who were organising the events. On the particular occasion that I was visiting the flats, one 
of these events was in full swing in the congregation area downstairs, and outside in the playground. 
However, as I ascended to the fourth floor and went to knock on the door, I heard that inside there 
was a party in full swing as well. There was music and I could smell delicious smells. Inside were 
approximately 12 women aged between 40 and 65 who were enjoying themselves very much, albeit 
far away from the planned event downstairs. I asked them why they were not attending the other 
event and their response was dismissive. One lady said to me ‘Why would we, when everything we 
need is here?’ Others expressed that they felt more comfortable among their friends and family and 
therefore did not wish to attend. I spoke to them about how the events were designed to bring 
together residents from different backgrounds and situations but they seemed puzzled at this. The 
general feeling was that this was not necessary, as they had their own groups already. 
I will discuss this particular strategy and the way that the community has become self-
protective further in the findings chapters. I believe it has manifested in many different ways, 
sometimes to the advantage of the community, particularly where they have robust support 
networks. However, sometimes it has caused individuals to shun other forms of outside assistance 
that have been offered, which might have been better able to meet particular needs.  
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It is clear that the Somali community in Melbourne is anxious to preserve a sense of 
collective identity. As Williams describes it, Somali collective identity in Australia is often 
interlinked with religious and ethnic identity, to the extent that many refugees in Australia have 
used religion as a means to preserve ethnicity’.238  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In this second chapter of section three, I gave some demographic information regarding Somalis in 
Melbourne, both from census data and from my own research. I also briefly sketched several issues 
of significance to the Somali community in Melbourne. These broad sample characteristics and 
issues facing the community were presented to contextualize the findings chapters that now follow. 
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IV  FINDINGS 
  
(a) Exploring violence: overt and covert forms, reflections of generation 1.5 and the 
notion of ‘radicalisation’ 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The following chapters are devoted to my empirical data and give voice to my participants. In this 
chapter I discuss overt violence that has recently taken place in Somalia and the way it has been 
interpreted by the respondents. Secondly I discuss events and situations that have affected Somalis 
in Melbourne. I reflect on these and examine whether or not they are covert forms of violence. Next 
I turn to the descriptions (in their own words) of violence that have affected generation 1.5 Somalis 
in Melbourne. Finally, I examine the idea of ‘radicalisation’ and the way in which generation 1.5 
Somalis conceptualise it. 
 
 
Overt forms of violence: experiences and interpretations 
 
In section three, I examined the sorts of violence that have taken place in Somalia, both pre- and 
post-colonial involvement. Following a period of relative stability post-independence, the country 
was thrown into a civil war in 1991. This coupled with competing economic interests, internecine 
conflict and harsh climatic events (most notably drought leading to extreme food scarcity and 
famine in many areas) has resulted in a significant amount of violence in Somalia, particularly over 
the last three decades. In section three, I outlined that violence is a characteristic often attributed to 
Somalis both in Somalia and abroad, before tracing how such representations have been constructed 
over centuries.  
I think it is particularly pertinent to note at this point that while sitting in front of an 
intelligent and articulate young adult (often the same age as myself), perhaps sharing some baklava 
and Lebanese coffee, or maybe talking in a brightly lit library or community centre, the idea of 
overt violence in this form seemed awfully far away. When overt violence was raised by the 
respondents, it was mostly in the context of the violence that has occurred in Somalia. The topic 
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often came up either later in an interview, or during the second or third time I met with people. 
However, I didn’t note any discomfort when speaking about violence in Somalia. Indeed, details 
were relayed to me in a very pragmatic or practical tone, even when they concerned disturbing 
events to be recalled from childhood, or in some cases memories of traumatic injury or loss of loved 
ones. 
  
Sumaya: Some areas are safer than others, but it’s a scary place. I wouldn’t go now. If 
someone gave me a ticket today I’d prefer to stay here. I remember I was 5 when we left. I 
remember Americans coming and storing all their weaponry in our household. I 
remember my brother got shot and all the blood everywhere. He was 15 and he was 
coming back from Qur’an school and he was on his way home and he got shot. And my 
brother brought him home covered in blood and then he went to hospital. The bullet had 
gone straight through so they stitched him up. 
INT / 05.05.2013 
 
Some of the respondents had a strong grasp of recent Somali politics. It was clear that they 
discussed this with their peers and others within the community. I found that it was culturally 
common to see men aged between 40 and 70 spend a full afternoon in a café with their friends in 
deep conversation. I was told that these conversations covered the situation in Somalia, Australian 
politics, the Somali community in Melbourne and other news and current affairs. The current affairs 
of Somalia are still quite present for the community in Melbourne, and it seems that some of the 
young people had heard and observed this, and taken in some of that knowledge. So when 
describing the situation in Somalia, some of the respondents were very well informed. They often 
made reference to the civil war and the subsequent international interventions that have occurred 
there.  
On the other hand, there were some people who actively distanced themselves from 
Somalia, and professed disinterest in knowing about developments there. Indeed, there were quite 
varied answers regarding the cause of the conflict.  
 
Hani: My uncle always invites me [to Somalia] and I don’t really want to go. I don’t want 
to see a war-torn country. I don’t know what I’d get out of it.  
Sumaya: … it’s not stable at all. The electricity still gets cut all the time and there are 
sometimes curfews and you can’t go out. 
FG / 02.11.2012 
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Suleiman: I asked my mum when I was a young kid, a teenager about why there was so 
much fighting in Somalia and she said there has always been fighting in Somalia and 
there always will be. That’s why they had to leave. 
INT / 20.02.2014 
 
Suleiman’s answer is a very clear indication that in the mind of his mother, the fighting in Somalia 
is endemic, and will not change. He was not inclined to visit Somalia for this reason. 
Cabaas was an example of an individual who took a great interest in Somalia. 
Consequently, he provided a nuanced answer, which displayed an understanding of Somali political 
history from the 1970s to the 1990s. 
 
Cabaas: I think the war started because the president, Siyad Barre tried to do too much 
in our country too fast. He wanted to set up all this education stuff and to, you know, 
change the way people were living for years. Nobody likes to change so fast. And when 
the people were getting sick of him, other bad people stepped in and made things worse. 
INT / 19.05.2013 
 
Scholars have noted the speed with which Siyad Barre made all references to clans a strictly 
punishable offence and outlawed traditional cultural practices, such as councils for resolving 
disputes, and even traditional ceremonies such as weddings. Once his regime was challenged, 
however, Barre sought to strengthen some clans at the cost of others in order to shore up his own 
rule.1 
Aaliya describes the situation in Mogadishu in some detail. 
 
Aaliya: I don’t even know what to say about it [Mogadishu] anymore. There is so many 
wars I think from 1991 until today 2012 so it’s a really changed city. War after war after 
war. Many times people fled and then they came back and then another war broke out. The 
wars used to be between clans before and then it changed to some warlords fighting one 
another and then it changed to some kind of regions thing when other African troops 
intervened and then the war was between Somalis and outside troops and still that kind of 
war since 2006 is going on. There is an official government which was elected I think one 
month ago and people have good hopes but now the president he… nominated the prime 
minister I think it was the day before yesterday and people are really disappointed with the 
guy he came up because he is [a] business man and when the war was going on he was in 
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Ethiopia and Kenya so he has really close ties with them and he doesn’t know anything 
about politics is what some people say.  
INT / 01.06.2012 
 
Aaliya describes the situation around the time of the Ethiopian military invasion of Somalia in 
2006. This conflict was very strong in the minds of older Somalis I spoke with, however it was not 
mentioned by any other of my younger respondents. The above account shows how much interest 
Aaliya takes in Somali political affairs from Australia. She engaged actively with family members 
in Somalia, and studied politics in Australia. As the quotes below show, this was not the norm in the 
context of the interviews. Many more respondents told me they had no idea about what happened in 
Somalia on a day-to-day basis.  
 
Mansuur: I don’t really care about it to be honest. It’s not my home anymore. 
Said: No, I don’t know a single thing about it. My life is in Melbourne. 
FG / 10.11.2012 
 
It is interesting that there was such a wide spectrum of responses on this topic. Some respondents 
regularly accessed news about Somalia, in Somali, Arabic and English. Others lacked this interest 
and did not consider Somali current affairs to be important. Some of the respondents told me that 
their parents had worked very hard to leave Somalia, and that they wanted their children to be 
Australian and be informed about Australian issues. Others said that discussions about Somali 
politics were a sore point within their homes and that their parents were unhappy speaking about the 
situation in Somalia as it was too upsetting for them. 
 Many of the respondents mentioned accessing forums and chat rooms that discussed 
Somalia and aspects of Somali life. These online spaces were available to them to access privately, 
and not all of them had discussed this with family members. These were a link for them to Somalia 
and a way of learning more about the situation there. They explained that it was good to have 
sources of information other than news broadcasts which they did not think were entirely 
trustworthy. In addition, the online spaces were populated with other young Somalis and they 
enjoyed conversing in Somali or English to learn more about developments in Somalia. 
Aaliya’s account below is a good indication of the range of conflicting interests that are 
vying for power in Somalia. According to her telling, her mother, who belonged to the Sid clan was 
persecuted after the president was overthrown so she fled the city. Her father’s clan, while small, 
was incorrectly assumed to be part of the Darod clan and therefore implicated in the already 
ongoing conflict between the Darod and the Hawiye. The Darod clan was in power in the 
government but was overthrown by the Hawiye clan. The Hawiye did not stop at ousting the 
President’s Sid sub-clan politically; they also started to ‘eliminate’ anyone from the Darod clan. 
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Aisha compares this to the genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 between the Tutsi and the 
Hutus. According to Aisha, the Hawiye persecuted or killed anyone who resembled a Darod clan 
member or who had any connection to the clan at all (real or imagined). 
 
Aaliya: And after the war broke out my mum was of the clan who was persecuted because 
she was from the president’s clan so she fled away from the city. My father’s clan wasn’t 
really that big, they didn’t really have influence. It was just people sometimes they were 
accused like being part of the Darod clan because the bigger war was between the Darod 
and the Hawiye. The Darod was the clan that had the government, the Hawiye came, they 
overthrow the Darod and then they didn’t overthrow only, they didn’t go after the clan, 
you know the Sid clan of the president but they just started to eliminate anyone from the 
Darod clan like what happened with the Tutsi and Hutus in Rwanda. They said these 
people used to colonise us so everyone who looks like that clan, any connection, we just 
tell him: ‘You are from that clan’ and they kill him. So many of the Somali were 
persecuted for looking like that clan. 
INT / 01.06.2012 
 
This account reveals the depth of confusion and the profound instability of the clans in Somalia at 
that time. It was a very dangerous place to be, where individuals could be killed for some physical 
characteristic that falsely or correctly led others to assume knowledge of their identity. Episodes of 
clan cleansing were carried out during the Somali civil war, and the testimony of survivors reveals 
that they were hunted down intentionally because of their group identity, sometimes by name by 
those who knew them.2 Similar testimony was given by survivors of the Rwandan and Yugoslav 
genocides.3 Sen’s argument that conflict is engendered by the ‘presumption that people can be 
uniquely categorized based on religion or culture’4 is pertinent here. However, the clan cleansing 
took place between groups of people who shared religion and culture, despite belonging to different 
clans. This alludes to an oft-mentioned feature of the Somali conflict — the fragmented nature of 
the social and cultural landscape, despite ethnic and religious homogeneity. 
There are many different versions of events that took place in Somalia during the 1990s. 
The clan warfare, although consistently reported on has been difficult to document comprehensively 
and accurately. What is certain is that the Somali clans have at times been brutal in their eradication 
of each other’s members. In times of such heightened conflict, as Aaliya described, it was not 
unusual to be misidentified as a member of a particular clan and injured or killed because of the 
assumed clan membership. In contrast, many respondents reported that their parents could tell what 
                                                
2 Kapteijns, Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Turn of 1991: 14. 
3 Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, "Introduction: Making Sense of Violence." 
4 Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny: xv. 
  
 
136 
clan someone belonged by looking at them, which raises questions about the accuracy of such 
comments. However, it seems that mistakes were often made with regard to kinship in Somalia. 
In discussion about violence in Somalia, many different theories were offered for the root 
cause of the continuing conflict. Below, I have collated some responses into the same categories 
described in section three. 
 
 
(i) Violence due to a personal characteristic  
 
Suleiman’s answer (above) to why there is violence in Somalia above, reveals that in his family, at 
least, the violence is attributed to a personal characteristic of the Somalis. ‘…she said there has 
always been fighting in Somalia and there always will be.’ Bilan agreed. 
 
Bilan: In Somalia when you’re young, 8, 7, 9, 10, you must stand up for yourself, because 
you know children are really very cruel… but when you are older you should grow up 
from that culture, from that bullying culture. But the fighting continues with the Somalis. 
Especially between women. Once two people argue, it almost always ends up in fighting 
in Somalia, and bashing.  
INT / 19.05.2013 
 
Her description of violence as a childhood last resort, when others are cruel is not unusual, but she 
believes that Somali children do not grow out of what she terms a ‘bullying culture’. Here, Bilan 
implies that some Somalis remain childlike in their psychology, and are unable to grow up. She 
specifically notes that women are very likely to fight physically, which will be discussed in greater 
detail further on in this chapter. Aaliya also used the term ‘bullying’ to describe Somalis’ violent 
responses: 
 
Aaliya: This is something that goes back a long time in Somali culture. Yes, I think it goes 
back because they fight about something so easy. Like ‘you scratched my car’. And if you 
say ‘what are you talking about, I didn’t touch your car. Just get lost!’ You say get lost 
and a fight starts. So, you know, the young Somali guys, Do they hear that from their 
mothers? I don’t know where they get it from. It’s in their genes. … You will hear some 
mums telling their boys ‘you have to stand up for yourself, and do whatever it takes’. And 
they wouldn’t tell their children bullying is not acceptable in Australia. … The Somalis 
are bullies… they really bully people. 
INT / 01.06.2012 
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Aaliya pointed out that the fighting culture ‘goes back a long way’ for Somalis, and argued that it 
only takes something very small to set this off. She wonders if this is something that is now ‘in their 
genes’, which is an explanation that draws on science. However, she then reflects that this message 
is passed on from parents to children, and thus permeates from one generation to the next, even in 
the Australian context, where she believes the acceptable culture is different from in Somalia. 
Interestingly, she states that the violence is passed from mother to son. 
 
Aaliya: Also, Somali girls really fight. Australia doesn’t know fighting, but in my country 
people fight. 
Elizabeth: Physically you mean? 
Aaliya: Yeah, it’s normal. The Somalis are physical fighters. The women fight, especially 
the women fight too much. They fight about something which is really very easy like their 
kids, if one kid hits another child the mothers will be so furious. They will fight and the 
one who is defeated will go out and find her sisters and friends and whatever and bring a 
group and then this group they… bash each other. 
INT / 01.06.2012 
 
Aaliya in particular, has a very strong opinion about the violence of Somalis, and especially the 
women who she believes are very easily prompted to use physical violence as a response to their 
circumstances. Again, she has described a situation where there is a minor dispute. She argues that 
Somali women have as their first response to such situations, a violent instinct. They will not 
attempt to resolve the dispute through debate, but will use physical strength to do so. She also 
describes how the situation will escalate from there, and how if one party is defeated, she will round 
up supporters from her family and group of friends and return to the winner of the previous 
argument to try and defeat her with the added physical strength of her supporters. While she was the 
most vocal about female violence, Aaliya was not the only person to describe women fighting in 
groups. 
 
Ishaar: Women, they do the group fighting. It’s something that existed… I don’t know 
where it came from and we don’t see it much as violent. Nobody sees it as violent. I guess 
this the way some women solve their problems together. 
GROUP INT / 17.08.2014 
 
According to Ishaar, this physical violence is a dispute resolution system that is not perceived to be 
violent. This could be because it is common (although it was not mentioned by many of the 
respondents), or because physical violence is not seen to be as serious if it occurs between women 
  
 
138 
rather than men. According to Ishaar’s explanation, this violence is not identified as such, perhaps 
because it is a customary way of resolving disputes. 
 
Absame: I remember when we were in the camp in Kenya, there were so many women 
fighting all the time! We all lived very close together and they argued about their kids 
and their things (belongings). And I remember now, once I did see a big group of women 
doing a fight in the street. But my mum made us leave straight away. 
FG / 10.02.2014 
 
Absame’s recollection does offer some support to the comments above about women fighting in 
groups, however the living situation in refugee camps is very densely packed and fraught with 
uncertainty, and the situation he describes may be no more than a general response to these 
difficulties. Indeed, according to Absame’s account, not all women participated in this fighting, 
with his mother at least choosing to remove herself and her children as quickly as she could. 
 
 
(ii) Violence due to the clan system  
 
Many of the respondents discussed the role of the clan system in the expressions of overt violence 
in Somalia. 
 
Bilan: I think it’s the clan system that’s totally responsible for the war there. There are 
loads of other African countries where they’re very poor too, and have the same 
droughts, and they’re not fighting all the time. 
INT / 19.05.2013 
 
Bilan was not one of the young people who was actively engaged in the discussion of Somali 
politics. However he raises an important point in the comparison between Somalia and other 
countries who have similar climatic conditions. His analysis suggests that drought and harsh 
environmental conditions are not the reasons for the conflict in Somalia. 
Nevertheless, the respondents did generally agree that the clan system played a role in the 
conflict. It was interesting that while the overwhelming response when asked for explanations of 
violence and conflict in Somalia referred directly to clans as an explanation, some young people 
were able to offer detailed insight, referring specific historical events, particularly periods when 
different clans had political power. Other young people believed strongly that the clan system plays 
a big part in the creation and recreation of violence in Somalia, but were not able to explain this in 
depth. Indeed, there was a sense from some respondents that the clan system itself is inherently 
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violent, and that we shouldn’t expect anything different from a group of people who subscribe to 
such a system.  
Hani, for example, argued that the clan system is no more than a prejudice that is handed 
down from parents to their children. Her statement below supports the argument made by Aaliya 
earlier, that children absorb the beliefs and prejudices of their parents and act on them as well, 
although Hani believes that it is both mothers and fathers who transmit these messages. 
 
Hani: And it’s also the parents that influence the children — my father was completely 
against teaching about the tribes but there are parents who will tell the importance of 
their own tribe to their kids and that kid would go to school and find out a person from a 
different tribe and start that enmity and cause problems because that child is already 
thinking differently from a very young age. So that’s what causes the problem. It’s the 
parents that transfer that into their kids and their kids will do the same thing again.  
INT / 20.01.2014 
 
 
 
(iii) Violence due to the harsh environment of Somalia 
 
On the previous page, Bilan contrasted the violence in Somalia with other more peaceful African 
countries, where he believes the environment is equally harsh. Suleiman did make reference to the 
harsh environment in Somalia as a reason for violence. Interestingly, however, there were no other 
reflections from the respondents on the severity of the climate and harsh living conditions in 
Somalia as a reason for violence to occur. This was despite this idea cropping up quite regularly 
from academics and reporters as a possible reason for the extended conflict and violence in 
Somalia. 
 
Suleiman: I have heard that in the old days it was about making sure they could get 
enough water and grass for their camels. And I do believe that — it’s always so dry there 
that people would die without getting access to water. 
INT / 20.02.2014 
 
 
(iv) Violence due to outside intervention 
 
Some of the respondents who had shown that they were interested in the politics of Somalia noted 
the outside interventions which they believed had exacerbated or prolonged the conflict in Somalia.  
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Aaliya: But before it used to be two men in Somalia they would have a physical fight and 
then they leave [finish the argument]. But now what happens in my country when two 
people argue, especially men, they use guns and kill each other … now your enemy will 
kill you.   
INT / 01.06.2012 
 
Absame: It’s a hard question. I don’t know much about what is happening in Somalia 
today, but the way I understand it, there was a lot of involvements from America and the 
Soviets too. I want to know how all the guns and weapons got into there in the first place, 
because the Somalis couldn’t afford all that steel and guns and tanks as well. I have 
discussed this a lot with my father and also with my friends. 
GROUP INT / 10.02.2014 
 
 
Some thoughts on the experiences and interpretations of overt violence 
 
In section three, I presented the four main ways that violence is attributed to Somalis in public 
discourse. Here, I’ve organised the reflections on generation 1.5 into the same categories. What was 
surprising to me as I was analysing this data, was the low correlation between discussions of 
violence with the young people, and the categories proliferated in the discourse. Part of the reason 
for this is likely to be that their life experience is quite different from those still living in Somalia, or 
those who have spent their adult life living there. Additionally, their conceptions and ideas of 
Somalia were quite different from those that are presented in academia and the media. This may be 
because they hear different recollections and interpretations from the older generations of Somalis 
in Melbourne. 
 One of the main features of overt violence is the ease with which it can be identified. The 
respondents were very free in their discussions of overt violence in Somalia, and did not have any 
difficulty identifying such violence. Indeed, when I did ask the respondents about violence, they 
were able to tell me about what had happened in Somalia in the past, and to give me scant but 
practical details. But there was a clear juncture in their minds between the violence that had taken 
place in Somalia and any overt violence that had been experienced in Australia. This is not to say 
that none of the respondents had ever experienced overt violence in Australia. However, overt 
violence that happened in Somalia belonged in Somalia, was explained in certain terms, and was 
removed from their life experience. Interestingly, while the young people discussed women fighting 
both in the refugee camps and in Australia as a way of resolving differences, they did not consider 
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this to constitute violence. Rather, they thought of it as a perhaps regrettable but legitimate way of 
resolving differences. 
In compiling this chapter, it became clear to me that more respondents had discussed overt 
violence in Somalia in interviews than focus groups or group interviews. That is, more people were 
talking about violence in Somalia with me, when they were on their own. It appeared easier for 
individuals to discuss violence in Somalia in such a setting. This is perhaps because one of the 
features of the individual interviews is that they had a tendency to become more sombre and 
melancholy than the focus groups or group interviews. In a group situation, while sensitive topics 
were still able to be broached, there were often a multitude of opinions, so the same depth of 
individual experience was rarely traversed.  
 
 
 
Covert forms of violence: experiences and interpretations 
 
I now turn to describing covert violence as it has been experienced by the Somali community in 
Melbourne. This section is devoted mostly to my reflections on information I was given, and to 
situations described by people associated with the community (such as social workers, and 
community elders). While beginning to compile this section on covert violence, I realized that most 
of the examples I had collected did not come from quotes from interviews and focus groups. Rather, 
the instances of covert violence presented below were more from my field notes and observations of 
community meetings, and discussions with older Somalis in Melbourne. 
 
 
The closure of remittances to Somalia 
 
One such example of an issue which affected the Somali community was the question of sending 
remittances to Somalia through official channels. Over the course of 2013 and 2014 it became more 
and more difficult for Somalis to send money back to their families using the Australian banking 
system. This was because there was extended pressure on the banks to close the official money 
transfer channels due to suspicion that money entering Somalia was being diverted to support Al 
Shabaab, a group known to commit acts of terrorism. There were numerous meetings about the 
situation in the Preston/West Heidelberg areas and in North Melbourne/Flemington. These meetings 
were both formal and informal, and some were just conversations between friends who were 
worried about the situation. They spoke about how it was nearly impossible to send money through 
any of the big four banks and the smaller credit unions were also steadily closing their remittance 
programs. 
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There were two levels of obstacles to those wishing to send money to Somalia. Firstly, the 
official level, which comprised the banks and credit unions closing off the flow of money to 
Somalia. Secondly, the personal obstacles which were encountered depending on which person was 
serving at a particular bank were particularly difficult. There were theories about which time it was 
better to go into a bank, and which sort of person should go (old, young, male, female) to get the 
best chance of transferring money. 
At a community meeting in Ascot Vale in October 2014, there was an extended discussion 
about remittances and the increasing difficulty being encountered when sending money home. 
Some people told stories about how going to a particular bank at different times of day, or on 
different days would make the process easier or more difficult depending on who was serving 
behind the counter. There was agreement that sending money to Somalia was regarded with deep 
suspicion by many bank employees. 
Westpac was the last Australian bank allowing remittances to be sent to Somalia. This 
avenue was finally closed after much uncertainty on March 31, 2015,5 putting already vulnerable 
individuals in Somalia at further risk.6 This caused a great deal of stress and worry to some 
community members in Melbourne, although they did acknowledge the risk that once they sent 
money to Somalia they did not have control over it, and they believed there was a significant chance 
that the money could be intercepted (some told stories of sending money which never arrived).  
This is a fitting example of how covert violence operates. There is inherent violence in 
stopping a flow of money to a vulnerable population, especially when it is known how much this 
population relies on remittances from outside their country (in 2015 remittances formed 35% of the 
Somali GDP)7. The priority of the dominant actors is to ensure that Al Shabaab has a reduced 
chance of getting funds from outside Somalia, (‘foreign banks’ concerns stem from U.S. regulation 
and enforcement’).8 In order to ensure this, the money flow is suspended to those who need it but do 
not practice any terrorism-related activities. Indeed, the decision to stop the flow of remittances is 
an example of ‘legally allowable activities that disrupt or influence the democratic flow of civil life 
in favour of “higher powers” and against the well-being or rights of citizens or workers’, which can 
be understood as a form of covert violence. This decision ‘selectively victimizes certain members of 
the population’.9 
                                                
5 Chris Cummings, "Westpac Bank in Australia Ceases Somali Remittances," American Banker 4 April 2015 
6 Oxfam Australia Media. "Westpac's closure of vital lifeline could be catastrophic for Somalia - Oxfam."  
https://www.oxfam.org.au/media/2015/03/westpacs-closure-of-vital-lifeline-could-be-catastrophic-for-
somalia-oxfam/: Oxfam Australia, 30 March 2015. Accessed 10 December 2015. 
7 Jessica Hatcher, "Ending Somali-U.S. money transfers will be devastating, Merchants Bank warned," The 
Guardian February 6, 2015 
8 Cummings, "Westpac Bank in Australia Ceases Somali Remittances." 
9 Claudio Colaguori, "Symbolic Violence and the Violation of Human Rights: Continuing the Sociological 
Critique of Domination " International Journal of Criminology and Sociological Theory 3, no. 2 (2010): 398. 
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Additionally, the personal obstacles encountered are also examples of covert violence, 
although this is not officially sanctioned in the same way. The community members pointed out that 
they were at the will of different bank tellers and that they believed that their ethnicity and the 
destination they wished to send their money to was regarded with mistrust. According to their 
reports, sometimes they were able to send money, and other times the same bank branch would 
refuse with no reason given. In this case, they felt that the bank employees had control over whether 
their money was sent to Somalia or not. They altered their routines, behaviour and ‘cover stories’ 
about what the money was needed for in Somalia in order to have the best chance of sending money 
back to Somalia.  
 As I mentioned above, the majority of fieldwork data in this section came from participant 
observation, rather than from conversations with generation 1.5. The issue of remittances shows this 
clearly, because in my conversations with the young people, while there was an awareness of the 
money being sent back to Somalia, it became clear that generation 1.5 were not often expected to 
make contributions to funds, and they had a limited engagement with the issue. Nonetheless, some 
voiced irritation at the financial expectations of relatives in Somalia. 
 
Sumaya: I think they live better there than us here! Must be all the money we send them. 
We give them so much. The American dollars buy them so much.  
INT / 05.05.2013 
 
 
Access to (and willingness to engage with) social services 
 
In conceiving of covert violence, I thought about the disadvantage that Somalis face in their 
capacity as recently arrived refugees. In order to gain a clearer understanding of the way that 
Somalis access social services, I conducted an extended interview with a social worker in 
Flemington who had worked for a decade with the Somalis living locally. She spoke at length about 
how recent cuts to the sector had forced her agency to reduce its number of cases by a third. She 
told me that the first clients to be removed from the active case lists were Somalis. This was 
because the agency had tightened its criteria for accepting clients, and their reasoning was that, 
based on experience; the Somali clients chose to access support networks within their own 
communities than other minority groups and were therefore more likely to resolve their issues 
without the support of the agency. In her words, 
 
Social Worker: Somalis are known for sorting their own problems out. They sometimes 
take advantage of the services we offer, but just as often, I think, I will work with a client 
and come up with a plan to deal with some issue. And I mean work over an extended 
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period of time, say 12 weeks. And then they don’t bother coming one week, and I hear 
through the grapevine that they have moved away from their particular problem, to 
another suburb or state, or that they have been given a job by a relative, or invited to live 
in another family’s house. So my work is wasted. They just, you know, they keep their 
problems ‘in-house’. 
INT / 08.12.2014 
 
The use of the word ‘wasted’ above suggests annoyance on the part of the social worker. It also 
suggests, that she feels her work has no further advantage than the immediate situation. Perhaps she 
considers her contribution less as an educative process, and more as a means to an end in an 
immediate crisis situation. 
 This is undoubtedly a difficult situation, and the response of the agency is not unreasonable. 
It is a sad fact that when funds are cut to service areas, the service providers must tighten the criteria 
by which they accept applications for assistance. However, I believe this situation is also indicative 
of everyday misunderstandings between the Australian way of giving assistance and the Somali 
method of solving problems. I was told many times in my discussion with Somalis of all ages, that 
it is good to be able to rely on your family (and sometimes your clan) in order to solve personal 
problems. Indeed, this reliance on extended networks can be seen as a form of social capital in the 
Bourdieuian sense. This is particularly true because the power that accrues through one network of 
belonging is at the expense of another. That is, Somalis who take advantage of their kinship and 
clan networks cut themselves off from the local Australian systems in place to offer assistance in 
times of need. This is further evidence of the strategy of looking inwards, and choosing to rely on 
resources from within the community. 
 I did hear of a formalized situation that was an example of the above, regarding an 
agreement between a Somali community organization and the Sherriff’s office. In the case of traffic 
infringements (of which there are apparently many, because many Somalis drive taxis for a living), 
this organization had come to a solution with the Sherriff’s office. The president of this well 
respected community organization described a situation as follows: 
 
President: Imagine you have a Somali taxi driver who is 45 or 50. He runs through a red 
light or gets a parking ticket and is sent an infringement notice in the mail. He receives 
the official envelope and he is too scared to open it, so he puts it away in a drawer and 
forgets about it. Or maybe he does open it, but he is not able to understand the official 
language that is printed there. So he puts it away and tries to forget about it. Then a 
couple of months later, another letter arrives from the same place. He knows that there is 
bad news, but he tries to ignore it again. Then again, another letter arrives and when he 
opens this he sees that now he has to pay three fines instead of just one, or maybe he has 
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to go to court. His English skills are not very good and he is very worried about the 
police involvement. So he might come to us for help and show us all his letters. And 
always we say, ‘why didn’t you come earlier? We could have solved this problem much 
faster’. 
INT / 13.11.2012 
 
The arrangement with the Sherriff’s office allows the taxi driver (or another individual in a similar 
situation) to convert some of his fines to community service, and to carry out the community 
service in an organization that is linked to the local Somali community. 
The above shows an example of successful ‘in-house’ management of problems, however, 
there were also multiple issues that were pointed out to me as being very difficult for the 
community to manage ‘in-house’. Youth unemployment is a significant problem for Somali males, 
according to Iman, a young social worker (and a member of the target population) with Somali 
young men. He told me anecdotally that Somali male high school dropouts are overrepresented in 
comparison to their peers. He argued that because Somali parents do not enforce discipline in the 
home for their sons, they may not gain employment for many years. This unemployment can cause 
familial discord, including parental nagging and sibling jealousy (this is later explored in further 
detail in the third findings chapter). However, he agreed that the Somali community prefers to 
manage these cases independently, without seeking help from the community services that exist to 
address these problems in the mainstream community as well as for minority groups.   
According to Iman, it would be useful for young Somali men to engage with the social 
services that are available. 
 
Iman: I try to talk to these guys, you know, to tell them that there is nothing embarrassing 
about seeing a social worker. It might really improve their life! But they just won’t do it. 
They prefer to ignore their problems. It is difficult for them to talk to an outsider about 
what is going on in their life, and I think they feel afraid to show that they are weak. 
INT  / 13.02.2014 
 
When asked about accessing financial help from Centrelink, Iman told me that some of his clients 
‘couldn’t face’ going into a Centrelink office. I pressed him for further details, and he said that in 
his opinion, Centrelink makes it difficult for people to access payments to save money. 
 
Iman: But they do that for everyone, not just the Somalis. No one likes to fill out the 
forms, and take in the ID and wait and wait and wait. But you just have to do it. 
  INT / 13.02.2014 
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While this could be argued to be a form of covert violence (although, it could perhaps more 
convincingly be described as poor bureaucratic practice), Iman does not believe that it is targeted at 
Somalis. Nevertheless, he agreed that it is difficult to convince Somalis to access social services. It 
is worth noting here though, that if young Somalis know that they are able to rely on familiar 
networks to help them when they need it, they may consider accessing social services a waste of 
time. However, it is also important to remember that the relatively recent arrival of large numbers of 
Somalis to Melbourne, coupled with their status as refugees has had an effect on the ability they 
have to mobilise resources and support members of their community. In this way, we see that the 
community tendency to look inward for help and support, may have adverse effects. 
Iman told me that he was part of a team seeking to address young Somali men’s reluctance 
to present at medical centres when ill. According to Iman, it is difficult to persuade young Somali 
men to go to medical centres, both when they are ill and as a preventative measure or for regular 
checkups. Previous studies have shown that Somali women are frustrated with the western model of 
medical care,10 and that Somalis often present to an Emergency department rather than attending a 
medical clinic for relatively minor illnesses.11 
Some of the respondents told me that there is confusion about whether they will need to pay 
for medical care at a clinic. There are difficulties understanding which clinics bulk bill, and for what 
services, so the fear of being charged for medical attention causes them not to present at all. I see 
this as a form of covert violence, because although the medical centres are there and available for 
all patients to present themselves for help, a portion of the patients does not have the education or 
understanding of the local bureaucracy to take advantage of the services that are there for them. 
This is an example of low social capital impacting access to social services, and potentially 
resulting in to poor health outcomes that could have been prevented. 
 
 
Some thoughts on the experiences and interpretations of covert violence 
 
Covert violence is difficult to pin down because it has been absorbed ‘like air’ and is very difficult 
to escape from.12 In the cases above, which can be taken as emblematic of many similar situations 
in the Somali community in Melbourne, we can see the latent power structures which have imposed 
hierarchies and ‘ways of being and knowing the world that unevenly distribute suffering, and limit 
                                                
10 Carol Lynn Pavlish, Sahra Noor, and Joan Brandt, "Somali Immigrant Women and the American health 
Care System: Discordant Beliefs, Divergent Expectations, and Silent Worries," Soc Sci Med 71, no. 2 (2010). 
11 Pamela J DeShaw, "Use of the Emergency Department by Somali Immigrants and Refugees," Minnesota 
Medicine August 2006. 
12 Terry Eagleton and Pierre Bourdieu, "Doxa and Common Life," New Left Review 191, no. 111-121 (1992). 
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even the ways in which we can imagine the possibility of an alternative world’.13 The over-
representation of Africans (and other minority groups) in crime statistics in Australia14 can be 
thought of in terms of covert violence. The structural violence of discrimination against ethnic 
minorities by local legal systems and the media is well documented.15 In the above case of the taxi 
driver, the structural violence rests at a deeper level because it has led to a situation where an 
individual is being penalised for their lack of understanding of the local legal system — another 
reflection of the lack of social capital among the Somali community. I believe that the remedial 
system they have organised highlights how strong and capable the Somali community can be, 
despite their perceived disadvantage.  
Power is always expressed through multiple layers of relations, and can be expressed in 
seemingly hidden forms. One issue which arose on a regular basis was the Somalis’ mistrust of 
official and bureaucratic processes. This included fear of the police, as has been reported in the 
context of African youths (and other ethnic minority groups).16 This mistrust can result in further 
disadvantage to the Somali community in the following way. 
A number of Somali community workers and a social worker told me that they believe the 
number of Somalis as stated in the census is incorrect. They said that many Somalis are afraid to 
note their ethnicity down in writing on the census form. They are also afraid to note their religion as 
Islam, so they leave the section blank, or put down that they speak English at home. According to 
community service workers, this is a problem because funding and services are targeted at areas 
where there is the highest need, and if the census data shows fewer numbers of Somalis residing in 
a certain area, funding and services may be reduced in that area. 
According to the social workers, the fear that causes Somali Australians to either lie or 
refuse to answer questions about their ethnicity, religion and culture leads directly to negative 
consequences for them (in this case, funding cuts to services they might need to access). This is an 
example of structural violence reproducing the conditions which allow it to flourish, as it leads to a 
cycle of further disadvantage for Somalis in Melbourne.  
 
 
  
                                                
13 J. Daniel Schubert, "Suffering/symbolic violence," in Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts, ed. Michael James 
Grenfell (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 192. 
14 Centre for Multicultural Youth. "Fair and Accurate? Migrant and Refugee Young People, Crime and the 
Media."  Carlton, Melbourne: Centre for Multicultural Youth, 2014.  
15 Allan Roulstone and Hannah Mason-Bish, Disability, Hate Crime and Violence  (Oxon: Routledge, 2013); 
Valerie Alia and Simone Bull, Media and Ethnic Minorities  (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005). 
16 David Wilson, Cities and Race: America's New Black Ghetto  (New York: Routledge, 2007); Selma 
Milovanovic, "Police racially abusing African youths: report," The Age 16 March 2010; Kristina Murphy, 
"Fostering cooperation with the police: How do ethnic minorities in Australia respond to procedural justice-
based policing?," Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 44, no. 2 (2011). 
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Reflections on violence by generation 1.5 
 
This section focuses on the responses of my participants and their reflections on the perception and 
representations of Somalis as violent. There are many examples of covert violence offered, 
accompanied by their reflections. These examples reflect the lived experience of generation 1.5 on a 
daily basis. For instance, the following quote is a reconstruction of a conversation I had with a 
young man who did not want to be recorded. 
 
Elizabeth: What can you tell me about violence in the Somali community in Melbourne? 
 X: I don’t want to talk about this issue, because it gets taken out of context and looks 
very bad for us, for my community. 
Elizabeth: Can you explain a bit more what you mean? 
X: I don’t want to say anything about it because, even if we do have some violence 
problems in our people in Melbourne, I don’t think it’s right to focus on that. Every group 
of people has some problems, even if they’re rich and white. I think that when we talk 
about it all the time we are making sure that that’s the thing that people remember about 
us. 
  INT / 09.08.2014 
 
The conversation continued in a similar vein for a few minutes, with me probing gently into why 
this young man did not want to engage with the issue of violence in the Somali community. He told 
me that he believes that there is violence in every group of people because there are good and bad 
people everywhere. After some more polite questions from me, I began to have the feeling that I 
was causing him distress, so I turned the conversation to other topics. His sense of unease was very 
strong, and reminded me that this is a significant personal issue for some young Somalis.  
 
 
Gendered experiences of violence 
 
When questioned about violence in the Somali community in Melbourne, the assumption from the 
females was that I was referring to domestic violence. The males, on the other hand thought first of 
criminal violence and assaults. See the two contrasting responses below: 
 
Elizabeth: What do you think about violence in the Somali community? 
Ismahaan: If that happens, if a woman gets bashed, she will retaliate and get her 
husband back. 
  INT / 04.05.2013 
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Elizabeth: What do you think about violence in the Somali community? 
Iman: I think there are some problems with the police, yes. 
  INT / 13.02.2014 
 
This reveals much about what the females and males consider violent, and what features in their 
daily lives constitute violence. Violence is often described as a masculine trait, and it is true that 
violent crime occurs much more among males than females,17 but my female respondents described 
incidents of female violence towards males in retaliation to intimate partner violence (this violence 
would almost certainly go unreported). The women used language such as a man being ‘taught a 
lesson’ by his wife (and in some cases her sisters, cousins and friends, which adds an interesting 
dimension to the conversation about women’s group violence above). Interestingly, none of the 
males had any such experiences to relate. According to the women, this was most likely due to the 
need for men to save face and not appear weak or emasculated. The women stressed that because 
divorce was a frequent and accepted feature of Somali culture (both in Somalia and in Melbourne), 
there was recourse for women if they suffered at the hands of their husbands and also a way out of a 
violent marriage. However, this could also be an indication that the men did not consider that such 
interactions constituted violence. 
 
Layla: I had a cousin that was suffering very badly from her husband. She didn’t want to 
break up the marriage because it had been a long time to organize it with all her family. 
But this guy lost his job and he was at home all the time, the whole day, and he was 
giving her trouble. And she couldn’t take it any more. She spoke to his parents and they 
went to the Imam and she got a divorce a year after they got married. I think she felt 
guilty because her parents paid for them to go do it in Somalia. But you can’t stay in a 
relationship where there is violence! 
Nafiso: I never knew anyone in a violent marriage, but I heard some stories about a guy 
who was bashing his wife, and she got all her sisters to go round there and they pulled 
his hair and they taught him a lesson. And he stopped doing it. 
  FG / 15.01.2014 
 
The above reflections indicate that the women in both cases ‘found a solution’ to the problem of 
violence in their marriage. One solution was to leave the marriage, the other solution was to 
intimidate the violent partner into stopping his previous behaviour. In the discussion in this 
particular focus group the respondents did not judge that one solution was better than another. 
                                                
17 Larry Ray, Violence and Society  (London: SAGE Publications, 2011). 83.  
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Rather, they were pleased that the women involved had been able to solve their problems with their 
husbands. 
 
 
Relations with law enforcement 
 
The young men chose to tell stories of friends and acquaintances who had been involved with the 
police (all felt that this involvement was unfair). There is a significant body of work that deals with 
youth and police relations, particularly ethnic minority youth. Some studies have suggested that 
minority youth have a more troubled relationship with police and report more personal negative 
experience with police officers.18  
It has also been well documented that police have a tendency to mistrust young black 
males.19 More recently, scholarly work has been devoted to examining the complex ways citizens 
manage their behaviour towards the police. In particular, Ronald Weitzer and Rod Brunson have 
uncovered the contours of male youth’s strategic responses to the police in living in an inner-city 
neighbourhood with high crime rates in the United States.20 Discussing minority male relationships 
with police, Robin Engel suggests that the wider the gap in the social background of the police 
officers and the minority youth, the more likely mutual displays of disrespect are. Engel states ‘it is 
possible that particular types of citizens (e.g., young minority males) may act in disrespectful or 
otherwise resistant ways to symbolize their perceptions of injustice’.21 
In my interview with one of the young men who did not wish to be recorded, he explained 
that the police expect Somalis to be criminals, so what is the point of telling them otherwise?  
 
X: They’re always on the look out for us. Especially if we’re in a group of friends 
together. Sometimes I wonder if we should do something bad just to see what happens. I 
know they’re going to question us anyway, so maybe we should make it worth the hassle? 
  INT / 09.08.2014 
 
                                                
18 Rod K Brunson and Ronald Weitzer, "Police Relations with Black and White Youths in Different Urban 
Neighborhoods," Urban Affairs Review 44, no. 6 (2009). 
19 Irving Piliavin and Scott Briar, "Police Encounters with Juveniles," American Journal of Sociology 
70(1964); Donald Black and Albert Reiss, "Police Control of Juveniles," American Sociological Review 
35(1970); Yolander Hurst, James Frank, and Sandra Browning, "The Attitudes of Juveniles towards the 
Police," Policing 23, no. 37-53 (2000). 
20 Ronald Weitzer and Rod K Brunson, "Strategic responses to the police among inner-city youth," The 
Sociological Quarterly 50(2009). 
21 Robin Engel, "Explaining Suspects’ Resistance and Disrespect toward Police," Journal of Criminal Justice 
31(2003): 477. 
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The above is a reconstructed quote, and the conversation continued for some time with me trying to 
unpack the statement ‘I know they’re going to question us anyway, so maybe we should make it 
worth the hassle?’. Essentially, this young man believed that he would be targeted because of his 
ethnicity and that this would probably result in negative consequences for him, regardless of his 
innocence or guilt. He said he was sometimes tempted to ‘play up’ to this increased police attention 
because then at least he would ‘deserve’ the attention. However his friends had always talked him 
out of such behaviour, warning that the result would be damaging for him and his family. 
The idea that young Somalis are unfairly targeted by police was very common with the 
respondents. 
 
Bashir: There is always, always, always someone from our community in trouble with the 
police. It’s obvious it’s because we are Somali 
Bilan: It’s still hard because, we’re not trained to trust the police, you know? The boys 
expect bad things will happen if they go there, and sometimes I think that’s probably true.  
  FG / 02.11.2012 
 
When pressed about what she meant by ‘not trained to trust the police’, Bilan explained that law 
enforcement was something to be feared in Somalia, and that many parents of young people had a 
visible attitude of mistrust. 
 
Bilan: Our parents are afraid of the police. I knew that even from a very young age. They 
would cross over the street to avoid them, and you could tell that they were very nervous. 
INT / 19.05.2013 
 
The behaviour from Bilan’s parents served to reinforce the way that power is expressed in society 
through multiple layers of relations. People are always conceiving of themselves in terms of the 
categories available to them. Bilan’s parents consider themselves as untrustworthy in the eyes of the 
police, or believe that police are suspicious of them because they are seen as very dangerous. This 
move encourages Bilan to ask herself whether she needs to be wary of police as well, even in 
Australia. Generation 1.5 Somalis in Melbourne grow up in a space where they are forced to view 
themselves in terms of the constructed categories prevalent, and to negotiate their identity formation 
and expression against the backdrop of embedded power relations in society. This is also simply 
due to the fact that police in Somalia operate in a very different way compared with police in 
Melbourne. In Somalia, police and other official representatives were certainly people to be feared, 
rather than trusted. 
However, I do not suggest that young Somali Australians do not have grounds for fearing 
members of the police force in Australia. There have long been questions about how the police 
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interact with young African Australian males in particular. In 2013, a case brought against Victoria 
Police by six young African Australian men was settled outside court the day before it was due to 
be heard. The young men accused Victoria Police of widespread racial profiling and alleged that 
police force members were stopping them for unwarranted searching and questioning. As part of the 
case, they requested a statistician, Professor Ian Gordon, to analyse police notes. He found that 
young African Australian men living in Flemington and North Melbourne were stopped two and a 
half times more than their counterparts who were not of African descent.22  
Police diary notes which were to be used as evidence in the case showed that police had 
described African Australian males as ‘criminals loitering in the area’. ‘Unable to provide police 
with reason of why they were there or what they were doing. Nervous in police presence’ was an 
example given by police in a stop where they required an African Australian teenager to justify 
being in a public place. This is in disagreement with the law, which requires police to have a 
legitimate reason to interfere with a person’s freedom of movement.23 Additionally, Professor 
Gordon’s analysis of police statistics found that in fact young men of African descent committed 
significantly less crime than other populations in Flemington and North Melbourne.24  
In 2015, two of the men who brought the original case against Victoria Police released a 
report titled The More Things Change, The More they Stay the Same. Daniel Haile-Michael & Maki 
Issa spoke with young people in Sunshine, Flemington, Noble Park and Dandenong about their 
experiences with the police and found that negative experiences were still common, public 
occurrences which caused isolation, fear and anxiety.25 
It seems that young Somali Australians consistently see themselves as the type of people 
who will be targeted by police and are likely to end up in jail. I observed tension between a group of 
Somali young men and police officers in Footscray in September 2013. At that time there were 
construction works being undertaken at the footbridge, with some ramps and stairs being blocked 
off. There was a group of around 8 young men, aged between 17 and 25 or so. They were in high 
spirits; laughing and talking and pushing each other around as a joke. Two uniformed police 
officers, one male and one female were approaching along the footpath. They were heading in the 
direction of the group of boys, but it was not clear if they intended to speak with them or not. As 
soon as they were noticed, the laughter died away. The group dispersed immediately, in groups of 
twos and threes. Some went into the station, others walked away in the same direction as the police 
                                                
22 Samantha Donovan, "Victoria Police settles racial profiling case," ABC News, February 18 2013. 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-02-18/police-agree-to-new-procedures-to-combat-racism/4524770 
Accessed 4 January 2016. 
23 Peter Seidel and Tamar Hopkins, "No one should be stopped by police just because they're black," The Age, 
February 19 2013. http://www.theage.com.au/comment/no-one-should-be-stopped-by-police-just-because-
theyre-black-20130218-2end5.html Accessed 4 January 2016. 
24 Donovan, "Victoria Police settles racial profiling case." 
25 Daniel Haile-Michael and Maki Issa. "The More Things Change, The More they Stay the Same: Racial 
profiling across Melbourne."  Kensington: Flemington and Kensington Community Legal centre, 2015.  
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officers were heading, and two even crossed the road against the lights to avoid having to speak 
with them.  
I was with a friend — a young Somali woman who is active in the community and she told 
me that this is not uncommon. I was amazed that it was preferable to jay-walk in front of police 
officers rather than be found in a seemingly innocent group of friends, however she said that in the 
minds of young Somali men, anything is better than having contact with a police officer. After all, 
once they are across the road, they can always run away if necessary. When I spoke to some of the 
respondents about this incident, their response was matter-of-fact. Many believed it is better to 
disappear rather than risk a confrontation. They thought similarly about ticket inspectors on public 
transport. I have seen young Somalis exit a train as ticket inspectors have boarded it, or passed 
through to the next carriage in an attempt to exit successfully at the next stop, however I had 
assumed that they had not had a valid ticket. Perhaps this is not always the case. 
Iman explained that in his work as a social worker he had dealt with many young men who 
felt they were targeted unfairly by the police. 
 
Iman: I talk to heaps of these guys, you know? They feel like they’re trying to live their 
life and when they hang out in the mall, or go out with their friends, there’s always 
someone watching them and the police get involved if there’s a big group of them. 
  INT / 27.04.2014 
 
Absame reflects that part of the problem for the Somali youth comes down to a lack of 
understanding of the law and of Australia’s bureaucratic processes and of the inability of their 
parents to link to a network that would be able to help their sons (lawyers, social workers, medical 
officers for example). 
 
Absame: Some of the young guys act violent and sometimes he have problems with 
maybe the ticket inspectors and sometimes he acted like… we accused him of acting like 
he was above the law: driving without license, you know things like normal teenagers do. 
I hear from other people — there’s too many young Somalis who are in jail. They are in 
jail for some easy things which if they have some people to fix, or if their parents know 
more about the law or if their parents could help them… It’s a very, very big 
disadvantage. 
Elizabeth: So you think if they had better representation they wouldn’t be in jail… 
Absame: Better representation, yeah, because they often go to jail, for things that young 
Australian people — teenagers wouldn’t go to jail for. You know, sometimes they bash 
people? And bashing people doesn’t go to jail for bashing because of some justification, 
but the Somalis go.  
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  FG / 10.02.2014 
 
 These Somali youth are exposed to a form of inherent structural violence. Poor 
representation and understanding of the structures of the legal system, for instance, can lead to an 
inflated proportion of Somalis appearing in crime statistics. This, in turn, may reinforce notions of 
inherent violence in Somalis and reproduces the conditions for a cyclic reproduction of events.26 
Additionally, there have been incidents of police and journalists analysing statistics incorrectly and 
producing data which inaccurately claims that young Somali Australians and African Australians 
more generally commit more crimes than other populations. It is difficult to overstate the 
implications of this inaccuracy, both in terms of the effect it has on the young people themselves, 
and in terms of the way it encourages others to view them in a certain way. The reinforcement of 
such inaccuracies entrenches ideological categories and reinforces what are, for generation 1.5, 
prejudiced distributions of power. 
 
 
Representation by the media 
 
Many of the respondents talked about how crime was a reality for any one living in any country in 
the world and the way that if a Muslim commits a crime, the lead story is his identification as 
Muslim and how that must have contributed to his crime. 
 
Omar: I read an article a couple of years ago on the Herald Sun, and it was two young 
men that I actually knew they were Ethiopian. They were non-Muslim. And they got 
intoxicated and they were harassing people, I can’t remember exactly what the article 
was on. But they got categorized as young Muslim youth who weren’t used to this culture, 
and alcohol and the lifestyle. But there was actually a lot of alcohol back in Ethiopia and 
even in Somalia… there was alcohol back home. It’s not something new but they were 
getting categorized as Muslims who never drank alcohol in their life, but now that they’re 
here they get introduced to alcohol, they don’t know how to handle it. So I was like, 
‘Yeah, I recognize these guys and they’re not Muslim, so you can’t say there’s no alcohol 
in their culture’. 
GROUP INT / 11.05.2014 
 
Here, Omar is referring to a situation where Islam was used directly as an explanation for poor 
behaviour. The assumption that the young men were Muslim and this explained their unfamiliarity 
                                                
26 David Nolan et al. "The AuSud Media Project 2011 - 2013."  Centre for Advancing Journalism: University 
of Melbourne, 2014.  
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with alcohol carries two levels of falsity. In the first, explicit level, the reportage was incorrect 
about the Muslim origins of the youths. In the second instance, although alcohol is not tolerated by 
Islam, the respondents told me that there was alcohol in Somalia (where the population is almost 
universally Muslim). This means that the young people would have been exposed to alcohol before. 
This kind of reportage seems at first glance to be a reasonable and even sympathetic 
account of events. However, making such essentialist statements about Islam and what is permitted 
for Muslims homogenises them to a mass of people who are bound tightly by Islam and never 
experiment or do anything that falls outside a literal interpretation of the religion. Such statements 
would not likely be made about Catholics, or Christians more broadly, for example — indeed I have 
never read in any newspaper that no Christians have tattoos, even though the bible expressly forbids 
it. 
 
 
The problem of absent or disengaged fathers 
 
One common reflection made by the respondents was on the loss of fathers during violent conflict 
or in circumstances unknown.  
 
Amal: The high school I went to [in Australia], many of the Somali students there didn’t 
have fathers. Some of them said their father left in the morning and never came back. 
They couldn’t bury them … 80% of them. They shot Meriam’s dad right in front of the 
family... 
INT / 21.01.2014 
 
The respondents worried about the effects of this loss, both on their mothers and on the children 
who have been raised fatherless in Australia. This was also an area of concern for the older women 
I spoke to who claimed that the lack of a father can lead to young men in particular ‘getting into 
trouble with the law’. The problem of absent or disengaged fathers has also been remarked on in 
other studies with some young Somalis in London explaining that absent fathers are part of the 
reason Somali boys get into criminal activity, because of lack of authority and discipline.27 In 2009, 
Farah Aw-Osman, the president of Canadian Friends of Somalia wrote an essay pointing to the 
problem of absent fathers as directly linked to crime rates among Somali youth in Ottawa, saying: 
                                                
27 Jenny Harding, Andrew Clarke, and Adrian Chappell. "Family Matters: Intergenerational Conflict in the 
Somali Community."  London Metropolitan University: Department of Applied Social Sciences, 2007.  
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‘The absence of Somali fathers in the lives of their children is a key reason as to why so many youth 
have fallen into the hands of the criminal justice system’.28 Some of the young people agreed: 
 
Elizabeth: So who is responsible for this situation? 
Ismahaan: Well in the families its just like they’re single mothers. The fathers are really 
useless.. the African fathers, especially the Somali fathers are really… not involved. 
Elizabeth: Do you mean here, in Melbourne? Or also in Somalia? 
Ismahaan: Even in Somalia. After the war they lost their responsibility. But in Somalia 
you can give them some concession why this happened because there is no work, there is 
nothing to work for so they turn to chewing qat. You know what qat is? Some kind of drug 
whatever it is and the mothers are, especially in Somali society, the mothers took the role 
of father, of bringing money to the family and the role of mother as well. But in 
Australia… I don’t know, they really, really don’t know. They [the men] lost the 
responsibility of being a father, of being role models to their children. Some of them even 
doesn’t know which school their children is studying at. 
INT / 03.12.2014 
 
Many of the respondents identified a change in gender roles upon arrival to Australia, with the 
mothers taking on more responsibility inside and outside the household. This is discussed further in 
the following chapters. Suffice to say, the lack of strong discipline from fathers was a recurrent 
theme in discussing many of the issues faced by Somali young men in Melbourne. It is worth 
mentioning here that in my discussion with older women (the first generation migrants), many 
expressed serious concerns for their sons’ futures. They were worried about employment, their 
attendance at university, or other study (including apprenticeships). There was a sense that the 
world is more difficult to navigate for males than females. When I asked why this is so, a common 
response was that women can simply manage more things in life. One mother told me that ‘things 
come easier for my daughters’. Another said there are ‘too many distractions for the boys’. 
Certainly, the mothers had a differentiated view of their children based on gender. 
 
 
Some thoughts on the reflections of generation 1.5 on violence 
 
When reading ethnographic and anthropological accounts of violence, there is often a visceral 
nature to the retelling. There are details (such as the use of bamboo poles to impale victims during 
                                                
28 Farah Aw-Ossman. Somali Youth: Stop the Violence.Aw-Osman Canada, 2009. http://aw-
osman.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/somali-youth-stop-violence.html Accessed 31 December 2015. Accessed 4 Jan 
2015. 
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the massacre in Rwanda,29 or the torture carried out in Cambodia in the killing fields).30 The 
respondents did not tell me any raw details. They didn’t seem to know the details of physical 
violence that had been perpetrated in Somalia. They spoke at length of political conflict, and the 
food scarcity and the continual disruptions of living in a war-torn country (the unreliability of the 
electricity supply, the lack of petrol, the sirens and raids which meant they had to hide). From my 
interaction with older Somali women, I believe that this is because the first generation migrants 
have not told their children many details. In the focus group with the mothers, I asked about their 
choice to speak with their children about what it was like in Somalia before and during the civil 
war. Their responses indicated that they did not wish to burden their children with this knowledge. 
 
Mother 1: Why [would] I tell my children this? It was a very bad time. They do not want 
to remember these things. 
Mother 2: We start a new life in Australia. It was difficult to get here, and now we have a 
different future. I do not want my children to have this heavy past with them all the time. 
FG / 30.03.2014 
 
Das and Kleinman describe how the recovery of the ‘everyday’ requires a renewed capability to 
address the future.  
 
How does one shape a future in which the collective experience of violence and terror can find 
recognition in the narratives of larger entities such as the nation and the state? And at the level of 
interpersonal relations, how does one contain and seal off the violence that might poison the life of 
future generations?31  
 
From the data I collected, I have come to the conclusion that Somali first generation migrants to 
Australia have made strong efforts to contain and seal off the violence they suffered. This is 
manifest in many ways. I believe that the older generation has made a conscious choice to withhold 
certain information from their children. The respondents told me that their parents wanted to ensure 
they grew up with the knowledge that when Somalia was in a peaceful period, it was a beautiful 
country, and the good memories they have of the parks, universities and city life. 
 
                                                
29 Philip Gourevitch, "We Wish to Inform you the Tomorrow we will be Killed with our Families: Stories 
from Rwanda," in Violence in War and Peace, ed. N Scheper-Hughes and P Bourgois (Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2004). 
30 Alexander Laban Hinton, "Why did you Kill?: The Cambodian Genocide and the Dark Side of Face and 
Honor," in Violence in War and Peace, ed. N Scheper-Hughes and P Bourgois (Oxford, UK: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2004). 
31 Veena Das and Arthur Kleinman, "Introduction," in Remaking a World: Violence, Social Suffering and 
Recovery, ed. Veena Das, et al. (Berkely, California: University of California Press, 2011), 4. 
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Sumaya: Our parents have such amazing love for the country because it’s their home… 
So they have these beautiful memories. Whereas, all our memories are of trouble and 
war. To them, they remember the days when there was university, cafes, and beaches. It 
was beautiful! I wish I could go to that Somalia. The photos are so nice to look at. To be 
forced out and to see the country destroyed…. It’s still their home because they came 
here as adults. But to us, it’s not home, because we were raised here and it’s normal for 
us. So I really feel that I belong here.  
  INT / 05.05.2013 
 
‘Radicalisation’ 
 
A final important idea to cover in this chapter is that of ‘radicalisation’. When presenting the 
examples of violent acts perpetrated by Somalis, the notion of generation 1.5 becoming radicalised 
was briefly discussed. This term is often used in connection with an individual who has been 
exposed to extremist views, before taking these views on. Such individuals are considered to be 
willing to deploy extreme acts to promote their views; often deemed to be acts of terrorism.  
None of the respondents volunteered the term ‘radicalisation’ during the interviews and 
focus groups without me introducing it into conversation. It is interesting that the term which is so 
often used by academics, reporters, authority figures and members of government was not in the 
lexicon of the generation 1.5ers I interviewed. However, many wished to discuss events such as 
terror raids in Melbourne in September 2012 and August 2013 and reports that dugsis (cultural 
schools, which are similar to Sunday School, but also include elements of education such as Arabic 
grammar and letter formation) may be teaching extremist doctrines. They were also worried by 
reports that groups such as Al Shabaab are recruiting young men to fight jihad. Interestingly, the 
media reports they mentioned very rarely linked dugsis directly with terror attacks. In fact, some of 
the reports were about the calls from within the Somali community to regulate dugsis in 
Melbourne.32 
The collective memory of the young people regarding media reports of dugsis teaching 
terrorism was not supported by the evidence I could find. Indeed, it has been suggested that scholars 
are insufficiently critical of the construction of collective memories.33 Beth Roy has also shown 
how strong emotions and political motivations can alter and reconstruct memory.34 The young 
people clearly had strong feelings about their representation in the media, and it is possible that this 
                                                
32 Waleed Aly. "Concern over Madrassas in Australia."  Radio National, 2013. ; Adam Shand, "Madrassa 
lessons worry Somalis," The Australian, September 24 2013 
33 Mary Jo Maynes, Jennifer L. Pierce, and Barbara Laslett, Telling Stories: The use of Personal Narratives in 
the Social Sciences and History  (London: Cornell University Press, 2008). 62. 
34 Beth Roy, Bitters in the Honey: Tales of Hope and Disappointment across the Divides of Race and Time  
(Fayetville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 1999). 
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coloured their memory, and led to what Luisa Passerini describes as ‘distortions or “false 
memory”’.35 
In general, there was a strong sense of injustice around these events and reporting, and in 
some focus groups I had to call for quiet more than once to allow everyone’s ideas to be heard. 
 
Hani: I was overseas when this news happened in Australia, and I came back and heard 
it and I was gobsmacked. I was like, ‘Seriously? Kids learning Qur’an leads to 
terrorism?’ I found that to be the most stupid thing…the most stupid reporting. If they 
actually came in and saw what the kids were learning, they would never conclude to that. 
Never! 
Ismahaan: I think everyone had the same feeling of ‘Oh my God, you’re kidding me’. 
Just disbelief. It was ridiculous. 
Amal: And come on! We’re the ones doing the teaching! It’s not some guy who has come 
from Somalia. It’s us! We grew up here. When I saw the reports on TV I couldn’t 
understand it, it was all foreign to me. And it’s really strange to see it on TV and think 
‘Oh, that’s what people think of me’.  
  FG / 02.11.2012 
 
The above exchange illustrates the shock felt by the young people and the distance they place 
between their practicing of Islam and the way it has been interpreted. Nobody in any focus groups 
or interviews discussed radicalisation as a real threat from the Somali community. Some young 
people wanted to explain that they believe that the threat in general has been grossly overestimated. 
 
Hani: My brother, one of them, he started to practice at 19 or 20, and to other people, as 
soon as a boy starts to practice his religion, even though it’s a private thing, it’s like 
what’s happening? Is he going to be an extremist? Should we be worried? He lost some 
friends for sure when he became religious. I think girls have more permission to practice 
their religion. And for my brother, it didn’t have anything to do with that kind of 
radicalisation. He never thought of going overseas and getting into war. He just wanted 
to better himself. He would just do little things that the prophet would teach us in our 
books, little good things like charity and good deeds. And he became a better person; he 
was a positive person, a much happier person than before. And my whole family were 
really happy. 
  INT / 20.12.2014 
 
                                                
35 Luisa Passerini, "Introduction," in Memory and Totalitarianism, ed. Luisa Passerini (London: Transaction 
Publishers, 2005), 4. 
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Hani’s response indicates that for some of her brother’s friends, his decision to start practicing his 
faith was unacceptable. I asked Hani about what she meant by ‘started to practice’. She explained 
that while her brother had attended mosque and religious events with the family (he still lived at 
home), he had not read Qur’an or prayed daily. He made a decision to start doing these things, and 
also (she suspects) to stop drinking alcohol with his non-Muslim friends when they were out. 
 
Kadiye: I never knew anyone who was approached to go and fight, or to do any terror 
acts. 
Said: There is always somebody saying that we can’t be trusted and that we will fight for 
the terrorist cause, but I don’t meet anyone who actually feels this way. Sure, we think 
what is happening in Somalia is very bad news. But our home is here now, and we are not 
going to risk everything our parents have done for us to go to a war that doesn’t belong 
to us. 
  FG / 10.11.2012 
 
Said was not unusual in mentioning a sense of responsibility towards his parents and the sacrifices 
they have made. Again, Said speaks about belonging here — and he uses his allegiance to Australia 
to explain why he would not go to a war that does not belong to him. 
There was another answer which came up over the course of the interviews and the 
discussion groups which surprised me. 
 
Naado: And it’s just another hit, another jab, you know? Now they say the Somali 
community teaches terrorism at school and tries to influence children. It’s basically like 
the bogey-man. They make it bigger and bigger every time they do reportage.  
Kadiye: People, you know, they got to be scared of something. So maybe it just has to be 
us? 
Cabass: Every time I’m watching like a detective show or something and the bad guy is 
Muslim — he’s always Muslim! I think about how it’s shown as good guys versus bad 
guys. And if you want to be a good guy, then you have to have a bad guy to fight against. 
  FG / 10.11.2012 
 
These comments show that some respondents believe that there is a human need to categorise and 
label others. They support an observation made by Barrie Wharton at a public lecture in Melbourne 
in October 2014.36 He encouraged the audience to think of the villains in Hollywood films and how 
these have developed from Nazi sympathisers, to Soviet sympathisers to Arab terrorists over the last 
                                                
36 Wharton, "Globalization, Islam and the struggle for cultural identity in contemporary Europe." 
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few decades. He characterised this development as evidence that ‘we all need to fear someone’, and 
that Arabs and Muslims are the latest villains we have elevated to be a vessel for our fears. This 
‘othering’ is certainly not a new phenomenon and has most memorably and vividly described by 
Edward Said in his foundational text Orientalism in 1978.37 Since then, this concept has been 
elaborated on by many authors including Gyan Prakesh38, Nicholas Dirks39 and Hamid Dabashi.40  
  The young people I spoke with had similar viewpoints, although they did not refer to 
Hollywood as evidence for these views. Rather, they reflected on their personal experience and the 
broader context of terrorism and fear of the other. They worried that the media fuelled fear, with 
little or no evidence to back the claims up. 
When I asked them what they thought about second-generation terrorism (explaining that it 
means acts of terrorism carried out by people who were born or raised in the country they commit 
the attacks in), they dismissed the phenomenon altogether. 
 
Amal: I have heard about that, but if you think about it — there must be thousands and 
thousands living there, and lets say three of them go back and the religion is 
misrepresented to them or they meet people with certain political agendas they come back 
and that gets reported on so strongly, and all of a sudden ordinary people get 
investigated and can’t live their lives. And what about all the people who do the school 
shootings? We don’t say that all white Americans are gun killers and they have an 
agenda against everyone else. 
  INT / 21.01.2014 
 
Many times after leaving interviews, I had a sense that there was a gap in the way that the women 
spoke about the men’s propensity to violence. It seemed strange to me that they would often speak 
about instances where men had harmed their intimate partners or family, but did not believe that 
these same men would harm others outside their immediate circle. There is something of a conflict 
between the way the women presented young men as not dangerous, and the way they view 
violence in their own community. This could perhaps be explained by different definitions of 
exactly what constitutes violence. For example, many young people described situations where 
violence had been used as a direct response to an issue. They gave examples of women using 
violence to protect their children from perceived slights, or to solve marital issues (including as a 
response to male instigated domestic violence). Some young people discussed the way that violence 
                                                
37 Said, Orientalism. 
38 Gyan Prakash, "Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives from Indian 
Historiography," Comparative Studies in Society and History 32, no. 2 (1990). 
39 Nicholas Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India  (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2001). 
40 Hamid Dabashi, Iran: A People Interrupted  (New York: The New Press, 2007). 
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is quickly resorted to by Somalis in general; they believed more than is the norm within other 
communities.  
Additionally, I heard many descriptions of how young Somali Australian people feel 
disenfranchised, targeted unfairly by authorities, lacking in social support and mistrusted by the 
broader Australian community.41 These are often-cited indicators of the potential for someone to 
become radicalised, however none of the young people I spoke to believed that this was a real 
possibility.  
 
 
Conclusion: key findings 
 
When overt violence was raised, it was raised in the context of Somalia, not Australia. Generation 
1.5 could analyse it quite deeply, and offered various reasons why it might happen. On the other 
hand, during the period of my field work, there were a number of current issues which were 
reflective of the covert violence Somalis in Melbourne are exposed to. The situation with 
remittances is illustrative of the ways in which covert violence functions, and the different levels it 
affects individuals, for example. Another example of covert violence is the misleading over-
representation of Somalis (and other minority groups) in crime statistics. As the agreement between 
a Somali community organization and the Sherriff’s office shows, there have been steps taken to 
address this covert violence within the Somali community, however this situation is not the norm, 
and it is not always possible to address the issues that face Somalis ‘in-house’.  
The young people offered many reflections on the sorts of violence that face them on a 
daily basis. These included problematic relationships with law enforcers, difficulty gaining 
adequate representation if they were in trouble with the law and the problem of absent or 
disengaged father figures. There was a notable difference in the way that young men and young 
women conceived of violence, with the men stressing issues with the police, and women focusing 
on intimate partner violence 
In terms of radicalisation, the respondents reported that they had been badly affected by 
media coverage of terror raids and what they believed to be suggestions that there is a problem with 
the Somali community in Melbourne. The girls who taught at the dugsis were especially surprised 
and disappointed by reportage suggesting that what was being taught in dugsis in the Australian 
context was dangerous, although I could not find evidence to support their memories about the 
media reportage. They pointed out that no reporters aside from ABC and SBS representatives have 
ever come to meet with them and enquire about the schools.  
                                                
41 Shira Fishman. "Community-Level Indicators of Radicalization: A Data and Methods Task Force."  
University of Maryland: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010. ; Paul Bailey. "Guidance for Working 
with Children and Young People who are vulnerable to the messages of Radicalisation and Extremism."  
London Borough of Merton: Merton Safeguarding Children Board, 2015.  
  
 
163 
The respondents have been affected by many different forms of relational power: Legal, 
administrative, economic, military. Being a migrant/refugee places them on the receiving end of 
many expressions of power that are both explicit (gaining entry to a country, reporting as part of 
visa conditions) and implicit (difficulty in entering the labour market, learning new languages or 
making oneself understood). This is especially relevant to Muslims in Australia because a great deal 
of fear around terrorism is projected onto them, and has resulted in documented abuse. Perhaps 
most relevant here is the media, which creates, proliferates and reinforces public opinion around 
refugees, Somalis, Muslims and terrorism among other things.  
The generation 1.5 Somali Australians I spoke with have a strong sense that their identity is 
something that is available for public consumption and critique. Because of their visible ethnic and 
religious difference and the increasing scrutiny that is focussed on individuals who share their 
characteristics, they felt unfairly judged by members of the mainstream Australian public. Overt 
violence is something that many of them had stories of from their time in Somalia, but not from the 
time after they settled in Australia. This violence was real to them, but at a remove from their 
everyday lives in Australia. I believe this is because their parents’ generation have decided not to 
share detailed stories of their experiences with violence in Somalia in order for their children not to 
be burdened with them.  
Covert violence, on the other hand was something that many of the respondents had 
experienced during their time in Australia, even if they did not recognise it as such. The 
disadvantage they face in their status as refugees and the challenges they have in terms of 
expressing their identity openly and without fear of repercussions attest to this. However, they 
stopped short at suggesting that the problems that face the Somali community could lead to 
radicalisation of young people. The respondents did not believe that the Somali community in 
Melbourne poses a real threat. Instead, they believe that the danger has been overestimated for 
various reasons. Some pointed out that it is difficult to identify Somalis from other dark-skinned 
Africans. Others believe that the negative reportage about their community is purely to sell 
newspapers and attract TV viewers. Still others pointed out that there is a natural human need to 
have something to fear, and that unfortunately, for many people, their community occupied that 
position.  
The following chapter examines some of the issues raised in this chapter in more depth, 
including clan divisions and the importance of Islam in the young people’s lives. 
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IV  FINDINGS 
 
(b) Negotiating identity: examining the role of Islam and the place of clan kinship 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the significance of Islam for generation 1.5 Somali Australians in 
Melbourne. Aspects of Islamic life including personal faith are discussed in the context of living in 
Melbourne today, especially with reference to the representation of young Muslims and Somalis in 
the media. Secondly, the stated insignificance of clan allegiances for the young people is discussed. 
However, this is probed; generation 1.5 seem to understand a great deal about clan allegiances and 
are able to discuss them at length when questioned. I draw a distinction between the ways the 
respondents engage with Islam in a very practical sense (observing dietary requirements, daily 
prayers, regular worship) and the way that their knowledge of the clan system is mostly theoretical. 
I do not suggest that this diminishes the importance of the clans for the young people, rather that 
they have had limited opportunities to experience and engage with the clan system in Australia in 
the same way they do with Islam. 
 
 
Examining the role of Islam 
 
It has been suggested that Islam provides the strongest determinant for Somali identity in diaspora.1 
The respondents were in agreement about the importance of Islam in their lives. They discussed it 
as a personal, social, political and cultural force and were very open about the way their religion 
affected them and contributed to their identity. Aaliya’s statement below is representative of the 
way many young people discussed Islam with me. 
 
Aaliya: I am a very religious person. I believe that Islam is the best way to live your life 
and I do my best to follow the … orders every day. 
INT / 21.06.2013 
 
In a group interview, I asked Mohamed and Ali how they thought of Islam in their lives. 
                                                
1 Deborah Sporton, Gill  Valentine, and Katrina B Nielsen, "Post Conflict Identities: Affiliations and Practices 
of Somali Asylum Seeker Children," Children’s Geographies 4(2006). 
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Mohamed: For me, religion is the thing that defines me. It is very important to my family 
and to me and it’s different to the religions you have here (like Catholic, Jew, Hinduism) 
because it means more to Muslims than other religions mean in Australia. I don’t see 
other people praying like we do. 
Ali: Yeah, I think religion, you know being Islamic is my… what defines me… yeah, I’m 
religious, but I think my religion and my beliefs doesn’t really prevent me to study or 
socialize or be like a normal person 
GROUP INT / 28.05.2014 
 
Two interesting perspectives are presented above. Mohamed believes that religion means more to 
Muslims than other religions do for their adherents in Australia. He highlights the difference 
between Islam and other religions practised in Australia, and the visibility of the way that Islam is 
practised. Ali, however, makes a distinction between being religious and being a ‘normal person’. 
He feels a need to point out that his religion and beliefs do not prevent him from engaging in other 
areas of life. 
Throughout my fieldwork, I was struck many times by the physical and practical presence 
of Islam in the lives of the respondents. This was particularly pertinent at the time of Ramadan, 
when I mostly ceased contact with the Somali community (except for the occasional email or text 
message). However, it was also noticeable at community events, such as soccer games or cultural 
festivals. There was a daily observance of prayer, and it was not unusual for people to excuse 
themselves politely and kneel in a quiet corner to pray. This was disconcerting in the context of 
what were sometimes very loud and lively events. Equally, conversations with all generations were 
peppered with references to Allah. Insha’Allah (if Allah wills it) was perhaps the most common 
phrase I heard in discussion. There was also an acceptance that human actions are defined by the 
purpose of Allah. I have experienced a similar language and way of being in the company of devout 
evangelical Christians. I was very interested to find out about the features of religious belief and 
practice in Australia as I had so often read that Islam in Somalia is uniform across the country and 
the practice that most unites the Somali people. 
While Somalia has often been presented as a religiously homogenous country, it is 
important to note that the religious practices across Somalia are not entirely uniform. The Islam that 
is practiced in Somalia is a very particular interpretation of the religion. Sufism and traces of 
Sufism permeate the religious practices today, despite consistent efforts by different groups to 
eradicate it.  
Another aspect of Islam that is quite particular is the continued adherence of some Somalis 
to folk and animist religions. For example, Aaliya described her journey to Somalia in order to be 
treated with what she described as ‘tribal medicine’ for a chronic problem with her leg. She was 
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reluctant to give details about what the medicine entailed. This is possibly an example of the folk 
aspects of the ancient Somali practices being incorporated into modern Somali Islam.2 Aaliya has 
limited function in both legs, and requires a mobility aid to get around. She emphasised that her 
disability was the result of something foreign in her body which needed to be gotten rid of in order 
for her to heal. There are doctors in Somalia who practice these healings, and she told me that they 
live outside the cities. While Aaliya’s remaining family in Somalia reside in the main in 
Mogadishu, she had to drive for 4-5 hours outside the city to find a healer. She was not willing to 
give any details about what occurred during the healing.  
 
Aaliya: I have been back to Somalia a couple of times for my leg. This is not the normal 
Islam that is practiced in Australia, but a specific sort that belongs in Somalia. I am lucky 
to be able to return and to visit the tribal medicine doctors. 
INT / 21.06.2013 
 
When asked about how this sort of Islam relates to the ‘normal’ Islam that in is practiced in 
Australia, she responded like this: 
 
Aaliya: Yeah, this is an addition to Islam that we Somalis have. But it is all about our 
relationship with Allah, so it is fine. 
INT / 21.06.2013 
 
There are echoes of Sufism in Aaliya’s statement above. Sufism is quite widely practiced in 
Somalia, and it focuses on the inner, mystical elements of Islam. This emphasises the relationship 
that adherents have with Allah above all else. Sufism has come under attack in Somalia, with Al 
Shabaab forbidding its practice and destroying shrines and the graves of saints.3 Healing such as 
Aaliya described has often occurred in Sufi practice across the Muslim world although it is difficult 
to document as it is considered private.4 It may also be dangerous to identify as Sufi in certain 
places and times, as seen above. 
This was not the first only time the respondents described ‘additions’ to Islam that are 
specific to Somalia. One other comment that was frequently raised by both males and females was 
the position of women in Somali households compared with other Muslim communities. This is 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
                                                
2 Chapin Metz, " Somalia: A Country Study." 
3 "International Religious Freedom (2010): Annual Report to Congress."  Washington, DC: United States 
Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2010.  
4 Ellen J Amster, Medicine and the Saints: Science, Islam and the Colonial Encounter in Morocco 1877-1956  
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013). 6; Marta Dominguez Diaz, Women in Sufism: Female Religiosities 
in a Transnational Order  (New York: Routledge, 2015). Chapter 7. 
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Many respondents spoke about Islam being the thing that ‘defines’ them. They were very 
open about this. However, sometimes in the context of the same interview, I heard them complain 
that they were defined by their religion by others (this will also be discussed further in the following 
chapter).  
 
Ismahaan: This is one aspect of my life, Islam, I mean. It is very important to me, but it is 
not the only important thing about me. 
FG / 02.11.2012 
 
In discussing refugee identity, Yuval-Davis highlights the influence that markers of identity have on 
refugees and their establishment of cultural identities in their new homelands. She focuses on the 
‘stories people tell themselves and others about who they are (and who they are not).’5 She believes 
that ‘constructions of self and identity can [...] be forced on people’.6 So the respondents felt 
comfortable in defining themselves by their religion, but (perhaps because of perceived ignorance 
of Islamic teaching) were not comfortable for others to do the same thing.  
I propose that what is concerning to my participants is that their situational identity (that 
which is predominant in face-to-face interactions with others and allows us, upon entering the 
presence of others, to mutually construct a definition of the situation)7 is being conflated with their 
personal identity (that which involves distinctive traits of individuals, such as their name and 
appearance, personal history and information, personality characteristics, and their special place in a 
particular kinship network). 8  If personal identity is the identity that defines us as unique 
individuals,9 it is an identity that mainstream Australians are able to keep private if they choose. 
However, for the respondents, their situational identity (aided by their very visible difference) 
trumped their personal identity to a mainstream observer and their entire identity was subsumed by 
the fact of their religion. While the understanding of religion as part of the private arena is contested 
and historically specific, it was a common complaint from the respondents that mainstream 
Australians have a choice about whether their religion (or lack of religion) is public. Conversely, it 
is one of the first things noted about generation 1.5 Somalis due to their dress, visibly different 
appearance and certain religious requirements. 
The conversation about religion and its importance often turned very quickly to a worry 
about how Islam was perceived by mainstream Australian society: 
 
                                                
5 Yuval-Davis, "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging," 200. 
6 Ibid., 202. 
7 Thomas, Primitive Behaviour.  
8 Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. 
9 Stets, "Role Identities and Person Identities: Gender Identity, Mastery Identity, and Controlling One’s 
Partner." 
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Amal: In terms of religion, it’s like any other religion. If somebody is Christian, Jewish, 
whatever, it’s your personal life. It’s you and your relationship with God and whatever 
you believe. And everything else, like everything Somali and Australian, is your culture. 
It’s where you live. And I think my life is pretty similar to yours in terms of work and 
family and my religion is my private life. So when you see the vision of yourself in the 
media it’s really hard, and you think; ‘I’m just like you!’ 
FG / 02.11.2014 
 
When Muslims are (over)represented in the media as potentially violent fundamentalists, a powerful 
and distinct category is proliferated. In reinforcing notions of Muslims as ‘terrorists’ or 
‘radicalised’, these ideas become constitutive concepts of experience. So when people see Somali 
generation 1.5ers in the street, they have a predisposition to view them in this way. Amal’s 
comment above reveals that this process affects the generation 1.5 subjects as well. And it’s ‘really 
hard’ for them, as it challenges their own conception of identity. None of the respondents told me 
that they had questioned their faith as a result of others’ interpretations or ignorance of Islam. I was 
told about some family members who chose not to practice although it was not clear whether this 
decision was informed by the reception of Islam by the mainstream Australian population. 
Hani described how becoming a more observant Muslim changed her brother Ibrahim’s life 
for the better. 
 
Hani: I remember one day, my sister was like, ‘Oh Ibrahim, you know what he did one 
day? We were on the road and there was this dead cat on the street and he stopped it and 
got out and moved it off the road, got if off the road and then put in in the boot to put it in 
the bin’. And I was amazed, because anyone would just leave it there, personally, I would 
leave it there, because, yuk! But he wanted to do the right thing. It was because he was 
practicing he was becoming a better person. And I think that personal choice is easier for 
girls to make. And everyone else like his work friends thought it was a negative thing and 
tried to convince him out of it. 
FG / 02.11.2012 
 
Here, both Amal and Hani highlight what they perceive as the private nature of their religious belief 
in direct contrast to the public nature of the condemnation they receive for their religion. Although 
Hani says here that she believes it is easier for girls to practice Islam than boys, this was not the 
consensus, with a number of women pointing out that they are much more visible because they 
wear hijab. I discuss this in greater detail below. 
Many participants gave examples of how Islam had improved their everyday life in order to 
illustrate its importance to them. They often highlighted the effect it has on their desire to better 
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themselves and to do good for those around them. This was juxtaposed with their idea that the 
general opinion of Islam in Australia is very low. 
 
Said: Islam is a wonderful religion. It helps to make you a better person. 
GROUP INT / 17.08.2014 
 
Amal: It’s interesting when someone has seen a program for half an hour on SBS and 
they think they know the whole story of Muslims. 
INT / 21.01.2014 
 
Here, Amal points out that there is a great deal of ignorance regarding Muslims and Islam in 
Australia (despite the programs she says are offered on SBS to educate the general public). Amal’s 
comment regarding SBS was somewhat unusual, as most of the young people believed that SBS and 
ABC are the two national TV channels, which are sympathetic to Muslims and other minority 
groups. They directly contrasted this with the commercial channels, which they believe present 
insensitive and ill informed material regarding Muslims in particular. Perhaps Amal meant to 
highlight that it takes more than half an hour of watching a program about Islam (no matter what 
channel it is broadcast on) to understand Muslims 
 A common complaint was that mainstream Australians are more likely to assume that 
Muslims have issues with crime and violence, and to believe that if there are a couple of individuals 
whose behaviour is unacceptable, that this is representative of the whole community. This was 
discussed in the previous chapter in regard to police interaction with young African Australian 
males. 
 
Kadiye: I don’t get how people can focus on all the negative things that Muslims do when 
it’s actually not that much, statistically. You know, white guys beat their wives up all the 
time, and they hurt their children and drive badly and kill other people on the road. But 
there is no ‘Aussie crime wave’. But I don’t want to be the guy to point that out to my 
friends, so I just stay quiet about it. 
FG / 10.02.2014 
 
Kadiye’s reflections expose a deep level of prejudice prevalent in mainstream society. By inverting 
the imagery, and inviting us to consider an ‘Aussie crime wave’, it becomes clear that this is not 
something which we would likely hear reported. When a situation is turned on its head, for 
example, with mainstream Australia viewed through the same lens as Muslim Australians are 
observed, the implicit power relations become apparent. This is a trope used by many artists to 
encourage us to reconsider ourselves in light of the stereotypes we project onto others. For example, 
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the satirical documentary ‘BabaKiueria’ shows us how patently ridiculous these kinds of 
assumptions are by presenting white Australia as seen through Aboriginal eyes.10  
Kadiye explained that if the topic came up in conversation at work, he would remain silent 
or leave the room rather than open a dialogue. When I pressed him about why he did not feel 
comfortable talking to his friends about his faith and the way it is represented, he answered simply 
that he believes he can show people best by being a normal, nice guy and that they will understand 
that there are bad Muslims just like there are bad Christians and Jews but not all Muslims are like 
that. Although he told me this, his body language did not match what he was saying, and it seemed 
that he felt too nervous to discuss this topic with his work mates. He did admit that he did not like to 
make things serious at work, because: 
 
Kadiye: You know, we’re all relaxing, having a good time together. It doesn’t need to be 
political. 
FG / 10.02.2014 
 
I would argue that the situation is already political if Muslims are being denigrated or at least 
discussed in ignorance and Kadiye is not able to address that issue, for fear of what others will think 
of him. This is a strategic choice in how to handle a particular situation, and Kadiye has chosen not 
to challenge the assumptions of his work mates, perhaps to keep social relations cordial and 
unstrained. 
Once again, Kadiye’s situational identity has over-ruled his personal identity, to the point 
where he feels it necessary to leave the room whenever conversations about his faith (an integral 
part of his personal identity) arise. Kadiye sought to give the impression that he did not mind the 
way his work mates discussed Islam, and he did not tell me that he had ever been persecuted or 
made fun of directly, however he became very uncomfortable during this discussion. I recorded the 
following field note after leaving the focus group.  
 
Kadiye very awkward discussing the way his religion is understood in the work place. I 
wonder if he feels guilt at not defending his beliefs more? Other members of the group 
also quiet during this discussion. The tone of the conversation became muted and it took 
some time for the group energy to bounce back. 
FN / 10.02.2014 
 
 
  
                                                
10 Don Featherstone, "BabaKiueria," (Australian Broadcasting Coorporation 1986). 
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Islam in the media 
 
Many young people wanted to tell me about the shift in behaviour towards them after the September 
11, 2001 attacks in The United States. 
 
Hani: It’s scary. Ever since 9/11, I never used to question my belief at all. I never used to 
think that Islam taught anything negative. And then 9/11 happened and I was in year 9. 
Everything changed. People looked at you differently, like you were the enemy. From one 
day to the next. One day, you were just a normal kid with a scarf. You were odd, yes, but 
you weren’t the enemy. Now, you were the people who didn’t belong in this country, the 
opposite of all the normal people. I felt that so strongly after 9/11. And that was because 
of the media. And the day after it happened, my best friend had her hijab pulled off while 
she was going into the bus, and people spat at her. And I thought ‘What happened? Why 
are people being so negative towards us?’ ‘Til today, I find it really hard when people 
generalise and jump on the boat of ‘Muslims are terrorists, Muslims teach terrorism’ and 
they just don’t do any of their own research. I find that really heartbreaking. 
FG / 02.11.2014 
 
Hani’s comments reveal the very personal and intimate effect an event such as 9/11 had on young 
Muslims living in Australia. She characterises a ‘before’ and ‘after’ period in which everything had 
changed. Interestingly, she admits that before 9/11, while she just felt like ‘a normal kid with a 
scarf’ among her peers, she was considered to be ‘odd’. However, post the terrorist attacks, she said 
she felt that she became ‘the enemy’. And that she no longer belonged in this country. She was 
conscious that the public perception of her had altered, although she felt that she had not altered at 
all. 
According to Hani’s analysis, this change came about due to the media reportage of the 
event. This was a common theme among the respondents, who felt that the media portrayed them 
unfairly and inaccurately.  
 
Sumaya: Because they have that image from the news reports and they get it from the 
media and the Internet. These terrible headlines… And you can’t really blame the general 
public for what they think- you see the news and you think ‘that could be true’ and I just 
wish people would sit down with us and talk 
… 
It’s just so unfair that they can write all this stuff that is so wrong. They’re always talking 
about things like ‘ethnic gangs’ and the problem Muslim youth. 
INT / 29.11.2014 
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In relation to the gangs, a 1999 Study by White et al. examined the possibility that disenfranchised 
young Somalis would form groups such as gangs in Melbourne.11 The study focused on those who 
had experienced poor social integration and disruptions in schooling. The report found that while 
there were clashes with other youth (particularly those from a mainstream Australian background), 
the main source of conflict was racial harassment of the young Somalis. They banded together in 
order to protect each other in the face of the apparent threat. Interestingly, the report found that the 
young people were strongly committed to Islam and their families and also to Australian 
institutions. They were also found to be remarkably law-abiding citizens with many future hopes 
and aspirations despite their difficult pasts. 
 
Amal: That’s what I mean, the journalists don’t do research. If you’re going to do a story 
about a group of people, and generalize them, at least just take the time to go and speak 
with them. Find out about them and who they are and exactly what is going on. Don’t 
speak to one or two people and make up a story about that.  
FG / 02.11.2012 
 
Bashir believes there is another reason that cultural issues are not adequately reported on in 
Melbourne. 
 
Bashir: Well, they could come and do a report, but that would mean that they’d need to 
visit us, maybe a couple of times even, and there might not be a story at all if they go 
looking. If they don’t bother to look, they have a guaranteed story with all the terrorism 
stuff. 
Suleiman: The other problem, is that nobody will watch A Current Affair if the story is 
all about a happy multicultural community doing good things. They want to hear about 
danger and they want to know about all the different dangerous people. 
FG / 02.11.2012 
 
The respondents understood the way that the media shapes public opinion, and did not condemn the 
general public for their perceived tendency to believe what appears in the popular media.  Indeed, 
many of them told me that they believe most people are time-poor and simply do not have the 
resources to seek out alternatives to popular media. 
Here, it is worth noting that while media bias is a well-noted phenomenon, and one that is 
studied in various universities and monitored by various watchdog groups, there are signs that the 
                                                
11 Rob White et al. "Somali Young People."  Melbourne: Australian Multicultural Foundation, 1999.  
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general public’s trust in mass media is not high. In Australia in 2014, the Roy Morgan ‘Image of 
Professions’ survey found that only 18% of people polled had high or very high trust in Newspaper 
journalists and TV reporters.12 Another poll recently found that trust is significantly higher in ABC 
and SBS reporting than Commercial stations’ reporting. More than two thirds of respondents trusted 
ABC and SBS TV news and current affairs reporting. Conversely, less than half of the respondents 
trusted Commercial TV news and current affairs reporting.13 This suggests that at least some 
members of the general population are more discerning than the respondents think.  
However, they were not forthcoming with ideas to encourage a forum of cross-cultural 
discussion. 
 
Sumaya: But seriously, do you think that people would go out of their lives and say 
‘listen, I’m going to talk to a Muslim and find out what they’re all about’. And it’s hard. 
No-one wants to approach and say ‘Hey! You’re Muslim! Tell me all about yourself and 
your life’. People don’t have time. And they don’t have time to even google Islam and find 
out a bit more information. 
INT / 29.11.2014 
 
The idea of ‘lazy reporting’ was also a common theme in the interviews. There were various 
reasons offered to explain why reporters rarely get the full story, from the idea that bad news sells 
and this is what the reporters want to produce, and then the more nuanced understanding that some 
reporters may be scared of Muslims because of the bad press that already surrounds them. 
 
Cabaas: I find it really hard, you know, because the reporters, other than SBS don’t want 
to come here and find out what we’re all about. I really think they might be scared of us 
because of our difference and that they are affected by all the negative stuff they here on 
the news. Which makes it like some kind of circle we’ll never break out of. 
GROUP INT / 25.08.2014 
 
The response above shows the belief of the respondents that there is a cycle whereby reporters are 
reluctant to get close to Muslim communities in Australia, and this reluctance leads to shallow and 
inaccurate reporting which in turn fuels a further distance between Muslims and the mainstream 
Australian community. The respondents believed that their misrepresentation in the media means 
they are mistrusted by the mainstream Australian public. 
 
 
                                                
12 Roy Morgan. "Images of Professions Survey."  Melbourne, Australia: Roy Morgan Research, 2014.  
13 "Trust in Media."  Melbourne, Australia: Essential Media Communications, 2013.  
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Islam and identity 
 
The association between Islam and terrorism is now very prevalent in modern Australian society. 
This discursive formation is disseminated through multiple avenues, most notably the media and in 
some cases the police force (see the next chapter for further discussion). This exemplifies the 
network of power that can radiate from discourses. However I wish to spend some time here 
reflecting on what this means for the identity of the respondents. In section two, I used a number of 
identity theories in order to examine the expression of Generation 1.5 Somali Australian identity. At 
the innermost level, I have made use of John Hewitt’s tripartite consideration of identity. The next 
layer out concerns the accrual and dispersal of social capital. In the Bourdieuian sense, social 
capital greatly emphasizes class and the idea that the way individuals experience social capital will 
be markedly different depending on their gender, age, class and ethnic background. I conceive of 
this kind of social capital as the operationalization of the next level of force, which impacts the 
identity of the respondents. This is Foucault’s small ‘p’ power. This power, which is present for all 
social actors and is characterised by a complex web of power relations exercised through the 
expression of normalised discourse and other discursive formations.  
While I believe that this model is applicable to any individual and the struggle to express 
and maintain their identity, I am convinced that it is significantly more challenging for the 
respondents to do so because the same forces that act upon all social actors are stronger for them. 
For example, in terms of John Hewitt’s tripartite definition of identity, their situational identities are 
deeply informed by what others know and assume about them. Again, this is true for any social 
actor, but generation 1.5 Somali Australians approach interactions suspecting or knowing that 
others have already constructed a certain opinion of them. This informs their expectations and 
interpretations of their own and others’ behaviour. Similarly, their social identities are intricately 
tied up in being members of a visible group, based on age ethnicity and religion. Personal identity 
concerns the efforts of an individual to construct and preserve their personal narrative, which helps 
to establish a sense of difference from others. This includes their distinctive traits (again, many of 
which are highly visible). Goffman suggests that personal identity involves personal history and 
appearance and a special place in a kinship network. These were all described in detail by my 
participants over the course of my fieldwork.  Another way to think of the struggle that generation 
1.5 Somali Australians face in maintaining a coherent sense of identity is to posit that there is 
greater distance between the different selves of these young people than for many other social 
actors. In this sense, they must bring together more disparate identities, and under more intense 
scrutiny than is the norm.  
Stepping out to the next sphere of influence for the respondents, the notion of social capital 
in a Bourdieuian sense is also particularly relevant. There is a close connection between social 
capital and class, which I found to be particularly relevant to Somali generation 1.5ers in 
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Melbourne. This was expressed in a number of ways. Firstly, I believe that the people I interviewed 
were largely from families of middle to upper-middle class in Somalia, although they did not state 
this directly. There is evidence of this in the relatively high educational attainment of their parents 
(and in some cases, grandparents). Additionally, I was told that those people who were better 
educated and employed were the first to be able to leave Somalia around the time of the outbreak of 
the civil war. Thirdly, the respondents believed that there was a hierarchy of ideal destination 
countries for Somali refugees. While European countries apparently ranked highest, Australia was 
also high on this list, ahead of Asian countries and other African countries. Therefore, I believe that 
the people I spoke with were better connected in Somalia (in order to have been able to settle in 
Australia, they told me they required more money and connections than what was required to settle 
in another African country, for example). So my respondents and their families have potentially 
fallen in class rankings between Somalia and Australia. I argue that one strategy they have 
employed to deal with this situation is to become quite an inward-looking and independent group, 
which sets itself apart from other groups.  
This has been found by other researchers in a recent (2007) report on Somalis residing in 
London. The authors identify that Somalis ‘have a tradition of self-reliance and communal 
solidarity that often conflicts with their exiled status as passive recipients of welfare benefits’.14 I 
believe this self-reliance has both positive and negative aspects. For example, one outcome is the 
focus on young people and the need for them to improve their life circumstances which the older 
generation believe has pushed young people to achieve well in their education and entry to the 
labour market. However, some young people felt very pressured by the expectations upon them and 
would prefer not to face such intense scrutiny from their (well-meaning) parents and grandparents. 
Another outcome, which was discussed in depth in the previous chapter, is that there is a reluctance 
to engage with social services. This is partly due to Somali Australians’ preference to look to other 
members of their community for support in situations of difficulty. Indeed, there are many examples 
of these community connections proving successful in managing social, financial and personal 
problems. However equally, it means that there is limited knowledge of how (and perhaps more 
reluctance) to access relevant external services which might be of assistance when necessary. 
In terms of the next level in my model of those forces which affect the identity of 
generation 1.5, I believe that Foucauldian small ‘p’ power is also particularly applicable to this 
group of social actors.  The complex strategic situation referred to by Foucault is made further 
complex for the respondents by many factors. First, their status as generation 1.5 which means they 
are straddling quite different cultures. Secondly their visible difference due to their ethnicity and 
religion, and thirdly their refugee experience which has meant disrupted schooling, the need to learn 
                                                
14 Harding, Clarke, and Chappell, "Family Matters: Intergenerational Conflict in the Somali Community," 6. 
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another language quickly, loss of family social capital and the structural disadvantage they face in 
many aspects of life in Australia, such as access to the labour and housing market. 
The generation 1.5ers I spoke to are walking a delicate tightrope (which of course, is 
common language in reference to generation 1.5), however they must also contend with their 
identities being conflated with a larger misconception surrounding Islam. Ghassan Hage has 
consistently argued that  ‘Australia still comprises a predominantly white, Christian society, 
currently characterized by an increasing fear of different ethnic groups’.15  
When I asked the respondents why they thought there was such a strong focus on Islam in 
the media and from the general public, there were varied answers. Omar described it as a simple 
result of the attention being focussed on the latest migrants to arrive in the country: 
 
Omar: We arrived here last, and you know, there aren’t really that many of us, compared 
to the Italians and the Greeks. 
GROUP INT / 11.05.2014 
 
The small numbers of Muslims and their visibility was a common theme. 
 
Absame: When I walk around, people know straight away that I’m different. I can’t 
change the colour of my skin. You know, in Heidelberg it’s almost normal because we all 
live together, but as soon as I catch a train or a bus somewhere I’m the one that sticks out 
again. 
Kadiye: It’s weird because in my family we have really strong friendships with our 
neighbours and aunties and uncles so it’s like we could go on forever not really knowing 
any Anglo Aussies. But when I started my trade, that changed really fast. The rest of the 
boys are all white and even though they’re really good guys, it takes a long time to feel 
comfortable. 
FG / 10.02.2014 
 
Kadiye previously commented that he did not wish to enter conversations at work when the topic of 
Islam and Muslims came up, preferring to leave the room and keep peace with his colleagues. He 
professed not to care about this, but his comments above show that he has experienced tension in 
the workplace because of his visible difference. 
 
                                                
15 Ghassan Hage, Against Paranoid Nationalism  (Sydney: Pluto Press, 2003). 
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While the respondents painted a very positive picture of Islam for them in their personal 
lives, some did offer explanations as to why the religion is condemned, and how it can be practiced 
improperly. 
 
Naado: And the people who follow Islam in an oppressive country and want to escape it, 
they want to escape the implementation of the religion, and not the religion itself. This is 
a problem with society, not the religion. If the society implements the religion badly, 
people will want to escape and to feel free.  
INT / 06.06.2014 
 
In my discussions with Naado, it became apparent that she had reflected deeply on what Islam 
means to her on a personal level and the way that the religion has been practiced in different times 
and places. This was a topic of interest to her and she was eager to discuss the way that Islam is 
practiced in countries she has visited or has some connection to. Naado is an intelligent and 
articulate young woman, and she was one of the few respondents to draw distinction between the 
implementation of religion and the religion at its heart. One area of strong interest to her was the 
wearing of hijab.  
 
 
Wearing hijab 
 
Naado explained to me that she had considered not veiling herself in her late teens after she finished 
high school and started university. Interestingly, she had not told friends about her deliberations, 
although she did not give the impression of having agonised over her decision. Rather, it seemed 
that she felt a duty to question this aspect of her life and examine her beliefs before continuing to 
veil herself.  
One of the mixed gender focus groups yielded interesting discussions about wearing Hijab 
and what it means to Somali women. 
 
Mohamed: Yeah, I don’t know any girls that don’t wear hijab. I don’t think it would be 
allowed to be honest. 
Bilan: All the women in my family wear hijab. I remember being really excited when I 
was little to be able to do that too. It was really something I looked forward to, because it 
would show I had reached my maturity. 
FG / 25.08.2014 
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The expectation and willingness of the young women to wear hijab is not found in all 
Muslim communities in Melbourne. In her 2009 thesis, while acknowledging that most parents 
were happy for their daughters to wear hijab, Chloe Patton describes the family tensions that arose 
when one young Iraqi girl, Zhila, decided she would like to be veiled. Her father (a university 
academic) was so unhappy with her decision, he threatened that she would be forced to leave the 
family home.16 Patton discusses the reasons some young women have for their desire to be veiled 
and the way that their religion differs from the religion of their cousins and extended families still 
living in Muslim majority countries. According to Zhila: ‘You have more strength in your belief, 
and they’re just there and they were born into it and that’s it’.17 
It is difficult to draw conclusions about increased religiosity in the Somali community in 
Melbourne, although a number of studies have highlighted increased religiosity in diasporic 
communities across the world.18 Some of the respondents reported that they felt their religion had 
been tested by being a minority religion and was stronger as a result. However, others spoke about 
the way that religion in general is not very important in Australia and thus, Islam featured less in 
their personal lives. The young men who did not want to be recorded both reported that Islam is not 
important to them but that they ‘go along with it’ to keep their parents happy. 
When the discussion turned to the way hijab is perceived in Australia, Hani had this to say:  
 
Hani: I find the whole notion of being free and not wearing the hijab really ridiculous. 
This is my freedom — the opportunity to wear my hijab is my freedom. If there was a ban 
on hijab today, I would move out of this country. Because that is oppression. I think a lot 
of people don’t know what freedom is. 
Elizabeth: Would you go back to Somalia? 
Hani: It doesn’t matter where, just somewhere I would be able to practice my religion the 
way I believe is the right way. 
INT / 22.09.2014 
 
This comment did not have the air of a flippant observation. Hani was very serious about her desire 
and right to dress as she chooses. Her allegiance here is to Islam and the practice of her beliefs 
rather than to Australia. She is clear that it is more important to her to be able to practice Islam than 
it is to remain in Australia. For Hani, there was a hierarchy: The most important thing for her was 
                                                
16 Chloe Patton, "Multicultural Selves: Young Australian Muslims’ Images of Self and Belonging" (RMIT, 
2009). 
17 Ibid., 204. 
18 Will Herberg, Protestant - Catholic - Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology  (Garden City, New 
York: Anchor Books, 1960); Teresa Garcia-Muñoz and Shoshana Neuman, "Bridges or buffers? Motives 
behind Immigrants’ Religiosity," IZA Journal of Migration 2, no. 23 (2013); Frank Van Tubergen and Jorunn 
I. Sindradottir, "The Religiosity of Immigrants in Europe: A Cross-National Study," Journal for the Scientific 
Study of Religion 50, no. 2 (2011). 
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Islam, which trumped the commitment she felt to any nation. She clearly stated that her priority is 
the ability to practice her religion in the way she believes is right. 
Bilan discussed the way that others acted towards her based on nothing more than her 
wearing of hijab.  
 
Bilan: It’s so weird, because it’s like the only thing they see about me. They don’t 
recognise me as a woman, as a nurse, as a sister or daughter. They just think ‘Oh, she’s 
Muslim’. That used to make me really angry. Really angry and upset, but one of my 
colleagues at work sat with me one day and helped me to see…, she explained that that 
means their reaction to me is more about what the hijab means for them. 
INT / 19.05.2013 
  
There appears to be an immediate tension for women who wear hijab, as it has come to be treated as 
a symbol of the supposedly negative aspects of Islam and as a sign of the potential of Muslims to 
subvert social cohesion.19 The hijab can be likened to what Goffman would describe as a ‘stigma’; 
an undesired attribute which is deeply discrediting and which allows us to believe that the person 
with the stigma is ‘not quite human’.20 If the hijab is a stigma which represents Islam, then 
observers feel that the person wearing the hijab is inferior, and identified only by her religion. This 
was touched upon many times by my female respondents who felt very strongly that their wearing 
of the veil caused others to see them as inferior. I observed evidence of this on numerous occasions 
throughout the period of my fieldwork, most often while on public transport. It was very common 
for me to take the bus or train to my interviews and focus group meetings, and I noted that when 
veiled young women got onto public transport there was often a reaction from others in the carriage, 
or on the bus. This ranged from surreptitious looks directed at the veiled women, to conversations 
dying down and quite obvious stares. 
I did not witness any verbal or physical abuse, although I was told stories of women who 
had been spat on or shoved out of the way, as well as those who had been ordered to ‘go home’ and 
get out of Australia. There have been a host of Australian newspaper reports over the past five years 
indicating that racist attacks on Muslim women (particularly on public transport) are becoming 
more prevalent.21 The Islamophobia Register in Australia has compiled reports of abuse of Muslims 
since September 2014 and has noted a spike in these reports after incidents which bring terrorism to 
                                                
19 Christina Ho, "Muslim Women’s New Defenders: Women’s Rights, Nationalism and Islamophobia in 
Contemporary Australia," Women’s Studies International Forum 30(2007). 
20 Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity: 5. 
21 Mohaned Taha and Philippa McDonald, "'No-one sits next to me anymore': Australian Muslim women on 
how their lives have changed," ABC News, 2 October 2014 Lucy Battersby, "Veil lifts on daily abuse faced by 
Australian Muslims," The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 December 2015 
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public attention (for example, the Martin place siege in Sydney, or anti terrorism raids in 
Brisbane).22  
Bilan’s discussion with her colleague reveals a level of perspicacity regarding the idea that 
this stigma reveals more about those who cannot look past it than about she herself. As observers 
have chosen to focus on the stigma, and the presumed inferiority of the person wearing it, their fear 
may make it difficult to inform them about Islam and Muslims, which will allow them to continue 
to be close-minded and never challenged in their beliefs. 
Nafiso described her hijab as an outward expression of her commitment to Islam. 
 
Nafiso: This is the thing that shows the world that I follow Islam. It is an important part 
of who I am. I get it if other people don’t want to wear it. That’s fine by me. But I don’t go 
around judging other people’s clothes. No, it’s not something I would wear, but I’d never 
make rude comments about them. I think everyone should be able to wear what they want. 
INT / 25.01.2014 
 
Nafiso understood that while the hijab is a symbol of her faith for her, it represents different things 
to different people. Many of the young women I spoke with lamented that their wearing of the veil 
made their religion a matter of public consumption. They were adamant that they would like their 
religious practice to remain private (a luxury which they believe is afforded to people of many other 
religious faiths), but at the same time, they were clear about their choice to remain veiled. 
Removing their veils in order not to attract unwanted attention was not an option for them. 
While Nafiso was not concerned with other people’s decisions regarding modes of dress, 
some of the young men I spoke to were concerned about their exposure to women in dress they 
considered immodest.  
 
Said: When I’m at work, and some of the apprentices’ girlfriends come, I can’t believe 
the things they’re wearing. I just try to not look at them and keep going with the job. They 
tease me sometimes about it but I don’t feel comfortable… 
Cabaas: I wouldn’t be happy if my sisters were dressing like that [the way white 
Australian women dress]. I don’t think it’s good for anyone to go around wearing 
[revealing] clothes like that.  
Elizabeth: When you say anyone, do you mean men and women? 
Cabaas: Yeah, both. 
FG / 10.11.2012 
 
                                                
22 Battersby, "Veil lifts on daily abuse faced by Australian Muslims." 
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Interestingly, the young men thought it was equally important for them to be modest as for the 
women. However, they also felt entitled to judge women based on their dress according to their own 
religious code. 
 
Cabaas: Yeah, everyone does their best to follow Allah and the prophet, but we’re human 
too. We make mistakes, or some people don’t believe in all of the religion. It’s like saying 
that everyone who lives in Australia doesn’t have sexual relations before they get married 
because that’s what the Christian church teaches. And the Jewish religion too. 
GROUP INT / 25.08.2014 
 
This very astute analysis from Cabaas again turns the lens back on the analyst. It seems ridiculous 
to assume that all inhabitants of Australia abide by the ancient rules of their religion, but this is the 
sort of reportage that young Muslims in Australia hear about themselves every day. Consider how it 
might look if we assumed that any Australian who identifies as Christian must believe in original 
sin, never have pre-marital sexual relations, abstain from getting any kind of tattoo, and so on. It 
would be absurd to measure mainstream Australians by strict and inflexible religious standards 
which do not appreciate the diversity of lived religious expression. And yet this is a common 
occurrence for young Muslims. 
 Wearing hijab is a fitting example of the way my female respondents practice Islam in a 
significant and physical way. In their decision to veil every day, they are committing themselves 
outwardly and physically to their religion. This commitment comes in the face of significant 
pressure from some mainstream Australians, including verbal and physical abuse in some cases. 
The respondents were vocal about the importance of Islam in their lives, and on the whole, 
they believed that it sets them apart from both mainstream Australians, and other ethnic minorities. 
They described the difficulties they encountered when their religious identities were questioned by 
mainstream Australians, although some were more willing to defend themselves than others. The 
importance of Islam to their identities was continually underscored.  
This was not the case when discussions turned to the Somali clan system. As I describe 
below, some of the respondents were anxious to distance themselves from the clans and to play 
down the importance of the clans to their identities. 
 
 
The place of clan kinship 
 
The question of clans comes up with striking regularity in discussions about Somalia and Somali 
culture. This is true from the very early anthropological texts about Somalia to the latest reports 
detailing the security situation there, or many items in the popular media. In fact, they seem to be 
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the singular most recognisable attribute of the country. Mention is made of the clans to differentiate 
Somalia from other African nations facing similar humanitarian crises, to explain why the political 
situation has deteriorated there so rapidly and profoundly and also to describe the tension Somalis 
feel between allegiance to Somalia as a nation, to family, to Islam and to clans.  
According to Aden Ibrahim, president of the Somali Cultural Association, clan divisions are 
still prevalent in Melbourne.23 A 2008 report found that Somalis believe clan divisions are standing 
in the way of community cohesion and development in Melbourne.24 Ramon Spaaij emphasizes the 
fragmented nature of the Somali social landscape in Melbourne and points to clan divisions as 
contributing to this fragmentation. He argues that ‘Clan divisions have been particularly salient at 
the level of community associations that compete for power and funding.’25  
Indeed, I spoke with a public defender at Legal Aid who told me of two separate incidents 
where Somalis were on trial for criminal offences and they required an interpreter. In both cases, the 
trials had to be stopped as the interpreters could not refrain from adding their own remarks to the 
statements they interpreted from the defendant. They both questioned the trustworthiness of the two 
defendants based on their clan member ship, saying things like: He says he was not in the area on 
the Saturday night in August, but I wouldn’t believe what he says, because he is from the *** clan, 
and you can’t believe anything they say. They will lie to get ahead all the time. This is clear 
evidence of the clan divisions which are still pertinent in Melbourne today. 
Given the consistency and the depth of the discussion surrounding the Somali clans, I 
expected the young people I interviewed to raise the topic in conversation independently and also 
fairly early on in the interviews or focus groups. Interestingly, in the individual interviews, none of 
the respondents brought the topic up until I asked a direct question about clans or the political 
situation in Somalia. When the topic was raised, they gave considered responses, many of which 
included an element of political or social analysis regarding clan function in Somalia. 
 
Elizabeth: So what can you tell me about clans in Somalia? 
Absame: The clans is like… an ancient system to divide up the country’s people into 
groups where they have a duty [to each other]. It can get pretty dangerous if one clan 
feels insulted by another one, like if someone doesn’t get a job they applied for in an 
organisation that’s part of a clan. They all start to argue and it escalates pretty quick.  
FG / 10.02.2014 
 
                                                
23Cited in Drew Warne-Smith and Lauren Wilson, "Somali terror suspects ‘new to mosque'," The Australian 6 
August 2009 
24 Janita Smith. "Problem Gambling in New and Emerging Refugee Communities."  Melbourne: Centre for 
Culture, Ethnicity and Health, 2008.  
25 Spaaij, "Beyond the Playing Field: Experiences of Sport, Social Capital and Integration among Somalis in 
Australia," 1525. 
  
 
184 
Absame’s observation highlights the ancient nature of the clan system as a form of territorial 
governance, and the way that it functions based on mutual allegiance. The example he offered of the 
clan’s protection of its members was a common theme among the respondents. This is also very 
commonly described in academic and political writing as the main function of the clans. They have 
been described as ‘social insurance cooperatives’.26 However, the academic description of clans is 
steeped in ancient nomadic settings, with discussion of dowries, camels as currency and 
competition for water to survive in the desert. 27 Compare this ancient rural imagery with some of 
the examples the young people gave me which take place in urban or commercial settings.  
 
 
Cabaas: So if you are in a different clan, you might not get a job with a company where 
the director is from another clan. And if you do get that job, you might not be able to 
move up very high in the company. 
GROUP INT / 25.08.2014 
 
Suleiman: My uncle, he wanted to open a shop, a business in the central district in 
Mogadishu after the civil war, but he couldn’t find somewhere to rent in that district 
because it was controlled by another clan. I don’t even know who it was in charge, but 
they wouldn’t rent any buildings to him; not even a tiny room in an office. 
Ali: It’s hard to get ahead unless you have those clan connections looking after you. 
FG / 10.02.2014 
 
The young people very clearly identified the clan system as a form of social capital. They 
told me that in Somalia it was difficult to be successful without clan connections, and described the 
clans as a web of relationships that included everybody somehow. While they did not describe any 
of the ancient clan practices such as taking revenge for murder (something which is very often 
referred to in the literature), they did talk about how the clans back you up if you are in trouble 
financially or in business. 
The clan system can be considered as a form of social capital as conceived by Bourdieu. 
Far from being a system that accords every member equal opportunity, the clans emphasise the 
inherent power and inequality that is present in social capital. Again, Bourdieu’s definition of social 
capital as ‘the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of 
possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance 
                                                
26 Hesse, "The Myth of 'Somalia'," 251. 
27Abdullahi, Culture and Customs of Somalia; Aidid and Ruhela, Somalia: From the Dawn of Civilization to 
the Modern Times; Ali, Nomad; Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society; Lewis, A 
modern history of the Somali. 
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and recognition’28 is most fitting.  
It seems that the clan system is an ancient institution in Somalia. I believe it can be seen as 
a vehicle for examining social capital, which is generated each time a person subscribes to that 
institution in order to make a social, familial, financial or political connection. However, the clans 
are not simply an ancient kinship organisational system — the situation is far more complex. For 
example, the respondents informed me variously that clan conflict is responsible for the continued 
failure to establish a central government in Somalia, linked to pirates and their activities, and the 
reason their parents fled Somalia.  
In a Foucauldian sense, we can use the clan system as a lens to examine the way that 
ideology permeates individual actors across space and time. It allows individuals to orient (and re-
orient) themselves in relation to the unspoken, implicit structures of Somali society and historical 
roots. In this reading, clan discourse has been so ingrained in Somali identity that it acts as an 
implicit interpolation. However it is important to note that the young people did not raise the topic 
of clans independently. They seem to be distancing themselves from the social organisation that 
was the norm for their parents and grandparents in Somalia.  
Here, it is relevant to reflect on the idea of invented traditions as presented by Eric 
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger. In their edited 1992 book The Invention of Tradition, they 
proposed that many of the traditions we take to be ancient in origin are in fact quite recent and 
sometimes ‘invented’, rather than having emerged organically from a cultural system.29 The articles 
in the volume make it clear that invented traditions are particularly prevalent in the development of 
modern nations and nationalism. I do not suggest that the clan system is an invented tradition, but I 
wish to draw attention to the idea that some rituals and traditions which seem as though they have 
existed for centuries have, in fact been initiated far more recently and that this is not well 
understood by those that practice these traditions. This is a thinking tool in order to remain sceptical 
about the many purported attributes of the clan system, and its mobilisation as an explanation for 
violence, political turmoil and humanitarian disaster. 
Kadiye’s opinion about the origin of the clan system reflected the nomadic and pastoral 
history of Somalia, but also the way that the clan system has been taken advantage of: 
 
Kadiye: I think the tribes existed because Somali was like, a really hard place to live. The 
climate and the weather is hard and the people got together for protection and to help 
each other, like a security net. So that’s one side of it. Another side is that it was exploited 
by colonial powers or people who were supposed to be doing aid instead. And they tried 
                                                
28 Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology: 119. 
29 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger, The Invention of Tradition  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992). 
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to focus on the differences between the clans and make a wedge between people who used 
to be friends. 
FG / 10.02.2014 
  
This is in agreement with some of the published material about the clans, regarding the harshness of 
the environment of Somalia and the need for safety in numbers. However, Kadiye believes (along 
with many other commentators) that this human security net was manipulated by outsiders to their 
own advantage. 
Sumaya had different ideas about the origin of the clan system. 
 
Sumaya: I think it was more of a systematic kind of thing that was put in place, probably 
from the colonial power or whatever, I don’t know. My dad talks about it! 
INT / 05.05.2013 
 
She clearly does not believe the clan system to be as ancient as Absame does. Italy (the colonial 
power she refers to) did not have much involvement in Somalia before the early 20th century. When 
I pressed her on the existence of clans before the colonial power implemented the system, she 
replied that yes, of course it must be the case, because: 
 
Sumaya: I remember other kids reciting the line of the family when I was younger and it 
went on for a very long time! 
INT / 05.05.2013 
 
She is describing the ritual recitation of the family tree, which some (although it is very difficult to 
know how many) families consider very important. Sumaya told me that for some families, this 
recitation can go hand in hand with Qur’anic recitation and is similarly expected to be done by 
heart. 
Some respondents offered positive descriptions for the clan system.  
 
Nafiso described it this way: The clans are there for when you get into trouble. Maybe 
you have debt, or your business is not going well. Or maybe your kid did a crime and you 
need help to go to the courts or get him out of jail… 
FG / 15.01.2014 
 
When I asked a focus group if the clans carried any influence in the legal system in Somalia, there 
was a general agreement that they did, although this was not the case in Australia. The group went 
on to discuss the positive and negative aspects of the clans at length. 
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Hani: In some ways it helps, but the negative side obviously is, when someone, say you’re 
from a particular tribe and another tribe which is more common and affluent in that area 
is killed by a minor person, then that person would retaliate and come and start a war 
against this person. So it’s like a back and forth issue of fighting and killing because one 
people (sic) died. And the pride they have – I think it’s more a pride issue when they say 
‘Why did you kill our people, this is our blood?’ And this is what led to the war in 
Somalia. 
Amal: Yeah, because tribes have always existed and the way it was used was assisting, 
helping each other and developing communities, but it wasn’t actually meant to cause 
problems but people and their lack of education… 
FG / 02.11.2012 
 
The clan system offers a clear way to identify and understand actors’ places within a network of 
relations. While there are no distinct modes of dress or jewellery that distinguish members of 
clans,30 the respondents told me their parents could usually tell who belonged to which clans. This 
information is apparently readily proffered, however most people do not need to ask. However, this 
is not a foolproof or completely accurate identification, and mistakes are made in ascribing kinship. 
 The young people mobilised the clan system themselves as an explanation for the 
circumstances in Somalia, and of Somalis who have emigrated elsewhere. I have already discussed 
Ramon Spaaij’s findings that the Somali Australian community in Melbourne is divided by clans 
and that these divisions prevent successful representation in the fight for social and financial 
resources.31 Similarly, in London, one study found that clan divisions have remained prominent and 
have weakened the community’s ability to pursue collective projects.32 However, this is by no 
means a universal occurrence among Somalis living abroad. Mulki Al-Sharmani has argued that 
Somalis in Cairo have emphasized the need for unity and cooperation, and that they explicitly 
contrast this to the clan conflict in Somalia.33 In the same edited volume, Cindy Horst points out 
that while Somalis living in Minneapolis tend to remit only to their particular networks, there are no 
significant clan divisions in the city.34 This suggests that clan divisions are not a fixture of Somali 
                                                
30 Martin Stanton, Somali on $5 a Day: A Soldier's Story  (New York: Presidio Press, 2003). 
31 Spaaij, "Beyond the Playing Field: Experiences of Sport, Social Capital and Integration among Somalis in 
Australia." 
32 David Griffiths, Somali and Kurdish Refugees in london: New Identities in the Diaspora  (Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2002). 
33 Mulki Al-Sharmani, "Diasporic Somalis in Cairo: The Poetics and Practices of Soomaalinimo," in From 
Mogadisho to Dixon: The Somali Diaspora in a Global Context, ed. A. Kusow and SR. Bjork (Trenton, New 
Jersey: Red Sea, 2007). 
34 Cindy Horst, "The Somali Diaspora in Minneapolis: Expectations and Realities," in From Mogadishu to 
Dixon: The Somali Diaspora in a Global Context, ed. A. Kusow and SR. Bjork (Trenton, New Jersey: Red 
Sea, 2007). 
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identity, rather that they are a response to certain specific circumstances. 
Nonetheless, the people I spoke to referred frequently to the role the clans have played in 
the war in Somalia. They also frequently referred to the problems the clan system causes, while 
acknowledging that there are positive aspects also. 
 
Amal: So we never ever discussed it at all. It never comes into the conversation other 
than us bagging it or saying how much it causes problems. But we actually we’re never 
taught that at a young age so when I was older I found out the good side of tribes, which 
is you know, people assisting one another, people recognizing where you’re from, even 
though you’re in a different part of Somalia.  
Sumaya: I found out my cousin, she’s my second cousin actually, was one of my friends. 
We were talking about our grandfather and we realized it was the same guy. So it’s good 
in some ways. 
FG / 02.11.2012 
 
Furthermore, none of the participants (in either the focus groups or the individual interviews) ever 
identified themselves as belonging to a particular clan or lineage without me asking directly. The 
below excerpt of a focus group is an good example. 
 
Elizabeth: Now, when I’ve spoken to a lot of older people, they’ve talked about what 
clans are and what an important part of life they are. 
[Group reacts]: Ew! 
Oh! 
Here we go… 
Elizabeth: And when I’ve spoken to young people, I’ve had [the above] reaction. So I 
wanted to gauge what you think about the clan system. 
Sumaya: I didn’t even know my tribe until I was second year of university. 
Amal: I think it’s absolutely irrelevant.  
Hani: The thing is, at a young age, my parents actually never taught us our tribe. They 
never gave it any importance to us as kids — especially living in Australia. My dad is the 
one that’s totally against teaching us our clan, but my mother said ‘you should know who 
you’re from and who are your people.’ So at a young age I remember my aunty coming to 
my house and saying ‘can you count from generations what the names of your clan are?’ 
and she used to teach us. And my dad would hear and say ‘Don’t teach my kids that’. And 
so at a young age, we thought it was something bad. I personally thought it was 
something that caused wars and was difficult and hard and it was just something negative 
to me. 
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Elizabeth: So do you know what clans you belong to? 
Sumaya: Yeah, but do we really have to go into it? 
FG / 02.11.2012 
 
Sumaya’s frustration at being asked about her clan identity was palpable. Throughout my 
discussions with the young people, while there was a high level of knowledge of clan systems, I 
began to wonder if they were distancing themselves from the clans partly in order to differentiate 
themselves from their parents and the previous generation. Some of them said explicitly that the 
clan system doesn’t belong in Australia and that it is not useful anymore. This was in direct contrast 
to the opinions of older Somali Australians I spoke with who believed strongly that clans are 
important and useful in both Somalia and Australia. 
Interestingly, the family tree recitation described above by Sumaya was expressly forbidden 
in Hani’s house, although there was some disagreement between Hani’s parents about the 
importance of clan knowledge for children. Some of the older people I spoke with believed that it 
was important for the younger generations (those who have spent much of their lives outside 
Somalia) to understand and take part in this ritual in order to know their place, and where they come 
from. For them, the ritual recital of clan lineage serves to orient young people in their personal, 
familial and national history.  
What characterised my discussions about the clans was an initial strong reticence to speak 
about the topic, followed by very in depth discussion about the influence the clans have had in 
Somalia. However, this influence was described at arm’s length, and the respondents very rarely 
reflected on the impact of the clans on their own lives. Some of them were not even aware of which 
clan they belonged to until they reached adulthood as described by Sumaya above. As Hani 
describes, she only found out her clan lineage by accident: 
 
Hani: …and then at an older age, when I found out about my tribe at Uni. 
Elizabeth: Did you ask about that, or did it just come up? 
Hani: Well the thing is, it was by accident that it came up because none of my friends are 
the same tribe as me. But one of them made a mistake and assumed she was. So I went 
home that night and asked my Mum about it for the first time. 
INT / 20.01.2014 
 
The majority of respondents believed that there were some young Somalis who found the 
clan lineage important, although these people were not held in particularly high regard. I began to 
sense that the generation 1.5ers were linked by their professed disregard for the clans. They sought 
to identify themselves as different from their parents, the first generation migrants. The majority of 
older Somalis in spoke to in Melbourne told 
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there to help when people experience difficult times. (However, there were some — such as Hani’s 
father —who have disasocciated from the clans completely.) The young people had been exposed to 
the clan system in Somalia for long enough to have personal memories of it, and it is still something 
that is important to their parents in Australia. Many older men and women I spoke to were proud of 
the clan system and told stories of how it had benefitted them in Somalia and in Australia (helping 
them to find employment, housing, or getting them out of financial trouble). 
 
Ismahaan: Some people still have arguments about it! I sit there and I’m like ‘Yep, I 
know what I am and that’s all that matters’. 
Amal: it’s still an issue amongst people in our age group who really feel like because 
they’re a certain tribe they’re superior. They have this feeling. It exists in Somalia and it 
exists here. I just don’t know why. Because the clans aren’t really in place here, you 
know? 
FG / 15.01.2014 
 
Said: It depends who you hang around with. Personally, I don’t care about the clans very 
much. But I know my parents still do. 
GROUP INT / 17.08.2014 
 
Hani’s father did not like to have the clans discussed in the house when she was growing up. Hani 
told me that she believed this was positive. 
 
Hani: It’s sad, because I thought everyone didn’t know, that everyone else was like me. I 
think the clans are completely irrelevant. 
INT / 20.01.2014 
 
But I was conscious that what the young women were saying did not entirely match the information 
they were giving me. On the one hand, they told me that the clan system was ‘completely 
irrelevant’ to them, but on the other they had lengthy discussions with me and around me on the 
subject of clans. 
Similarly, Hani highlighted that she did not even find out her clan lineage until university 
and only then by accident, but the way the accident arose was through her friend assuming that she 
was part of the same clan and questioning her about it. Ismahaan described how it is important for 
her to know who she is ‘and that’s all that matters’. So the identity conferred by clan-belonging is 
actually important to her, even if she says she does not care what other people think, or care what 
clan others belong to. The young people seemed to be taking control of their current circumstances 
by distancing themselves from a clan system that had not offered them anything in terms of help in 
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distress, rather they viewed it as an old-fashioned system which had no use for them in their lives in 
Australia.  
It took a number of focus groups and individual interviews for me to realise that I was 
suspicious of the data I was collecting on the young people’s impressions of the clan system. It was 
difficult, because once asked, they were all happy to talk about the subject. However, I was always 
required to raise the topic before it could be discussed. Something that initially surprised me (and 
then made me suspicious after I had heard the same story over and over) was that they professed not 
to care at all about the clans, but were able to offer well thought-out answers to my questions on the 
topic. These answers had obviously been discussed before, and not thought up ‘off the cuff’. I was 
also interested in the fact that what the young people reported was quite different to what people of 
their parents’ generation reported, so I believe they had discussed the clan system privately amongst 
themselves as well as with older people. Finally, I was surprised at how long discussion about clans 
could go on after I had raised the topic. They had lots to say, and truly wanted me to understand 
their perspective on the clans. For these reasons, I began to suspect that their dismissive stance on 
clans was not all it seemed. 
I puzzled over the reasons for the young peoples’ professed disinterest in the clan system, 
especially in direct contrast to the importance placed on clans by older community members. One 
reason the young people didn’t want to identify with the clan system was perhaps that they 
recognise that it is called upon to explain many of the negative circumstances in Somalia. They do 
not wish to be considered primitive or old fashioned, instead locating themselves in their “new” 
culture and looking forward, rather than being associated with a “backwards practice”. 
 I believe that they were also purposefully distancing themselves from their parents’ faith in 
the clans in order to identify themselves as different from their parents’ generation. I started to 
wonder if one of the things that could perhaps help to explain this indifference was that all the 
young people I spoke to were either studying or working and were living with their parents. Due to 
the support of their immediate families, and the relatively few financial and professional pressures 
they have experienced, it is possible that they have not needed to draw on the support of the clans. 
Perhaps if the young people had more exposure to financial, personal and professional pressures, 
they would be forced to rely on their clan networks more heavily. Equally, while I believe the 
support system offered within the Somali Australian community is strong, there are limits to what 
connections such a newly arrived refugee group has been able to make in the past two decades since 
they began to settle in Australia. While these connections were well established and regularly called 
upon in Somalia, the scope for what can be achieved in Australia based on such connections is 
limited. 
Wittgenstein’s metaphor of forms of life is a useful metaphorical tool to help unpack what 
is going on here. Forms of life are a type of dynamic and constantly shifting way of being in the 
world; hinging on cultures, contexts and histories. The importance of the clan structure is not 
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something at the forefront of generation 1.5 identity. Their form of life is conditioned by spending 
their youth in Australian society. They do not view the clan system as a vital part of life in the way 
their parents do. For their parents, on the other hand, the vagaries of their historical trajectories 
mean that many will have relied on their clans in the past, and still feel a great sense of connection 
to them today. Nevertheless, if generation 1.5ers were to travel back to Somalia and live for a 
period of time under greater hardship with distant family connections, they might begin to see the 
relevance of the clan system for themselves. Even if the clan structure is dismissed as irrelevant by 
many of the participants, they do know about it. It exists dormant in the background — in their own 
personal narrative histories — and is thus still a part of their constructed identities. 
So the clans are certainly present in the minds of the young Somalis I interviewed, even if 
they stress that they do not mean much to them. There was, however, no strong agreement about the 
history of the clans, or about their current incarnation. See this conversation below: 
 
Ismahaan: I always knew what tribe I came from but never really in depth. I didn’t learn 
the sub, sub, sub tribes. 
Sumaya: When you describe it there’s one common one and from that a sub one and a 
sub from that and so on. It’s like a family tree.  
Hani: I think there’s two different clans, the Darod and the Hawiye. 
Sumaya: There’s many 
Hani: Oh yeah? 
Ismahaan: There’s all these other ones! And each speaks its own dialect. There’s heaps 
of other ones though. 
FG / 02.11.2012 
 
It must be stated that many people come from different areas within countries and regions and have 
particular dialects and practices. However, it is difficult to think of other regions and countries 
where those that are aligned to each other have been required to take certain formalised steps in 
response to different events including marriage, blood payments when a clan member has done 
wrong, grazing rights and ritualised recitation of kinship lines. According to Hesse, not all Somalis 
agree to which lineage other Somalis belong. As Somali genealogy presents so many ways to 
affiliate with or disassociate from fellow Somalis, Hesse even argues that this may be the point of 
the genealogy system.35 So the young people’s confusion is understandable, given the lack of 
certainty about lineage. This is also because certainty is established through practice, and as I have 
argued, while Islam is practiced in a physical sense, daily, the clans are understood through family 
knowledge, but have a much more limited practice among the young people. 
                                                
35 Hesse, "The Myth of 'Somalia'," 249. 
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In my meetings with community leaders and social workers involved with the Somali 
community in Melbourne, there was much more of an immediate focus on the issue of clans, and 
they were described without any probing from me. One noted community leader described the clans 
as ‘insurance’ in case something goes wrong. He stressed the importance of the clan system in 
everyday life and described the way that some elements of the clan protection system have been re-
established in Australia through the organisations committed to Somali welfare. 
It is important to note though, that despite the large number of Somali organisations (a fact 
that one community elder put down to clan pride and wishing to prove that one clan is as powerful 
as another), there are few, if any, questions about clan affiliation before joining. Indeed, I was not 
able to find any situation of clan-based discrimination within the Somali community in Melbourne.  
 Similarly, the sporting clubs organised by the young men remain a relatively clan-free 
arena. Spaaij argues that sport is seen as being inclusive and remaining relatively free of clan 
politics. He also notes that within the Melbourne Giants Soccer club, although the founding 
members are Somali, and it is a Somali community organisation, there are players and spectators 
from other backgrounds such as Eritrea, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Ghana. There is a warm welcome 
for these other Africans to the club, based on their shared skin colour and common African 
identity.36 
 
 
Conclusion: key findings 
 
All of the respondents spoke about the importance of Islam in their lives. Many described Islam as a 
powerful force in their identity construction, and there was a lot of worry about how Islam is 
perceived by mainstream Australians. They spoke about how the active practice of Islam is 
something that raises concerns in mainstream Australian society. One example of this was the way 
that hijab is perceived and reacted to. Within the Somali community in Melbourne, the vast 
majority of women are veiled and some of the respondents were frustrated that the veil is the only 
thing that people see about them, to the point that it negates other facets of their person.  
Despite the challenges of participating fully in Islamic life while living in a Muslim 
minority country, the young people were proud of this particular aspect of their identities. This was 
not the case when I asked them about the importance of the Somali clan system. Some of the 
respondents acknowledged the purpose and use of the clan system in Somalia, but most were 
anxious to distance themselves from it in their lives in Australia. This was despite the fact that they 
were clearly well informed about the history of the clans and the way they operate both in Somali 
and in Australia. 
                                                
36 Spaaij, "Beyond the Playing Field: Experiences of Sport, Social Capital and Integration among Somalis in 
Australia." 
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While the young people were reluctant to broach the topic of the clan system, they were 
very knowledgeable about it when it did arise. They gave examples of how membership of a 
particular clan had helped or hindered their family members in Somalia with business prospects and 
opportunities. They reflected on the role of the clans in Somalia and in Melbourne and there was a 
consensus that while the clans were an integral part of life in Somalia, they are no longer necessary 
for the younger generation living in Melbourne. None of the respondents ever identified themselves 
as belonging to a particular clan until I asked them directly. Islam was part of everyday practices, 
while clans were thought about but did not inform practice. 
While the young people told me that they did not believe the clans were important in 
Australia and that they thought the clan system was responsible for much of the bloodshed and 
conflict in Somalia, they told me they did not care very much about the clan system. However, it 
was clear that they had thought about it in quite some detail as they offered considered responses to 
all of my questions. I had the feeling that they had discussed these issues before at length and 
indeed, they went on to discuss the clans for a long time without much prompting from me when 
offered the chance to do so. I believe that they actually do care about the clan system quite deeply 
despite their initial lack of interest about the topic. 
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IV  FINDINGS 
 
(c) A contested sphere of identity: multiple dimensions, the value of education and the 
place of women 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I turn my attention to the nature of the contested identities occupied by generation 
1.5 Somalis in Melbourne, by highlighting the multiple (and often competing) facets that influence 
the configurations of identity expression. The second part discusses the role of education in the 
Somali community and the perspectives of generation 1.5 on the importance of education. 
Education is something that is prized by the broader Somali Australian community, and 
consequently carried a great deal of expectation. Thirdly, I discuss the place of women in the 
Somali community, and how this adds another compounding factor to the contested sphere that 
informs generation 1.5 expressions of identity.  
One very important reflection to make on the accounts of the respondents as reported in the 
chapter below is that their experiences are very clearly gendered with regard to competing 
identities, their perspectives on education, and of course, the place of women within their 
community. What became starkly clear to me as I compiled this chapter was that in most cases, it is 
the young men who experience greater difficulty in assembling and presenting a coherent narrative 
or identity. In order to present this data as accurately as possible, I have divided the sections by 
gender.  
 
 
The multiple (competing) dimensions of identity for generation 1.5 
 
As has been previously discussed, generation 1.5 Somalis in Melbourne occupy very contested 
identities. There are manifold and often competing facets to the way in which their expressions of 
identity are configured. In terms of this occupation of contested of identities, it is worth 
remembering the description of power and ideology as offered by Foucault; that power is intricately 
connected with human activity. In Foucault’s words ‘Power is everywhere; not because it embraces 
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everything, but because it comes from everywhere’.1 Connecting this with the formation of self-
identity, Somali generation 1.5 certainly present a multifaceted case. Power, in the form of implicit 
ideology, comes from everywhere. But, for them, ‘everywhere’ represents so many directions that 
have the potential to form their conception of self — migrant, refugee, Somalia, clan systems, 
Africa, Australia, multicultural, and so on. Just how contested the identities of these young people 
are should not be underestimated. Their conception of themselves is intricately tied up with their 
perception of the world and orientation within the world and how they are able to orient themselves 
with respect to the discursive categories made possible for them.  
I wish to point out here that it took some time for me to be able to speak more frankly with 
the respondents about the issues that confronted them in terms of balancing family expectations 
with the expectations they felt from other quarters. In the first instance, they were keen to point out 
that they were proud of their roots and culture and focussed on the many positive aspects of their 
familial relationships. I needed to ask them further questions such as ‘Is there anything your parents 
don’t understand about your life in Melbourne?’ for them to begin to unpack their experience a little 
more. Towards the middle of my fieldwork, in the beginning of 2014, I made a note after an 
interview on the back of a bus timetable  
 
Are they trying to protect their parents? Or do they want to protect themselves from being 
portrayed as immigrant kids going off the rails? 
FN / 21.01.2014 
 
After some follow up interviews, I had a sense that their reticence to speak about certain issues was 
not so much a conscious decision, rather a result of the fact that many had not explicitly thought 
about these issues. To them their lives are normal, and perhaps not worthy of dissection and 
presentation. I believe that for some respondents at least, our conversations encouraged them to 
think about themselves in a way they had not done before.  
 
 
Female experiences of contested identities   
 
Filad: I think everyone has difficulties finding out who they are in life, no matter where 
they come from. But for us, it’s like we have to be one person for our parents, one person 
for our grandparents, one person for our friends, one person for our colleagues. It’s hard 
to find the person you can be in all situations. 
INT / 19.05.2014 
                                                
1 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume One: The Will to Knowledge: 93. 
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Here, Filad has summed up the struggles she faces in negotiating her identity on a day-to-
day basis. Other respondents touched on similar themes to those mentioned above, telling me that 
they were torn between their families and the outside world. According to Loukia Sarroub, Muslim 
youth are ‘triangulators of identity, and, as a result, culture is enacted in the in-between places they 
occupy in their home and school worlds’.2 Sarroub’s work with immigrant Yemeni girls in the US 
has greatly facilitated my understanding of the experiences of Somali youth and the fact that their 
identity construction does not only occur in response to or in conflict with white mainstream 
society. It also occurs within their families, across generations, and within their communities.3 Filad 
refers to this above, saying she feels the need to be one person for her parents and another person 
for her grandparents. She is struggling to meet the expectations of different generations within her 
community. Somali generation 1.5ers must integrate many distinct identities including Muslim, 
visibly different refugee, young person and generation 1.5. Their identities are contested and 
complex. This is the case for many young people but, as I described in the previous chapter, the 
forces that act on the identity expression of my research participants are more numerous and 
powerful than those that affect mainstream young people. 
Layla spoke about the need to fuse identities: 
 
Layla: You just have to be able to get to a point where you know who you are to different 
people and join those individual personalities up to get the one person. You can take bad 
and good things from different situations and the different expectations we have on us all 
the time. I don’t know, maybe it’s possible to join the good things together? And then you 
could become some kind of super woman! Laughs… But you got to protect your own 
culture and who you really are. That’s important. 
  FG / 03.02.2014 
 
Layla’s comments above are rich and detailed in terms of explaining how she sees herself 
in light of the competing expectations placed upon her. She acknowledges that it might be possible 
to maintain a consistent and coherent sense of self, but is perhaps a little sarcastic or gently mocking 
of the idea that she can take the ‘good things’ to make ‘some kind of  superwoman’. Although she 
laughed as she spoke about this issue, I had a sense that her identity is in flux, and that she is 
consciously trying to manage this. Her final comments regarding her own culture and who she 
really is show how tightly she holds onto her Somali identity, and how much this forms a core part 
of her sense of self. 
 
                                                
2 Loukia Sarroub, All American Yemeni Girls  (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005). 7. 
3 Ibid. 
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Male experiences of contested identities 
 
In terms of acceptance by the mainstream community, there were varied responses from the young 
men. 
 
Omar: Yeah, I found that in the wider community, I wasn’t accepted as an Australian, 
you know? I could say I was an Aussie as much as I liked, wear the green and gold as 
much as I liked, but no matter what, around my friends, I was never considered an 
Australian. I went to actually a very multicultural school, so there was a lot of Islanders, 
Arabs, Somalis. It was very diverse. It was called Banksia Secondary College; it’s shut 
down now. But it was a very diverse school … and if ever the teacher would be like 
‘Omar what nationality are you?’ I’d answer ‘I’m Australian.’ She’s like ‘But, your 
background’, and so I’d tell her I’m of Somali background and I consider myself as an 
Australian. So that was difficult, and then when I’d go home, I’m Somali but my parents 
would be [telling me] ‘You act like an Australian, you don’t even talk your own language 
at home. You got to talk your own language’. 
GROUP INT / 11.05.2014 
 
Omar’s response indicates his willingness to identify as Australian, and the difficulty he faced when 
questioned about this identification. He acknowledges his background but reaffirms his desire to be 
considered Australian. However, he contrasts this denial of his Australian identity in the public 
sphere with his parents’ idea that he was too Australian inside the home. 
Interestingly, one of the main identifiers for Omar (above) in terms of ‘Australian-ness’ was 
the ability and willingness to ‘wear the green and gold’. Sport has long been acknowledged as a 
‘means and marker of integration’.4 It was clear that sport was a place where my male respondents 
felt able to express their Australian identity. 
 
Mansuur: I just love the AFL football we have here. It’s a totally new game. And I know 
the stats and the scores. So this is something I can talk about with my Anglo friends. At 
first they were surprised that I knew what it is [Australian Football], but now it’s 
something we can discuss all the time. 
INT 17.05.2014 
 
                                                
4 Noble and Taber, "On being Lebanese-Australian: hybridity, essentialism and strategy among Arabic-
speaking youth." 
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When the men discussed elements of Australian culture they valued, sport was often 
referenced. Bashir suggested that this was because in the refugee camps, the children did not have a 
structured school life, or the facilities to study. 
  
Bashir: So we would all get together, like, maybe 50 kids or more and play Soccer. We 
could always find a soccer ball to kick around and it was great! I mean, the camps were 
really hard. It wasn’t all fun, but we had the best time with each other. 
FG / 02.11.2012 
 
But a love of sport is not enough to bridge all the differences between Somali generation 1.5ers and 
their peers. 
 
Ali: I would say the Europeans; the wogs were accepted more as Australians rather than 
the Arabs and the Somalis and I thought that was because of our different faiths. With the 
Arabs, the Lebanese were Muslims just like the East Africans and Somalis so during 
lunch time we’d all take the time out to go pray… but they had a lot more similarities 
with the wogs that were non-Muslim because you know, they would eat the food from the 
canteen, where we wouldn’t eat it. We’d bring foods from home because we had to eat 
halal. So they were accepted more as Australians than us. But at the end of the day, 
whenever there was multicultural day and everyone was putting their different culture out 
in public, the Europeans did the same thing. So that was the only day it felt like ‘They’re 
just like us too’. 
GROUP INT / 28.05.2014 
 
Ali first says that he believes that the Europeans (who were often referred to as ‘wogs’ without any 
derision or distinction in the discussions) were more accepted because they were not of a different 
faith. He highlights the fact that all the Muslims would take the time to pray at lunchtime. Here, we 
see once again the lived practice of Islam, as discussed in the previous chapter. And for my research 
participants, their physical and practical commitment to Islam recreated the difference between 
them and their peers, through everyday practice. Ali presented a hierarchy of which ethnic 
backgrounds were most acceptable in his school. This response has echoes of the way 
multiculturalism has functioned in Australia in the past. I was drawn to make a connection between 
this perceived hierarchy of migrants and the hierarchy of acceptable migrants under the White 
Australia Policy. This divisive policy allowed migration based on European appearance. At that 
time, these demarcations were explicit and celebrated as a good method for Australia to expand its 
population. While this is no longer the case, Ali’s comment reveals that he, at least, believes that 
there are some migrants that are more acceptable than others.  
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Another revealing comment came from Mohamed: 
 
Mohamed: The thing is, everybody in Australia is always talking about being tolerant. 
But how tolerant can they be? I think there are some people it is too hard to tolerate. 
Elizabeth: What sort of people are they? 
Mohamed: You know, the people who do bad things, or who are too different? 
Elizabeth: Too different? 
Mohamed: Yeah, like different skin, different religion, that’s not OK. Different food and 
music is fine though. 
INT / 20.03.2014 
 
This analysis invites us to question the use of ‘tolerance’ as something Australian multiculturalism 
has promoted.5 Mohamed was quite matter-of-fact in his assessment of what sorts of characteristics 
were tolerated in Australia, however he was also faintly sarcastic about what people it is ‘too hard 
to tolerate’. Ghassan Hage points out the insidious inner meanings of the term ‘tolerance’. Far from 
being a term we should be proud of, he argues that it reflects our narrow and insular ideals.6 As 
Mohamed puts it, ‘Different skin, different religion, that’s not ok.’ Our ‘tolerance’ does extend, 
however, to foreign food and music. Similar to Ali’s comments above, there is a sense here that 
there exists a hierarchy of acceptable migrants and that Somalis are low in the ranking. This idea 
came up quite regularly during the interviews, and I was interested to contrast the hierarchy of ideal 
places to migrate to after leaving Somalia, and the reception of Somalis in Australia, a place that 
was high in the ranking of ideal destinations. 
Suleiman was very sure of the need to respect and maintain his culture: 
 
Suleiman Personally I think it’s good to hold on to your culture…you know, you have 
something different to offer the country you’ve become a national to. I might be an 
Australian, but just like the Italians, you go to Lygon Street, you walk along, there’s 
different meals… a different way of life. So some part of my culture, people might like it if 
I hold on to it, but if I just automatically disregard my own culture, they won’t have an 
appreciation for it. But there are things that I like and accept about the Australian 
culture, which I’ve come to. Like the AFL, it’s not a sport that’s recognized by the whole 
world but it’s a really nice game.  
FG / 10.02.2014 
                                                
5 Spaaij, "Beyond the Playing Field: Experiences of Sport, Social Capital and Integration among Somalis in 
Australia," 1520. 
6 Ghassan Hage, White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society  (New South Wales: 
Pluto, 1998). 
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This statement from Suleiman stresses the need to value your own culture if you expect others to 
value it too. It also recognises that not every part of a culture will be appreciated and adopted by 
outsiders.  
 While compiling this chapter, it was interesting for me to note that while many young men 
referenced sport as a way of connecting with mainstream Australians (and other minority groups), 
the young women did not discuss sport, or any particular activity which they felt brought them 
closer to their peers and colleagues. It is not culturally acceptable for Somali women to play 
football, although there are some women involved in the Somali football association in Melbourne 
in administrative positions. Upon reflection, I believe that the young women I spoke to had largely 
more positive relationships with members of the mainstream population (particularly in the school 
setting) and did not feel the need to establish connections through other avenues. 
There was much discussion about the presentation of identity to Somali parents and 
extended family. Many respondents described their parents not understanding their perspectives. 
Many other reports and studies have found that Somalis experience significant intergenerational 
conflict due to Somali youth having different life experiences and expectations to their parents.7 
Absame explains that that he feels held back in his attempts to blend into Australian culture by his 
family:  
 
Absame: For me it’s more like my mum. She expects me to be very religious and when 
I’m with her to act proper Somali and I can’t talk English, she expects me to speak the 
Somali tongue. But when I’m at work I just act normal, and talk normal English.  
FG / 10.02.2014 
 
Here, Absame also identifies as Australian. That is what is ‘normal’ for him. It seems that being 
Australian is easier and more relaxed than being ‘proper Somali’, and that, for his mother at least, it 
is not possible to be ‘proper Somali’ while speaking English.  This was something that many older 
people discussed with me, and is indeed a very common migrant and refugee experience. The 
parents and first generation arrivals had a clear idea of how their children should behave, and what 
are acceptable choices for them to make. The following generations (including the respondents) are 
exposed to many new experiences and have the opportunity to lead very different lives from the 
ones their parents had envisaged for them. There is something of a tension here in that many older 
Somalis I spoke with had left Somalia in order to ensure a better life for their children: One with 
                                                
7 Smith, "Problem Gambling in New and Emerging Refugee Communities."; Keating and Simons, "Somali 
students in VET- some factors influencing pathways."; Omar, "Integration from Youth Perspectives: A 
Comparative Study of Young Somali Men in Melbourne and Minneapolis."; Harding, Clarke, and Chappell, 
"Family Matters: Intergenerational Conflict in the Somali Community." 
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more freedom and opportunities. However, they did not recognise the breadth of opportunity 
available to their children in Australia. 
This was something that the mothers I spoke with had serious concerns about, however, 
these concerns for the most part, were confined to their sons rather than their daughters. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the mothers I spoke with were much more confident in their 
daughters’ abilities to navigate life successfully. Their focus and attention was directed firmly 
towards their sons. The pressure felt by my male respondents was accordingly higher than the 
pressure felt by my female respondents.  
The difference between home life and professional life was highlighted by many of the 
males I spoke with. In general, their level of concern was directly related to their occupation: Those 
who worked in the industrial sector found a greater discrepancy between the expectations at work 
and at home than those in a white-collar profession. However this was not universally true. 
Abdinoor states: 
 
Abdinoor: Well me personally, I wasn’t born here. I came here when I was five. So I 
know what my expectation level is at home. So like, the way I speak at home I am 
expected to know the whole Somali community. But the younger ones, the ones who were 
born here, everyone is a bit more lenient with them. But I’m just comfortable. I sort of 
have to, I won’t say fake, but when I work, I do trade, plumbing. The way I am at home, 
that’s me but at work I have to put on a different character to fit in. But I don’t have to do 
that at home. 
GROUP INT / 11.05.2014 
 
Here, Abdinoor acknowledges that he behaves differently at home and in the workplace. But he is 
more comfortable with the expectations he has at home than those that are present in the workplace. 
This is in direct contrast to Absame’s experience of being ‘normal’ in the workplace and altering his 
behaviour when at home with his mother. 
Iman’s experience was different again: 
 
Iman: Well, I work as a youth social worker, you know? And in our area [North 
Melbourne], we’re working with lots and lots of multicultural youth. So it’s actually a 
topic of interest in the office and when we’re out on the street. The only thing is that my 
parents used to think that this was women’s work, not work for a man. I spent a lot of 
time talking to them about what I do to make them see that it is a good job to have. 
INT / 27.04.2014 
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Iman points out that he is immersed in a multicultural world at home and at work, so the transition 
for him is presumably easier. But he also explains that he needed to educate his parents about his 
chosen career in order for them to have an understanding and acceptance of his work.  
Iman is working towards a fusion of horizons in the Gadamerian sense. The horizon 
represents the ‘whole historical lifeworld’ of an individual.8 Gadamer describes it as ‘the range of 
vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point’.9 The limits of his 
parents’ being-in-the-world — their own historicised life-world and understanding — is being 
challenged. If a new consensus on this issue is reached through discourse, his parents’ horizons will 
be broadened. As Gadamer argues, the limits of our perspective are constantly evolving when we 
come to new understandings and interpretations. Similarly, Wittgenstein’s notion of forms of life is 
again relevant here as a helpful metaphorical tool: the dynamic and constantly shifting ways of 
being in the world hinge on cultures, contexts and histories.  
Similarly, Bashir, a graphic designer, reports as follows: 
 
Bashir: I work in a really white office. When I was at Uni it was pretty Anglo too, so I 
was used to it. But it’s not really a problem for me. Honestly, the issue doesn’t come up 
except for Ramadan when they ask why I don’t have [my] lunch with me. 
FG / 02.11.2012 
 
Here, despite his acknowledgement of visible difference, Bashir is not concerned about shifting 
between public and private identities. This situational identity allows him to interact comfortably 
with a wide range of people in his life. It enables him to know how to act or how not to act, and 
informs his expectations of situations 
Mansuur described how the navigation of contested identity becomes easier with practice. 
 
Mansuur: It was harder when I was younger. But now they don’t really care as much, 
but they’re still really aware of it. But it’s like getting used to two cultures and walking 
the fine line is not the easiest thing. But once you get the hang of it, you just cruise 
through. 
FG / 10.11.2012 
 
But Mohamed was frustrated with the need to tailor his responses to different situations. 
 
Mohamed: It just sometimes gets me so exhausted that I have to be one person at home, 
another person with my Somali friends, then another one at work, and another one with 
                                                
8 Gorner, Twentieth-Century German Philosophy: 148. 
9 Gadamer, Truth and Method: 302. 
  
 
204 
the Aussies I know. I wish I could be the same person all the time, but that’s not going to 
happen. 
GROUP INT / 28.05.2014 
 
Mohamed seems to assume here that he is unusual in needing to present himself differently in 
different contexts. His wish to be ‘the same person all the time’ is at odds with current scholarly 
theories of identity, however it was clear to me that he believes that mainstream Australians do not 
need to alter the way they present themselves in different contexts. He wished to be able to present 
a singular version of his ‘authentic self’ in the same way he believes mainstream Australians can. 
The question of career choices kept arising in the discussion around negotiating public and 
private identities. 
 
Mansuur: I’ve found balancing the two ways, the old way and the new way can be a bit 
tricky at times and you have to live a double life in a sense, because I found that growing 
up while I was studying through high school, I really didn’t want to keep studying, I 
wanted to…do a trade but I knew that would be frowned upon and people would say 
‘Why don’t you study instead?’ They wouldn’t give the trades an opportunity because if 
you’re a tradesman back in Somalia you’re considered a second-class citizen. Your job is 
not as important as a corporate job, you know, the guy wearing a tux. There is much 
more of a class difference in the trades back home. And the pay rate wasn’t high back 
home. And there wasn’t small businesses and things like that. So I was pretending a bit at 
school, and I actually got the apprenticeship without talking to my parents at all. 
FG / 10.11.2012 
 
Much like Absame’s experience above, Mansuur was not able to communicate his wishes 
adequately with his parents. He also stresses the trades are not highly valued by Somalis, However, 
unlike Iman, he was not able to explain why things are different in Australia, and why he did not 
wish to go to University (this is discussed in greater detail in the following section on educational 
perspectives). In my conversations with Mansuur, it became clear that he felt particularly torn 
between the life his parents expected him to have, and the life he wished to lead in Australia. He 
was a very good example of a generation 1.5er who felt pressured by straddling two worlds. This is 
particularly relevant for generation 1.5 Somali Australians, because they usually live at home until 
they get married. Therefore their parents are very present in their lives at a time when they are 
exercising greater and greater independence. Note that Mansuur pursued his apprenticeship without 
telling his parents about it, which indicates he was able to make a choice that was right for him 
despite knowing that his parents would not be happy with that choice. 
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Ishaar describes how, even though he is studying at a tertiary level, some members of his 
family are not pleased because he is studying a modern rather than a traditional course. 
 
Ishaar: I still went to university, but I decided to do media instead of doctor, or engineer 
or something like that. So… this is something new, media to my family wasn’t interesting 
because back home we look at people who do certain trades and occupations, they’re not 
viewed as highly as someone who is a doctor or a teacher… and having my grandmother 
live with me at home, she doesn’t speak any English. And she doesn’t understand what we 
can study these days… what is available to us. 
GROUP INT / 11.08.2014 
 
In general, there was a level of resentment among the men pursuing a trade or working in the 
industrial sector that their skills were not appreciated by their families. They also admitted jealousy 
of their sisters (many of whom are teachers, nurses or working in the medical field) for the way 
their choice of career was accepted and celebrated. Interestingly, in Ishaar’s case, despite his choice 
of study requiring a university qualification, his family equated it with undesirable trade work 
because it was unfamiliar to them. This supports Yusuf Omar’s findings about Somali youth in 
Minneapolis and Melbourne. He found that the young men believed their parents’ expectations to 
be unrealistic, and not take into account the diverse range of educational and professional 
opportunities available outside university.10  
 
Ishaar: I came here when I was 5 in 1998 and my mum’s a single mum and I have 3 older 
sisters. So living in a house full of women is hard... And the expectation that my mum had, 
because she saw my sisters, and they were a bit older when they came here. Especially 
my oldest sister. She took initiative straightaway saying, ‘Mum’s by herself…’ so she 
went to uni, got a degree. She did nursing and my other sister is a teacher and the other 
one is still studying. But I was completely different. I was different. That’s not what I 
wanted to do. But my mum, back home she worked for the UNDP, so she was expecting 
me to be educated, be proper. Go to university, do this do that. 
GROUP INT / 11.08.2014 
 
Ishaar’s family in Somalia was presumably well educated and connected for his mother to 
work for the UNDP. For Ishaar’s family, his sister’s choices of nursing and teaching were 
acceptable career paths to pursue. His younger sister is also studying at university in an unspecified 
course. The traditional nature of his sisters’ career paths seems to equate to success for his family, 
                                                
10 Omar, "Integration from Youth Perspectives: A Comparative Study of Young Somali Men in Melbourne 
and Minneapolis." 
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however his choice of media studies does not. This is despite media studies being a course that is 
generally considered respectable in Australia, and certainly not at a lower level than nursing or 
teaching. It is possible that his family does not see it as an appropriate career choice for a man. 
However I believe that the difficulty for Ishaar’s mother stems from the fact that his university 
course is a recent creation, and would not have existed in Somalia. It is most likely unfamiliarity 
which makes Ishaar’s mother anxious about his choice. 
 
 
My reflections on female and male contested identities 
 
The expression of identity is at the heart of this thesis, and the above section has shown that it can 
be challenging for generation 1.5 Somalis in Melbourne to inhabit their identities when confronted 
with the many different expectations they are faced with. These expectations come from within and 
outside their ethnic community. For example, the discussed the different people they needed to be 
for their parents and grandparents, and among their Somali Australian peers.  
As previously stated, these experiences were heavily affected by gender. The female 
research participants acknowledged the difficulties they faced in relation to competing expectations, 
however these difficulties were multiplied for the males. For example, some young men spoke 
about how they were uncomfortable about expressing their Muslim identity in the workplace. One 
way they bridged the divide between themselves and mainstream Australians was through a shared 
interest in sport, particularly Australian Rules football. However they also identified a perceived 
hierarchy of minority groups in Australia, and believed they fell towards the lower end of the 
hierarchy due to their cultural, religious and physical differences. One source of continued 
frustration for the young men in particular was the lack of support from their families about their 
educational and professional choices. This is explored in greater detail in the following section. 
 
 
The value of education 
 
As I have previously described, Somalis prize education very highly. This is not unusual in many 
migrant and refugee communities, where education is seen as the reward for the struggle to leave a 
homeland, and the ticket to a better life.11 In addition, education has long been prized in Somalia, 
with both urban and rural parents sending their children to private Qur’anic schools to be educated 
                                                
11 Nancy Foner, Jamaica Farewell: Jamaican Immigrants in London (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1979). Caitlin Nunn et al., "I came to this country for a better life': factors mediating employment trajectories 
among young people who migrated to Australia as refugees during adolescence," Journal of Youth Studies 17, 
no. 9 (2014); Eric H. Taylor and Lisa S. Barton. "Southeast Asian Refugee English Proficiency & Education 
in Texas."  Texas: Texas Department of Human Services, 1994. ; Foner, Jamaica Farewell: Jamaican 
Immigrants in London  
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in Islam and Arabic for many centuries. At the beginning of the 20th century, modern secular 
education was introduced by the British colonisers in the north and the Italians in the south, but this 
was reversed by Siyad Barre in 1969. All private schools were abolished under Barre’s regime,12 
but then public schools, universities and other public institutions began to close in the mid 1980s as 
tensions mounted throughout the country.  
By the time Barre was toppled in 1991, all forms of education had been eradicated. Schools 
were demolished, their supplies looted, and teachers and students displaced, or even killed in the 
chaos that ensued. With no government in place, international NGOs and the scant-resourced 
communities organised what they could to keep children in schools. However, constant insecurity in 
a nation embroiled in a civil war made these efforts inconsistent.13 Those born before 1980 had a 
chance to secure a relatively good education, either as part of the British or Italian system, or later 
under the regime of Siyad Barre, which allowed them the possibility of better-paid employment. 
But there is now at least one generation raised in Somalia with little or no formal education. 
The young Somalis who arrived in Melbourne after the onset of civil war at home have 
suffered severe disruption to their education. Once again, their experience of engagement with the 
education system was gendered, from primary school through to post secondary education. The 
respondents affirmed that education is important within Somali culture and also to Somalis in 
Australia: 
 
Muna: Somalis value education more highly than other Africans. 
INT / 03.02.2014 
 
Nafiso: My parents used to tell me that when Somalia was a peaceful country, they had 
universities; they had higher education; the Italian system. It was really well developed 
and people valued education firstly because Islam teaches you to seek education — 
whether it’s Islamic education or secular education, you were always encouraged to 
learn. And that really infiltrated the Somali culture and made them go towards education 
more than any other African country. It is the priority. It still is, even in Australia today. 
INT / 25.01.2014 
 
Both Muna and Nafiso set Somalis apart from other Africans due to their prioritising of education. 
This can be seen as another instance where Somalis distinguish themselves from other groups and 
see themselves as distinct. 
                                                
12 Abdullahi, Culture and Customs of Somalia: 162. 
13 Dina Birman, Edison Trickett, and Natalia Bacchus. "Somali Refugee Youth in Maryland: Needs 
Assessment."  Maryland: Maryland Department of Human Resources., 2001.  
  
 
208 
In 2013, Hughes found that Somali parents were engaged with the Australian education 
system (despite having limited understanding of it) and reported that they were satisfied with their 
children’s academic experience. It is clear that Somali parents are hoping to rebuild their own 
shattered futures through their children. 14  Despite sometimes significant language barriers, 
Ramsden found that Somali parents made every effort to engage with the Australian school system 
in order to monitor and understand their children’s academic progress. However, they were not 
aware of the existence of many educational resources, and due to their poor English language skills 
may not have benefitted from accessing them if they had known of their existence. Significantly, 
Ramsden found in 2008 that despite their wishes and efforts to engage with the school system, the 
fragmentation of the Somali community in Melbourne was a factor which limited the parents’ 
interaction with the Australian community in general and with their children’s schools.15   
 
 
Female perspectives on the value of education  
 
The female respondents too believed that education is the ticket to a better life. They rated it as very 
important to their futures, both as a means to earn a better wage and as a way of having control in 
their lives, which was important to them after their fractured pasts. This finding has been echoed 
elsewhere, with Ramsden and Taket describing Somali parents’ belief in education as a means to 
master life’s opportunities and to regain a sense of control over their family’s future.16 As Aaliya 
puts it: 
 
Aaliya: ‘It is absolutely number one for my parents’.  
INT 21.06.2013 
 
In terms of their schooling experience, none of the respondents reported that there was any 
barrier to practicing Islam in their schools. In fact, many of them said that there were facilities 
where they were able to pray. Geni told me that while there was no dedicated space for her to pray, 
she had requested that a music room be made available to her and that this was done immediately. 
 
Geni: I remember I felt uncomfortable praying in public at school, so I asked my teacher 
in year 8 or maybe 9 if I could have a room. She went to the principal and he gave me a 
music room (we had a whole floor of little practice rooms for music) and he did it straight 
                                                
14 Gabrielle Hughes, "Somali Refugees’ Views on Education in Melbourne, Australia: Implications for 
Identity Formation and Public Policy" (The University of Melbourne 2013). 
15 Robyn Ramsden, "The Hope of Education: Somali Families and Social Connections" (Deakin University, 
2008). 
16 Ramsden and Taket, "Social Capital and Somali Families in Australia." 
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away, which I was really thankful about. I still remember today being so happy and 
feeling that they were looking out for me. 
INT / 02.06.2014 
 
Education is a very important key to accessing and building social capital. This is well understood 
by Somalis living in Melbourne, and according to my participants, the benefits of education are 
more than monetary (i.e. a well paying job as a prize). The young women I interviewed were very 
interested in studying something that would benefit their community, such as nursing, teaching or 
social work. 
Perhaps unusually, every female I interviewed was either studying or in specialised 
employment that resulted from study (most often in the health sector). Most of the females had 
completed a Bachelor degree or higher, around one-fifth had a Diploma level qualification and the 
remainder were still studying. Of the males, two were unemployed and looking for work, about a 
third were employed in the construction/industrial sector, some were employed at white-collar jobs 
and a third were doing an apprenticeship (most commonly plumbing or electrical). In the wider 
Australian population, more women than men complete tertiary education17 and my respondents 
believed that the same was the case for Somalis in Melbourne. However the available data do not 
support this (strongly held) belief. I discuss this further in the following pages. 
I have included table five (on the following page) to comment on the numbers of Somalis 
(not differentiated by gender) completing tertiary education or qualifications in Victoria. It is 
interesting to compare these numbers within the Somali community between the two census years 
(2006 and 2011) and then to situate this in the context of the total Victorian population. The table 
shows that there has been a significant increase in the numbers of Somalis who attained a graduate 
qualification, bachelor degree, diploma or certificate between 2006 and 2011. For example, 117 
Somali born people obtained a bachelor degree between 2006 and 2011. This represents an increase 
of 70.5%, a significant gain, particularly in a very small community. It must be stated that the 
Somali community in Melbourne is a very young one, so large numbers of people are in their teens 
and twenties; at the age when one would normally pursue higher education. However, in comparing 
this figure to the broader Victorian population (where we see an increase of 27.6% in numbers of 
individuals obtaining a bachelor degree), it is clear that the Somali community in Melbourne is 
increasingly involved with the tertiary education system. Similarly, an increase of 77.8% of Somali-
born individuals gaining a graduate diploma or graduate certificate shows a deep engagement with 
tertiary education. The only higher qualification where the rest of the Victorian population out-
paced the increase in attainment in the Somali-born population was Postgraduate degree. 
 
                                                
17 Australian Bureau of Statistics, "Census 2011." 
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Table 5: Highest Level of Educational Attainment, Somali-born and Total Victoria: 2011,200618  
                                                
18 Ibid.; Australian Bureau of Statistics, "Census 2006.", presentation taken from Office of Multicultural 
Affairs and Citizenship, "Victorian Community Profiles: 2011 Census, Somali Born,"  
http://www.multicultural.vic.gov.au/images/stories/documents/2013/Censusfactsheetscommunityprofiles/com
mprofiles/64-somalia.pdf Accessed 10 May 2015. 
 Somali-born Total Victoria 
2011 2006 Change 
2006-
2011 
2011 2006 Change 
2006-
2011 
Highest level 
of educational 
attainment 
Persons % of 
total 
Persons % of 
total 
Persons % 
change 
Persons % of 
total 
Persons % of 
total 
Persons % 
change 
Postgraduate 
degree 
58 2.0 40 1.7 18 45.0 170,387 3.9 108,120 2.7 62,267 57.6 
Grad Dip & 
Grad Cert 
16 0.6 9 0.4 7 77.8 95,346 2.2 74,047 1.9 21,299 28.8 
Bachelor 
Degree 
283 9.8 166 7.1 117 70.5 641,225 14.7 502,513 12.6 138,712 27.6 
Adv Dip & 
Diploma 
267 9.2 153 6.6 114 74.5 364,755 8.4 289,646 7.3 75,109 25.9 
Certificate 322 11.1 124 5.3 198 159.7 614,795 14.1 529,581 13.3 85,214 16.1 
School 
Education only 
1,337 46.3 1,203 51.6 134 11.1 1,935,420 44.4 1,892,092 47.5 43,328 2.3 
No Educational 
attainment 
242 8.4 202 8.7 40 19.8 41,811 1.0 39,854 1.0 1,957 4.9 
Not stated / 
inadequately 
described 
364 12.6 434 18.6 –70 –16.1 491,504 11.3 546,184 13.7 –54,680 –10.0 
VICTORIA 2,889 100.0 2,331 100 558 23.9 4,355,243 100 3,982,037 100 373,206 9.4 
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Anecdotally, I was often told that within the Somali community young women achieve much higher 
than men in terms of education. One young woman even told me that Somali women go to 
university and Somali men go to jail. However a deeper look at census data does not support this 
claim at all. Looking at table six, it is clear that males outperformed females in 2006 and 2011 in 
post secondary educational attainment, with the notable exception that in 2011, more females had 
attained advanced diplomas, diplomas and certificates than males (there was a striking increase in 
the number of females with these qualifications between 2006 and 2011).  
 
Table 6: Highest Level of Educational Attainment for Somali born by Gender: 2011,200619 
  
                                                
19 Australian Bureau of Statistics, "Census 2011.", presentation taken from Victorian Multicultural 
Commission, "Victorian Community Profiles: 2006 Census, Somalia-Born," 
http://www.multicultural.vic.gov.au/images/stories/pdf/somalia-2006-census.pdf Accessed 24 February 2016.. 
Also note that due to the way census data regarding educational attainment is aggregated, there may be cases 
of categories which are not mutually exclusive. This can result in totals not adding perfectly.  
 Somali-born 
2011 2006 Change 2006-2011 
Highest level 
of educational 
attainment 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Postgraduate 
degree 
55 9 28 9 27 0 
Grad Dip & 
Grad Cert 
13 7 3 3 10 4 
Bachelor 
Degree 
177 109 112 55 68 54 
Adv Dip, 
Diploma & 
Certificate 
236 
 
441 137 
 
135 99 306 
School 
Education only 
644 643 551 648 99 –5 
No Educational 
attainment 
59 184 43 158 16 26 
Not stated / 
inadequately 
described 
142 171 207 236 –65 –65 
VICTORIA 1,326 1,564 1,081 1,244 254 320 
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The contrast between the data and what was reported to me by both young people and older 
people was a great surprise to me. I had considered that my sample might be skewed, both because 
of its small size and because of the original links I had to the Somali community being connected 
with my own study and teaching. It could simply be that I interacted with a small subset of the 
community which did not comprise many males with university qualifications. The perceptions I 
witnessed may not have been representative of the entire Somali community in Melbourne, but of a 
smaller subset — that of the two wider suburb areas I targeted.  
However it is difficult to overstate the frequency with which I was informed of the 
women’s educational attainment and how it compared favourably to young men’s educational 
attainment. I received a similar message from all generations in the community, not just the young 
people I spoke to. Nonetheless, the message I heard from many community members regarding the 
gendered differentiation of achievement in education simply did not match the census data. I did not 
have a chance to discuss this with the respondents, as I completed the fieldwork prior to analysing 
the census data. After consideration, I believe there are a number of possible explanations for the 
disparity between the perceptions of the community and the available statistics. 
One possibility is that the census data is not entirely accurate. As discussed in the first 
findings chapter, I found other incidents of Somalis being motivated to respond to census questions 
untruthfully. However, in that instance, there was a clear motivation — they feared adverse 
consequences would result from them honestly reporting their ethnicity and religion. Here, 
however, it is difficult see clear motivations to answer the census questions inaccurately.  
Secondly, it is possible that over the past five years (there is another census due in 2016), 
there has been an increase in the numbers of women obtaining qualifications, however this is mere 
speculation. Further research when the 2016 census has been published will be fascinating and may 
reveal much about the community. The large increase in numbers of women obtaining a diploma or 
advanced diploma (between 2006 and 2011) could be a sign that some women may progress from a 
diploma qualification to a bachelor qualification. Again, the data captured in the 2016 census will 
be able to shed light on the trends in educational attainment within the Somali community in 
Melbourne. It will be particularly interesting to examine this data, as in a small community (such as 
the Somali community in Melbourne) numbers can change significantly over a short period of time. 
This is particularly true of a young community, where proportionally high numbers of people will 
begin to attend educational institutions.  
Using my theoretical framework to examine this disparity in representation, results in some 
interesting possibilities. I believe that the responses I received from both my respondents and the 
broader community form part of a negotiated and strategic response to their circumstances, and in 
some ways it is not instructive to question the veracity of their claims, as they form part of their 
reality. Perhaps this is an example of the pride of the women I met, their strong sense of identity, 
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and their belief in their own ability to manage life and navigate whatever circumstances they are 
faced with.  
For the women, I believe that the gender specific attitudes they have encountered from 
within their own community encourage them to believe that they are more studious than young 
men. The young women in particular have identified education as a tangible form of social capital 
which they are striving to attain. This may lead to overinflated estimates of the actual levels of 
educational attainment within the community. Due to constraints of the study, I was not able to 
address these issues with the respondents. Thus, these suggestions are no more than my own 
educated guesses, informed by the time I spent with the community. 
While never in the mixed gender focus groups, in the female only groups, and in some of 
the extended interviews, some women were scathing of their male counterparts’ academic 
achievements. Remarks such as ‘he’s only studying a trade’ were common. 
 
Amal: The Somali guys are lazy and there’s not as much expectation for them. 
Education-wise there’s a lot of expectation, but the expectation doesn’t start from when 
they’re young. It starts early for the girls so they can build on it. They boys have no 
responsibility at a young age like the girls do. 
Hani: They’re spoon-fed at a young age and that carries on into adulthood. And that 
comes from the mother, not the father. I don’t think the women are not favoured, but they 
are treated in another way. 
Elizabeth: Do you think that affects their ability to succeed in their education later on in 
life? 
Bilan: Oh, definitely. You have to be disciplined to study and you have to know how to 
keep going, even when it gets difficult. I think the boys, they expect other people to help 
them and they give up too quickly if they feel like they can’t do something. 
FG / 02.11.2012 
 
I heard a variation of this explanation from many of the women I interviewed. They told me that 
they had been forced to be independent from a very early age and to assume responsibility around 
the house and in the care of their younger brothers, sisters and cousins (the average family size for 
the group I interviewed was six children, which is significantly higher than Melbourne’s average of 
1.8).20 I took this as evidence of the strong difference between Somali girls from a young age and 
the prevalent stereotype of the oppressed Muslim woman. The young boys, on the other hand, had 
far fewer responsibilities. According to many of my female respondents, the boys in Somali 
families are routinely spoiled, often at the expense of the girls.  
                                                
20 Australian Bureau of Statistics, "Census 2011." 
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Bilan: I remember one time I was trying to do my homework and it was hard, you know? 
And my mum, she came in and said I had to stop my homework so I could help my brother 
because he couldn’t understand what he had to do. And I told her, ‘But Iman is one year 
older than me! He should be able to do it on his own!’ But I still had to stop my own work 
so I could help him with his.  
INT / 19.05.2013 
 
Bilan’s explanation supports Hani’s comment above that this preferential treatment comes from the 
mothers, not the fathers. 
While there is limited data in Australia, there have been numerous studies in the UK 
showing that Somali students significantly underperform compared to the mainstream population 
and also to other migrant groups.21 The situation is similar in Canada.22 However, in the United 
States, studies have found that Somali students are performing well, on the whole.23 As I have 
previously discussed, the sample I interviewed is somewhat skewed in terms of educational 
attainment and aspiration. In terms of the list of desirable destinations for Somalis, the respondents 
told me that European countries were highest on the list. Presumably then, the better-educated and 
connected Somalis were able to settle in the UK. It is not clear then, why their educational 
performance there is poor, relative to their peers.24  
According to the respondents, level of education was a key determinant of who got out of 
Somalia quickly after the outbreak of war. 
 
Elizabeth: What enabled your families to leave Somalia before the war? 
Hani: I don’t know why we moved. My dad was overseas in Italy studying, so maybe he 
could afford for us to go? 
Sumaya: It was always easier if you had someone overseas already. 
                                                
21 Mohammed Kahin, Educating Somali Children in Britain  (London: Trentham Books, 1997); British 
Council. "Raising the attainment of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Somali and Turkish heritage pupils."  London: 
British Council, 2007. ; Emua Ali and Crispin Jones. "Meeting the Educational Needs of Somali Pupils in 
Camden Schools."  Institute of Education: University of London, 2000.  
22 Brian Borzykowski, "Canada in 2020 (Education): The kids who fell between the cracks," Canadian 
Business 2009. http://www.canadianbusiness.com/business-strategy/canada-in-2020-education-the-kids-who-
fell-between-the-cracks/ 22 December 2015. 
23 Kebba Darboe, "New Immigrant in Minnesota: The Somali Immigration and Assimilation," Journal of 
Developing Societies 19, no. 4 (2003); Katherine Fennelly and Nicole Palasz, "English Language Proficiency 
of Immigrants and Refugees in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area 41," International Migration 41, no. 5 
(2003). 
24 A 2011 OECD report found that some students born in Australia to migrant parents, and first generation 
migrant students out-perform their peers at school. While not the norm around the world, the OECD found 
that in Australia, Canada and Hungary this was the case. OECD, Education at a Glance 2011: OECD 
Indicators  (OECD Publishing, 2011). This could be because of the ethnicities of migrants and refugees to 
these countries, or because of favourable circumstances upon arrival. More research in this area would be 
very welcome. 
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Amal: Generally, it’s the people that got out in the early 90s were those who were well 
off and could afford to escape. My dad left 1990. He realized that bad things were going 
to come. He went to Kenya. He was a real estate agent and got us out like that. I think he 
had some links to Kenya through his work. But someone without money, even if they 
could see things getting worse, there was no way out. 
Sumaya: My parents left early at the start of the war and they could do that because they 
had wealth. So in Kenya we settled relatively easily.  
Suleiman: I think the people who were educated could see that the situation was getting 
worse, and they had access to better information about when to leave and how to get out. 
Amal: In Somalia at that time, education equalled wealth. And the people who got out 
early had the wealth to go. The ones that got out 96-98 went to the refugee camps in 
Kenya, Ethiopia, Jordan. They spread out. The wealthier you were, you had a better 
country to go to. To go to a European country, you were more wealthy than to go to an 
African country.  
FG / 02.11.2012 
 
The excerpts above reveal a number of things. Firstly, and most obviously, education was a key 
factor in determining the ability of people to leave Somalia quickly. This was due not only to the 
wealth they had as a result of their education, but also, crucially, to their professional networks. 
Secondly, the participants’ belief that the educated Somalis were better able to predict the 
deterioration of the situation and to act quickly to avoid becoming implicated. Finally, that there 
was a hierarchy of preferred destinations, which generally speaking, correlated negatively to 
physical proximity to Somalia. When asked about Australia’s position within this hierarchy, the 
general response was that while it was a more preferable destination than other African countries, it 
was not as sought-after as a European country such as The Netherlands, or Sweden. Many of the 
respondents arrived on humanitarian visas, which means there were no strict educational or 
professional requirements from receiving countries.  
Sumaya, Suleiman and Amal describe the way those with more social capital (the better-
connected) in Somalia  were able to predict the worsening of the situation and to act to remove 
themselves from it. Suleiman’s comment that those better educated (and wealthier people, in 
Amal’s estimation) had access to better information and support networks is evidence of social 
capital being produced by social actors for their own benefit and distributed in unequal measure. 
This is in agreement with Bourdieu’s conception of social capital, and is an example of how higher 
levels of social capital can be the difference between life and death in extreme situations. 
The young women discussed their male counterparts’ professional choices at length, and 
showed many of the same prejudices that the boys described from the older generations. 
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Naado: I don’t think for the boys that education is their strong point. There is a lot of 
Somali boys who don’t think about education at all. They only want to work and play. My 
brother who’s 31 this year never thought education was important. He was into soccer. 
My parents would always tell him to study and put the effort in at young age and you’d 
reap the rewards later. He’d get a good job and earn better money and he wouldn’t have 
to do a trade. But he never listened so when he finished school he didn’t go to university; 
he just did labour work and trade work. Then after that he went to Somalia, got married 
and then realized how important education was all of a sudden. So he did a diploma at 
NMIT and then to University and did accounting and finally finished last year. He tells 
me now; I should have listened to my mother and father. And I have 3 younger brothers 
and one of them has finished university. Another is going through a TAFE course and the 
other didn’t even choose to do TAFE. He’s just doing an apprenticeship. So those two 
will realize one day what the importance of education is and furthering your skills. 
INT / 06.06.2014 
 
Naado clearly believes that trade work and TAFE are inferior to a university education. She 
describes university as the best choice and is dismissive of the brother who ‘didn’t even choose to 
do TAFE’.  
 
Amal: What’s interesting is that a lot of our parents, being migrants, didn’t have any 
access to school or uni. But the whole community places such a big importance on 
education for us. Not just TAFE. We have to go to university! In Somali households, 
university is the ultimate goal! I don’t know what happened to the boys… Somehow they 
got left behind. 
INT / 21.01.2014 
 
Sumaya: My brothers, they all went to uni – except my younger brother. I don’t know 
what happened to him… there’s always one! Some got Masters, but maybe because my 
mum and dad were on our backs to do something and they slacked off on my younger 
brother. They are lazy with him. They don’t even care anymore! 
INT / 05.05.2013 
 
According to the women, males and females have access to the same opportunities but young girls 
work harder and reap the rewards. This is possibly due to the parental pressure on girls to be 
studious from a very young age. 
 
Muna: I think girls are just more interested in education. 
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Amal: And dedicated and focused. They can see things through. 
FG / 15.01.2014 
 
This finding is an echo of Omar’s 2011 thesis, in which he posits that a barrier to young Somali 
men succeeding in education is that they are not equipped to apply themselves consistently because 
they are not required to contribute as much as women are in the home and family spheres. 
Therefore, the young men have not acquired the necessary skills to succeed in their studies.25 This is 
despite their parents having high expectations, and expecting them to attain tertiary qualifications. 
 
 
Male perspectives on the value of education 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the males I spoke with did not view the situation in the same way. The 
group of men I spoke to were more likely to be doing a trade than studying at university, and they 
also believed that this was reflective of the Somali community in Melbourne as a whole, in contrast 
to the census data shown above. While they were described as lazy by their female counterparts, it 
is important to remember that they face a distinct set of pressures and challenges, which have been 
described above. They were much more focussed on the expectations they felt were put on them 
from a very young age to act properly. 
 
Absame: when I’m at home my mum will tell me like most of the time she tells me to act 
religious or whatever like she will remind me of all the stuff I have to do. And I’ll do it in 
that moment to make them happy. But…now I’m here I want to be happy too. I’m here to 
learn and to make something out of myself. I was 11 when I came here. So not that young.  
So I still remember back home and how it used to be and stuff. So mum, she’s always 
reminding me why I’m here and she’s always on my back, like I got to study and you 
know you got to be good and all that. And with the trade, at least I’m doing something 
with myself. I’m not sitting at home, not doing bad stuff in the streets. I’m busy doing 
something so that’s the main thing.  
Suleiman: My mum always goes on and on about what a young man has to do… He has 
to have a good job and a house and to have children. I swear, this guy is like Superman! 
FG / 10.02.2014 
 
The comments above point to the burden of expectations the young men feel from their mothers, in 
terms of both their responsibility to do well in Australia to make their flight from Somalia 
                                                
25 Omar, "Integration from Youth Perspectives: A Comparative Study of Young Somali Men in Melbourne 
and Minneapolis." 
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worthwhile, and also in terms of the goals their parents have for them and the (perhaps unrealistic) 
timeframe in which they are expected to achieve these goals. However, here it is important to note, 
that the young women seem to be achieving these goals in much higher numbers than the young 
men.  
For the young men I interviewed, education was a contested and conflicted space in terms 
of their desires and the need to manage their parents’ desires. There was a palpable sense of sadness 
and resignation that their parents did not appreciate that doing a trade is a legitimate and respectable 
job in Australia. The sadness, coupled with pressure from parents and grandparents affect 
relationships within the home and can cause resentment to grow. This was explained to me in a 
variety of ways. 
 
Absame: Yeah, that’s it; they just don’t respect the trade as much as getting a degree. It’s 
just the mentality they grew up with. Back then it was just like anyone would do the job. 
They would do it the hard way and not go to school. It was just like an apprenticeship but 
the wages were rubbish and the safety side of it — it was very dangerous — which makes 
it rubbish. And when it comes to Australia it’s much more structured. They [teach you] 
what to do, what’s right and wrong and you actually learn more. 
Ali: For me, it’s the same as Absame, but in my case it’s just like education-wise, from 
that point of view, parents from overseas have a lot of expectations of intellectual work 
like going to uni and doing stuff like doctor, or lawyer or whatnot. And they see the trade 
as not being number one on the list. And if you do come to Australia, it revolves around 
apprenticeships…and it’s not something (just) anyone can do. And they can’t understand 
that. 
FG / 10.02.2014 
 
Suleiman was even more explicit and explained that in Somalia, only lower-class people would 
perform menial work. 
 
Suleiman Back home, only the poor people did the physical work. It was really 
dangerous, because they didn’t have all the regulations like in Australia, and it was seen 
as a really poor and nasty thing to do. 
FG / 10.02.2014 
 
This supports the view presented in section three, that in Somalia, certain jobs were looked upon 
with disdain, and were only to be completed by people of a lower class. Ali’s idea that the 
workplace in Australia ‘revolves around apprenticeships’ is not a false assessment. However the 
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2011 census data show that 79% of apprentices were male,26 so it is a career path that is more 
common for men than women in mainstream Australian society as well. The young women are less 
likely to have been exposed to apprenticeships and the way they function. This fact may have 
informed the women’s assessment that to be studying a trade is an inferior choice to attending 
university.  
The reported differences between young men and their families regarding education choices 
were a source of conflict. As Absame described it: 
 
Absame: They’re never going to respect the trade as much as uni, so I try to keep both 
parties happy [me and my parents] and move on. 
FG / 10.02.2014 
 
The conflict experienced by the males in relation to their education and professional choices was 
often coupled with a discussion about how they manage to meet their own personal needs and the 
needs of their parents. This led them to discussion around the need to have different parts of their 
personalities available to different people and the way they negotiate this contested identity. 
 
 
The place of women 
 
I had not intended to focus on the place of women among Somalis in Melbourne, but found that it 
was a topic that emerged early on in the fieldwork and was an important discussion point for both 
men and women in various ways. One effect of the disruption caused by the civil war and the great 
changes encountered in subsequent emigration towards the west has been to dislodge customary 
gender roles — very much to women’s advantage, and this was discussed by my participants in 
great detail.  
Many of the participants informed me that in Somalia the gender roles were strictly 
outlined, but since the disruption of the civil war, this has changed significantly.  In Somalia, men 
are considered the head of the household. They are raganimo — a Somali word meaning brave and 
also an eloquent speaker, which is especially important in Somalia due to the high value placed on 
oratory skills, such as reciting poetry.27 Women are considered to be the managers of the household 
                                                
26 Australian Bureau of Statistics, "Census 2011." 
27 Abdullahi, Culture and Customs of Somalia: 120. 
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and children.28 In Somalia, children are raised to observe these roles and also to respect their parents 
at all times, as both a source of duo (advice and blessings) and habaar (curse).29 
 
 
Female perspectives on the place of women 
 
The position of women in Somali culture was raised independently in many of my interviews and 
focus groups. In one all-female group, it took over the other topics and was discussed for over an 
hour. The women enjoyed pointing out examples where women have power in the household and 
also the public domain. One thing that stood out very clearly was the sense that the mainstream 
public misunderstands Somali women altogether. This is supported by Garner and El Bushra who 
claim that ‘Somali women, whether nomadic or urban, have never been submissive, either to natural 
calamities or to social oppression’.30 
 
Layla: Women’s position in the Somali household is stronger than other women in 
Islamic households, definitely. 
Hani: This is definitely true. My father was more educated than my mother, but he wasn’t 
around as much, My mother was there from day one- following up and questioning us 
‘what are you doing with your life’ and we’re all a bit scared of her. She is the leader of 
the house. My dad is more of a guest. His character is very soft and he doesn’t really 
know how to raise kids… no discipline. And my mum does all of that.  
FG / 15.01.2014 
 
Here, the women equate strength with position in the household. This involves child rearing, which 
is to be expected, but also has a strong emphasis on discipline. 
However, the previous position of women in Somalia is also contested. For example, 
Hassan Keynan, a Somali sociologist living in Norway, explains that while ‘Somali “culture” has 
allowed and equipped Somali men to dominate women’ (citing a well know proverb that ‘a breast 
which contains milk cannot contain wisdom’),31 these previously well defined gender roles have 
been upended. Keynan has plotted the way that some Somali women have benefitted from their 
migration experience, in sometimes unexpected ways. Indeed, this was supported by my own 
research with many generation 1.5 women explaining that they are equally (if not more) capable 
                                                
28 Peter Hansen, "Circumcising Migration: Gendering Return Migration among Somalilanders  " Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies 34, no. 7 (2008): 112. 
29 Nauja Kleist, "Negotiating Respectable Masculinity: Gender and Recognition in the Somali Diaspora," 
African Diaspora 3(2010): 189. 
30 Garner and El Bushra, Somalia - The Untold Story: The War Through the Eyes of Somali Women: 9. 
31 Jan M. Haakonsen and Hassan K. Keynan, eds., Somalia after UNOSOM: Proceedings from a Conference 
Held in Oslo, 9-10 March 1995 (Oslo: Norwegian Red Cross, 1995), 27. 
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and accomplished than their male peers. Similarly, the older women I spoke with told me with great 
joy about how they are more independent in Australia, and do not have to answer to a husband the 
same way they did in Somalia. There are many female-headed Somali households in Melbourne, 
which of course removes the requirement of answering to a husband- many husbands are not 
present, having been lost in the war or never being reunited with their family in Australia. However 
even those women who are married were very clear that they have significantly more power in 
Australia than they would have had in Somalia.  
This is despite the fact that I was often told by the young women that in comparison to 
other Muslims, Somalis have always afforded women greater authority. Many cited the fact that 
Somali women can seek a divorce as evidence for this, along with the high proportion of women in 
Somalia who work outside the household. 
Some of the women speculated that the position of women was very different in other 
Muslim households: 
 
Hani: I used to talk to my Arab friends about our parents and they would always say that 
their fathers disciplined them and they would be scared of them and they didn’t have such 
a close relationship with their fathers because they were afraid. And I used to tell them it 
was the opposite in our house. Even if I stayed out all night — I would have to answer to 
my mother.  
Sumaya: They have self-belief. I don’t know where it comes from but it’s very strong. My 
dad is very respected in his tribe but my mum is equally respected in her sphere as well. 
There is no expectation that the man does everything and the woman sits at home. She 
has her own business. She’s not put down!  
FG / 15.01.2014 
 
Here, Sumaya affords equal weight to the work that is done inside the house and outside. 
There was a sense of respect when describing the work involved in running a household and rearing 
children. However, this work did not prevent women from also pursuing paid work outside the 
household and running business enterprises. 
 
Amal: Somali women have a very strong character — whether it’s discipline, education, 
community life; they’re very involved. 
Sumaya: My mum controls the finances of the house — she used to help me with 
homework and at school. Most things she did in the home. 
FG / 15.01.2014 
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A strong matriarch seems to be at the heart of many Somali households in Melbourne. While I 
assumed this would be because of the high numbers of single mothers (due to fathers being killed in 
the war or not being reunited with their families in Australia), most of the respondents identified 
their mothers as the head of the house, regardless of the presence of a father. I asked the 
respondents if women had been made strong by the prolonged conflict in Somalia. 
 
Hani: I don’t know if it’s post-war. I think it’s a woman’s characteristic. It’s a culture 
thing.  In Somali culture, women are able to divorce and remarry and that’s not the case 
in many Muslim cultures. That shows how much power women have. 
INT / 22.09.2014 
 
Sumaya: They’re definitely not limited. Islam was never really implemented properly into 
Somalia, was it? Properly. It was more culture. 
INT / 29.11.2014 
 
While Hani describes women’s power and pride as a Somali characteristic, Sumaya believes that it 
is in the nature of Islam to oppress women, or deny them some aspects of power and that it is a 
failure to implement Islam fully that has allowed Somali women to possess the power they do. In 
section three, I described how the arrival of Islam in Somalia in the 7th century did not have as large 
an impact as has been claimed. Certainly, the fact that large-scale conversions to Islam did not take 
place until some 500 years later could be construed as evidence that Somali culture had time to 
flourish alongside but distinct from Islam before Somalis converted fully to the religion. The 
suggestion that Somalis still practice Sufism, and perhaps still engage with tribal customs and 
rituals which existed prior to Islam’s implementation is an intriguing one, and an avenue which is 
ripe for further research. Sumaya’s belief that Islam is inherently sexist, and Somali women have 
benefitted from the improper implementation of Islam was not held by all the young people I spoke 
to, with many highlighting that they believe that sexism can arise in Islam when it is not practiced 
properly. 
Hani believes that Somali women are fundamentally different from Somali men. 
 
Hani: I think Somali women have more pride in them. It’s a national characteristic! I 
don’t think any Somali woman would sit at home and cry about being abused by her 
husband. She wouldn’t accept it. She would take a stand. She would either bash him up or 
call the police and the authorities on him. She is not belittled. She has a pride about her 
that she will not be discriminated against and abused. 
INT / 22.09.2014 
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Aaliya similarly described how her mother refused to be oppressed by her father when she 
wanted to end her marriage. 
 
Aaliya: My mother married when she was 18 or 19 and then she had 5 children close 
together and then she left. And she was unlike my father she was influential woman, you 
know some of her brothers were in the government. She was city, she was working, she 
was a graduate from high school and she was working for the army. So my father was 
different culturally so there is a clash between cultures. My father, where he came from a 
woman doesn’t have that independence. 
Elizabeth: So your mother was urban? 
Aaliya: Yeah, she was urban, and my father I couldn’t say he was like from the bush but 
you know he left from the village in Ethiopia when he was 16 but somehow his mentality 
doesn’t change that much from the way he sees women. He was of the belief that women 
should not work and should stay at home. And my mum was urban and she was a very 
proud woman. So she asked him he will either give her enough money to build her a 
house or he will allow her to work. She can’t support herself and her children and he 
doesn’t allow either one of the two so she has to get out from the marriage. 
INT / 21.06.2013 
 
Layla agrees that women are treated differently in other Muslim cultures: 
 
Layla: When I went to uni I had that feeling when I made friends with other Muslim girls. 
The women were very different. And I think some cultures used Islam to advantage the 
men and put them higher than the women. You’d hear certain things and they say ‘Oh… 
Islamically… I’m not permitted to do that’ And you think, ‘that’s not Islam!’ They teach 
you that to keep you down. But I could still be friends with them and we discussed it 
really openly. 
INT / 03.02.2014 
 
Here, Layla suggests that it is the implementation of Islam which does this, saying ‘They teach you 
that to keep you down’. While Layla describes the timid nature of her non-Somali Muslim friends, 
she also claims she is able to discuss their differences ‘really openly’. However she then continued 
on to say, 
 
Layla: After I left uni though, they weren’t really my friends any more. I would sometimes 
feel so frustrated with them, that they wouldn’t express themselves and work to get what 
they wanted. 
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INT / 03.02.2014 
 
The above comments show clearly the breadth of cultural and religious practice across the broader 
Muslim world. These practices change both across time and space. When asked about the situation 
for women in Somalia now, the answer was different. 
 
Nafiso: In Somalia at the moment it’s so unstable and there are so many radical groups 
coming and demanding things, and then they get overturned and more radicals come and 
demand more things. So I don’t know how it is for women there. 
INT / 25.01.2014 
 
This response indicates that the power women are accorded in Australia may not exist any more in 
Somalia as a result of the implementation of radical Islam. So there are two very different 
interpretations of Islam in play. The first, which Sumaya mused is an incorrect or incomplete 
application of Islam, allows women power and agency. Layla agrees that Islam is being 
manipulated to the detriment of women. The second, which is being implemented in Somalia now 
by the ‘radicals’, does not allow women free agency. Ironically, it seems that this is the way the 
young Somali women believe Islam functions in many other Muslim countries, even if it is not their 
preferred implementation of Islam.  
The women highlighted again the importance of the differences in the way that boys and 
girls are raised, but this time offered this difference as a practical reason for female power in Somali 
culture: 
 
Hani: They’re spoon-fed at a young age and that carries on into adulthood… I don’t 
think the women are not favoured, but they are treated in another way. And this means 
they know how to work hard and to make a success of themselves. And they know how to 
get what they want later on in life. 
FG / 15.01.2014 
 
It was often raised that the young women felt they had ‘something to prove’ both to their parents, 
the Somali community and the mainstream Australian community as well. As Layla puts it: 
 
Layla: The way I see it is this. I have so many crosses against me. Number one is my 
religion. Number two is because I’m a girl. Number three is because I arrived here when 
I was already 9 years old. And I have to prove myself to so many different people. I have 
to say to my parents, ‘Yes I can be as much of a success as my brothers’. Then I have to 
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show the other people at school and at uni that I can achieve and then after that I need to 
set an example. So I will work hard to be a success. 
INT / 03.02.2014 
 
This is an example of a positive response to the challenges faced by those who occupy contested 
identities. In this case, Layla uses the expectations that others have of her as motivation to succeed 
in order to prove herself. For Layla, gender is another identity that must be negotiated (in addition 
to ‘refugee’ and ‘Muslim’), and she chooses to use it as extra incentive to achieve. While Layla 
describes the many different expectations people have of her and the way she has strived to meet 
and exceed them, Amal thinks otherwise about the measure of success:  
 
Amal: I disagree. What I set to be a success might be different to other people. For 
Somalis, if you finish university, that’s success and if you don’t you have failed. But many 
boys are not going to uni. They do trades and doing other things. But at home the trades 
were done by lower class people. So I feel like they’re doing a lot! They’re learning a 
profession but they come home and they’re not respected. They are treated as less. 
Sumaya: They do a lot of things. They set up the soccer here and that’s like a massive 
success. There are so many options for boys here. 
Hani: Some of them are definitely trying to improve themselves, and if they don’t succeed 
in the academic section they do something else.  
FG / 15.01.2014 
 
The young women highlighted the role that gender plays in the construction of identities for males 
as well. As Amal explained, the expectation that all young men will graduate from university can 
have damaging consequences for those who wish to pursue other careers. The perception that they 
have failed was one that the young men described as well. Sumaya points to the formation of the 
Aussie Somali Football Association (ASFA), which has a number of teams around Melbourne. It is 
widely celebrated as an inclusive sporting organisation, and was mentioned many times during my 
fieldwork as something for the Somali community in Melbourne to be proud of.  
 
 
Male perspectives on the place of women 
 
The great changes brought about by the migration experience have had a significant effect on 
Somali men. As Keynan put it in 1995 describing Somalis in Norway: 
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Many believe that the changes taking place in gender relations are too radical and too destabilizing. 
They view the growing empowerment of women as a serious threat to their authority and dignity 
and, by extension, as a threat to the moral and cultural norms and traditions of Somali society. They 
complain about humiliation and lack of respect, marginalization and expulsion, orders being given 
by their wives, loss of family coherence and values and confusion and disorientation in the way 
children are brought up.32 
 
A decade later, Ladan Affi made very similar findings regarding Somalis who had moved to 
Canada.33 And in Australia, Samuel Muchocki’s recent Latrobe University PhD thesis examined 
gender relations as interpreted by men from the Horn of Africa (Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea and 
Ethiopia). Muchocki found that these men are suffering from a sense of marginalisation and even 
ostracism as is summed up in the title of a paper he published in 2013, an extract from a 
conversation with a participant in his study: ‘[In Australia] what comes first are the women, then 
children, cats, dogs, followed by men’.34 It is important to note that this shift within the Somali 
community in Melbourne is also taking place against a backdrop of increasing challenges to 
traditional masculinity in mainstream society. Challenges to what has been understood to be “male” 
and “masculine” are arising with greater frequency, to the point where it is common to speak of a 
‘crisis of masculinity’.35 
In many discussions, it was notable how much the young men deferred to the women in 
their lives; sisters, mothers and grandmothers. 
 
Bashir: Well, I’m engaged now, but this was organised by my mum. She made the visits 
to the family and I think she chose the girl a long time ago too. Of course, she asked me 
what I thought, but I just think of it this way: Who knows you better than your own 
mother? 
FG / 02.11.2012 
 
This statement displays Bashir’s willingness to go along with plans that were organised by his 
mother, even though it is a situation that concerns him intimately and profoundly. His acceptance of 
an arranged marriage is very telling in terms of his position as a member of generation 1.5. He is a 
                                                
32 Ibid. 
33 Ladan Affi, "Domestic conflict in the diaspora - Somali women asylum seekers and refugees in Canada," in 
Somalia- The Untold story: The War Through the Eyes of Somali Women, ed. Judith Gardner and Judy El 
Bushra (London: Pluto Press, 2005). 
34 Samuel M. Muchoki, "‘[In Australia] what comes first are the women, then children, cats, dogs, followed 
by men’: Exploring accounts of gender relations by men from the Horn of Africa," Australasian Review of 
African Studies 34, no. 2 (2013). 
35 Judith Welford and Jane Powell. "A Crisis in Modern Masculinity: Understanding the Causes of Male 
Suicide."  London: CALM, 2014.  Flourish Itulua-Abumere, "Understanding Men and Masculinity in Modern 
Society," Open Journal of Social Science Research 1, no. 2 (2013). 
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successful graphic designer with a Bachelor degree, working in a very white-collar environment, 
surrounded by what he calls ‘Anglos’. Despite his adaptation and settlement into what he 
acknowledges is a very ‘white’ environment, he accepts his mother’s decision about who would 
make an acceptable wife for him. Bashir’s case was significant for me as an example of the tension 
of the position occupied by generation 1.5. He is in some ways very Australian in his outlook and 
his daily life, but in this context at least, he is very Somali. 
 Iman reported that his mother is equally influential: 
 
Iman: The one who controls our house is definitely my mum. She is the one who tells us 
about what we should study, and how we should look after our money. My dad works full-
time but she is only part-time and it seems like she knows everything that goes on in our 
house. 
INT / 27.04.2014 
 
Some of the men explained that they didn’t always like the way women had control in their lives: 
 
Suleiman: My other Arab friends, they have a really different relationship with their 
mothers. They are much more independent and they check with their father before they do 
something. Like I still have to tell my mum every weekend if I want to play soccer. She 
doesn’t understand that I’m 22 now; I’m not a kid anymore. 
INT / 24.04.2014 
 
Interestingly, Suleiman would be more willing to run his plans by his father, but he feels resentful 
that he has to discuss them with his mother. Because all of my unmarried respondents lived at home 
with their parents, it seems they felt they had to obey the rules set out by the women in their family. 
One of the young men who did not wish to be recorded told me that he doesn’t have a 
father in Australia. It is not known what happened to him, but the family believes that he was killed 
in conflict in Somalia. He described how growing up without a father proved to be an immense 
challenge to his identity as he did not have anyone to look up to or imitate. A recent study in 
London contrasts the situation of young Somali men and women in this context: 
 
Another important outcome following the loss of a father is a lack of role models for many Somali 
boys. While many Somali women are enjoying a new sense of freedom and Somali girls are 
exploiting new opportunities in education, boys can experience a sense of alienation from the system 
and struggle for a sense of identity.36 
 
                                                
36 Harding, Clarke, and Chappell, "Family Matters: Intergenerational Conflict in the Somali Community," 7. 
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Previously, I have discussed the level of pressure from grandparents and parents, and the 
expectation they have of their children and grandchildren (generation 1.5 Somalis); pressures which 
influence the contested nature of their identity expression. However, the above examples also 
demonstrate the conflicting expectations that exist between peers in the Somali community. It 
seems that the women and the men have different expectations and conceptions of what a positive 
professional trajectory looks like. There appears also to be some confusion and resentment around 
who occupies what roles around the home. These aspects of Somali life, which take some 
navigation for the actors, add more compounding factors to the contested space that informs their 
expressions of identity. Indeed, this adds a further challenging dimension (from within the 
community) to their already multifaceted contested identities. It seems that being studious is 
culturally more acceptable for girls. It matches the expectations of their parents, that they are more 
mature and better able to manage the requirements of the outside world. 
 
 
Conclusion: key findings 
 
The respondents occupied contested identities, and had different strategies to enable them to move 
between the different spheres of their lives, most notably in their interactions with their parents and 
with the mainstream Australian community. However, they did so with varying degrees of success 
and their experiences were gendered. Many felt the burden of competing expectations and struggled 
to integrate their many identities. While some accepted that this was reality for many people, not 
just migrants and people who look different from mainstream Australians, others felt it was unjust 
that they had to tailor their personality to different situations. 
Education is highly valued by Somalis in Melbourne to the point where it becomes a 
distinguishing factor in their identity and something they believe sets them apart from other African 
communities. According to respondents, level of education (and as a result of education, increased 
wealth and better networks) was a key determinant in who was able to leave Somalia quickly when 
the political situation began to deteriorate in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
The young women were sometimes dismissive of their male counterparts’ success in 
education. They claimed that there are lower expectations of Somali boys to help around the house 
and be involved in family life, and that they are therefore less-equipped to persevere with education. 
While the young men did not explicitly agree with the women’s account, they described the burden 
of the high expectations their parents place upon them from a young age. The men in a trade 
profession were very aware (in their own minds) that they had fallen short of their parents’ 
expectations. They explained that they were unable to assure their parents that working in a trade is 
a viable and respectable occupation in Australia, and that they felt their parents would always be 
disappointed that they had not attended university. 
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The place of women has evolved dramatically between Somalia and Australia. While some 
argue that Somali society had strictly defined roles for men and women, these have been eroded by 
political, cultural and social flux in Somalia itself, and by the journey from Somalia to other 
countries where women occupy many different roles. Both men and women described the inner 
strength of Somali women and the way that in Australia, many women are ‘head of the household’. 
They contrasted this to other Muslim families, where they believe children report to their fathers 
and are disciplined by them. Some women described how their mothers and other women had 
successfully sought divorce as evidence of women’s strength and ability to be masters of their own 
destiny. 
The young men described the success of their sisters, wives and cousins in Australia. This 
was in terms of education, professional lives and ability to set goals and achieve them. However, 
this was not always viewed in a positive light, with some young men expressing frustration at the 
way their lives were directed by women. In addition, the young men have encountered significant 
difficulties and feelings of alienation because of the perceived success of the women. There was a 
notable lack of understanding and communication between men and women regarding these issues. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
When I started this research in 2010, it was for personal interest. I was excited to further my own 
understanding of some of my friends and acquaintances in Melbourne. Sadly, each year that passed, 
the themes of the thesis became more and more salient, politicised, and prominent in the public 
agenda. The pressures on the young people I spoke with have increased in accordance with the level 
of public scrutiny on them. This thesis has been an interesting journey for me. It allowed me to 
speak with some very accomplished people and I am very thankful for their willingness to let me 
into their lives. 
Overall, I was struck by the sheer scale of the effort that Somali generation 1.5ers in 
Melbourne have to go to in order to inhabit their contested identities, and the awareness they have 
about these identities and the way they have been represented. This is not an abstract awareness; 
rather it permeates everyday interactions, for example, in justifying your citizenship to a taxi driver, 
or leaving the lunch-room at work when the conversation turns to religion. I have critically 
examined the representation of Somalis by others, and analysed how their expression of identity 
differs from these representations. Even though I did not set out to dispel myths about this particular 
population, I found that their identity expression was vastly different to common representations of 
them.  
 
 
Reflections on the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of this thesis 
 
The thesis grapples with many theoretical concerns: identity, forms of life, issues of violence, 
power, discourse and ideology, social capital and representations of individuals and groups. There 
was a corresponding amount of theoretical groundwork to cover in order to faithfully present the 
findings in a coherent light.  
 While much of the theoretical groundwork has been linked to the findings chapters where 
appropriate, the methodological considerations require some further elaboration. Primarily, I want 
to offer some reflections on the way I employed critical narrative inquiry throughout the study. This 
form of narrative inquiry served me very well as the means to examine the stories presented by my 
respondents thoroughly and critically. I treated critical narrative inquiry as a lens through which to 
examine and potentially uncover the drives and forces behind stories. I hope that I have uncovered 
  
 
232 
latent aspects of the stories I was told. In the main, I was able to turn to critical narrative inquiry to 
unpack the stories I was being told about how my research participants struggle to maintain a 
coherent sense of self across temporal, geographical, cultural and religious divides from their 
heritage, and in some cases, the identity their parents, peers, and other members of the community, 
wished them to inhabit. 
Critical narrative inquiry can potentially reveal much about how storytellers view 
themselves and their agency in the world. I would like to acknowledge that this research experience 
instilled in me a profound respect for generation 1.5 Somalis in Melbourne, as they navigate their 
way through difficult histories, complex structural constraints, and a highly politicised ideological 
sphere. It was a privilege to be given intimate access to their world, especially in such a politically 
fraught period. 
 
 
Summary of key findings 
 
I will briefly re-state the key findings in relation to the two research questions identified in the 
introduction: 
 
i. How do generation 1.5 Somalis living in Melbourne aged between 18 and 30 express their 
identity? 
 
Firstly, it is worth noting that the identities of generation 1.5 Somalis in Melbourne are constructed 
in the context of many ideological influences and discursive categories. The respondents gave 
multiple examples which highlight the way the implicit power relations in society affect them in 
ways which are unique, compared with other young Australians. Representations of Somalis by 
others shape generation 1.5, as they forge and express their identities. They are often forced to 
consider themselves in terms of the categories that others project onto them. 
 The respondents had a deep engagement with Islam. Many described it as the thing that 
defined them, and they were worried about how Islam is perceived by mainstream Australian. This 
included widespread suspicions that actively practicing Muslims are likely to commit acts of 
terrorism. Within the Somali community in Melbourne, the vast majority of women are veiled and 
some of the respondents were frustrated that the veil is the only thing that people see about them, to 
the point that it negates other facets of their person. Although there were many challenges to their 
participation in Islamic life while living in a Muslim minority country, the young people were proud 
of this particular aspect of their identities. They lived their religion in a physical and practical way, 
determining what decisions to make based on prayer and Islamic values, dressing modestly and 
engaging in daily prayer. Their engagement with Islam was far more significant than their 
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engagement with Somali culture. In fact, they made some disparaging remarks about the cultural 
artefacts which their parents found important, and it was clear that their identity was much more 
reliant on Islam and their religious practices than their cultural heritage. 
 The importance of clans in the identity expression of my participants was also of particular 
interest. I found that the young people I spoke with were for the most part very knowledgeable 
about the clan and kinship system, but that this knowledge was mostly theoretical. They do not 
practice clan and kinship relationships on a daily basis. In fact, some of them had not become aware 
of which clan they belonged to until their late teens or early 20s. They were also anxious to put a 
distance between themselves and their parents’ and grandparents’ generations in terms of the 
importance they place on clans. While they acknowledged that a kinship system can be useful and 
helpful to some individuals in a time of need, they themselves had rarely experienced a need for 
assistance which had forced them to call on their clan. It is also worth remembering that the clan 
networks are not as strong in Australia as they were in Somalia, so there are limits to what can be 
achieved using these networks. 
What became apparent during my fieldwork was that the generation 1.5 Somalis were 
aware of a disruption of their social capital after their flight from Somalia. Although their families 
established and re-established networks here in Melbourne, they were conscious that they had lost 
their ‘standing’ in society. Some of them spoke about how their parents had created ‘another 
Somalia’ in Melbourne (perhaps evidence of my contention that Somalis in Melbourne are a very 
inward looking community), but how they felt locked out of this community, and had experienced a 
second rupture because they cannot or will not access the refugee networks their parents 
established. At the same time, many of the respondents felt that they were not able to take part fully 
in mainstream Australian society. Their descriptions echo the scholarly accounts of generation 
1.5ers the world over: They are not fully integrated into their host countries’ societies, nor their 
parents’ communities and networks. 
The respondents described different strategies to enable them to move between the 
contrasting spheres of their lives, most notably in their interactions with their parents and with the 
mainstream Australian community. However, many noted that this was challenging. They felt the 
burden of competing expectations and struggled to integrate their contested identities.  In general, 
this age group (adolescence to young adulthood) is noted for being a challenging life period in 
terms of identity expression. Generation 1.5 Somalis are faced with compounded difficulty in this 
phase due to their visible minority status, multiple pressures from within their community, the 
increased scrutiny on their actions by outsiders, and so on.  
 
ii. How does this compare with the representation of generation 1.5 Somalis in both the 
academic literature and the popular media? 
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I have shown that Somalis have been characterized as violent in both academic literature and the 
popular media. There have been various reasons advanced for this including that violence is a 
personal characteristic of Somalis, the clan system, the harsh environment of Somalia, and due to 
outside political and military intervention in Somalia. However, my analysis very clearly showed 
that while violence is an ongoing issue in Somalia, it is not the inevitable enactment of ancient tribal 
allegiances that ensures the continuation of violence, but the clever manipulations of individuals 
with vested interests in continuing the violence. This illustrates the danger with ideological 
discourse — that false ideologies (or, at least, reductive and over-simplistic ones) become 
consolidated and permeate the identities of the individuals or collective.  
The respondents were able to detail acts of brutality that had taken place in Somalia and 
told stories of friends whose brothers, uncles and fathers had disappeared or been shot. Their 
reflections on overt violence, however, were almost exclusively located in Somalia. During my 
participant observation, I was able to note a number of examples of covert violence that affected the 
Somali community in Melbourne deeply. Perhaps chief among these was the closure of official 
channels through which remittances could be sent to Somalia. As I argued in the first findings 
chapter, there is inherent violence in stopping the flow of money to a vulnerable population. This 
decision selectively victimised certain members of the population.  
The young people offered many reflections on the sorts of violence that face them on a 
daily basis. These included problematic relationships with law enforcers, difficulty gaining 
adequate representation if they were in trouble with the law and the problem of absent or 
disengaged father figures. There was a notable difference in the way that young men and young 
women conceived of violence, with the men stressing issues with the police, and women focusing 
on intimate partner violence. 
There have been many accusations against Victoria Police regarding their racial profiling of 
young African Australian males. It is clear that young male African Australians are much more 
likely to be stopped by members of the police force with no grounds. Their representation in crime 
statistics is also higher than the rest of the population, but not by as much as has been reported in 
various forms of the media. 
Because of the perception of the media and some academics, when violence does occur in 
the Somali Australian community, it appears to be subject to much more scrutiny than when it 
occurs in a mainstream setting. Many of the respondents pointed out that violence occurs in all 
communities, but that when it happens in a Muslim community and specifically in the Somali 
community, it is documented and disseminated broadly. This leads to an overrepresentation of 
Somali males (and Muslim males more broadly) being linked to violence and violent acts which in 
turn reinforces the notion that they are violent people. 
I could find no evidence to suggest that this generation of Somalis is more likely to engage 
in violent behaviour than the average Australian of the same age. The respondents did not believe 
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that the Somali community in Melbourne poses a real threat. Instead, they believe that the danger 
has been overestimated for various reasons. Some pointed out that it is difficult to identify Somalis 
from other dark-skinned Africans, and some people might jump to conclusions about the identity of 
offenders. Others believe that the negative reportage about their community is purely to sell 
newspapers and attract TV viewers. Still others pointed out that there is a natural human need to 
have something to fear, and that unfortunately, for many people, their community occupied that 
position.  
 
 
Unexpected findings 
 
While the findings detailed above were the deliberate focus of the research questions, there are a 
number of points to which I wish to draw attention, as they were unexpected findings for me. 
Firstly, the respondents spoke to me at length about the importance of Islam in their lives. I had 
thought of Islam as an organisational force for configuring social relations and cultural 
expectations. However, they also discussed their personal relationship with Allah in great detail. 
They believed that Islam was a force that improved them and encouraged them to strive to be better 
people. They also did not see any differences between Islamic values and mainstream Australian 
values. Some told me that there are universal values of good and that all religions aspire to these. 
Their level of personal faith was relatively high, and appeared to be the result of deep consideration 
rather than a simple following of the cultural and religious practices of their parents.  
For the young people I interviewed, religion, culture and ethnicity were important parts of 
their self-described identity. They shared many stories about how this identity had put them in 
risky, uncomfortable or unsafe positions. But they also described their pride in their identity and 
they way they present themselves to the outside world. 
All my preliminary research pointed to the clans being a crucial aspect of Somali identity. 
Indeed, the older Somali Australians I spoke with highlighted the clan system as a valuable 
categorising and organising factor in their lives. The younger people were in some cases very 
dismissive of the clans and professed not to know or care much about them. However, they were 
very eager to talk about the clans amongst themselves in focus groups and with me in longer 
interviews. Some were anxious to distance themselves from the clan system in their lives in 
Australia. This was despite the fact that they were clearly well informed about the history of the 
clans and the way they operate both in Somali and in Australia. It is unclear why they professed 
such disinterest in the clan system, despite having an intimate working knowledge of the functions 
of clan allegiances. My reflection on this has resulted in two possible answers. Firstly, I believe that 
generation 1.5 is deliberately trying to put distance between their way of life and their parents’ (and 
grandparents’). Secondly, it is possible that the young people associated the clan system with the 
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widespread negative perception of Somalis and therefore did not wish to identify with it. More 
research into this area would be instructive.  
While it is not unusual for migrants to value education highly, I was surprised that 
education was a distinguishing factor for the young people’s identities and something they believe 
sets them apart from other African communities in Melbourne. The respondents are active agents in 
their choices and many have mapped out professional trajectories for themselves. All of them were 
very aware of the hardships their parents had faced in order to reach Australia and make a new life 
here. Some spoke directly about owing a debt to their parents and their wish to repay this debt by 
studying hard and trying to ‘make something’ of their lives. 
I was also very interested in the way in which Somali Australians in general seem to set 
themselves apart from other communities. For example, they believe their interpretation and 
practice of Islam is different from other Muslim groups in Australia. Historically, Somalis have set 
themselves apart. As I described in chapter three, Somalis have traditionally considered themselves 
distinct from others, based for example on their direct (mythical) connection to the prophet 
Muhammad. They also believe their focus on education sets them apart from other migrant groups 
as described above.  I believe that this conviction (along with the older generations’ preference to 
rely on clan and kinship networks) has made them in some ways a very insular and inward looking 
community. While this emphasizes the strength of their own networks, it has also served as a 
deterrent to individuals from accessing services which might be helpful. These include welfare 
services, social services which might promote cohesion with other community groups and medical 
and financial services. 
I also wish to highlight the fragmented nature of the Somali community in Melbourne. This 
has been found elsewhere in Somali communities living abroad, but is not a universal feature of 
Somali diasporic communities.1 It is often attributed to the clan system, which it is argued, prevents 
Somalis from presenting a united front and may disadvantage them in their mission to seek 
resources, or begin community projects. While I agree that the clan system is to some degree 
responsible for this, it is possible that the social landscape for Somalis in Melbourne mirrors the 
social landscape in Somalia, which has been fragmented for many decades. This fragmentation has 
thwarted attempts to create a sense of Somali unity many times, and will perhaps continue to do so. 
Additionally, my argument above that Somalis see themselves as particular, and set themselves 
apart from other minority groups and the mainstream community may also serve to be instructive. It 
is possible that within the community, small factions have been created which are insular and 
inward looking (in the same way that I have described the community as a whole). In this way, this 
insularity may have been split along other lines within the community to further reinforce the 
fragmentation which has been commented on by so many authors.  
                                                
1 Al-Sharmani, "Diasporic Somalis in Cairo: The Poetics and Practices of Soomaalinimo." Horst, "The Somali 
Diaspora in Minneapolis: Expectations and Realities." 
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 A final unexpected finding was the sense of respect that the males accord females in Somali 
culture. This does not accord with the stereotypical expectations of Muslim gender relations, and 
indeed, some of the young women pointed out that they were frustrated with their Muslim (non-
Somali) friends and acquaintances for the way that they submitted to the males in their lives. Both 
men and women described the inner strength of Somali women and the way that in Australia, many 
women are ‘head of the household’. This is, they believed in contrast to other Muslim families, 
where children report to their fathers and are disciplined by them. Some women described how their 
mothers had successfully sought divorce as evidence of women’s strength and their ability to be 
masters of their own destiny. While my participants told me that Somali women have a 
characteristic of pride and a strong sense of self, both in Somalia and abroad, I believe that a 
significant change has been brought about by the migration experience. Women are experiencing 
freedom that they were less likely to experience in Somalia, and taking advantage of the many 
opportunities that living in the western world affords. However, this upheaval has had a marked 
effect on Somali men, with some reporting feelings of alienation and anxiety about their new, less-
defined gender roles. 
A final unexpected finding relates to the disparity between the community belief that 
females outperform males in terms of educational achievement. The available census data does not 
support this; in fact, it quite clearly contradicts it. All my contacts within the Somali community 
informed me that young women are more studious than young men. It was clear that being more 
studious matched the parental and cultural expectations of young women. It was seen as a sign that 
young women are more mature and better able to manage the requirements of the outside world. 
The respondents reported that there is a disjuncture between the expectations that parents have of 
their sons and the tools they equip them with to succeed. In particular, the young women argued 
that because there are lower expectations of Somali boys to help around the house, and be involved 
in family life, they are less equipped to apply themselves to study and persevere with their 
education.  
 
 
Avenues for further research 
 
This project has suggested many avenues for further research. It would be instructive to more 
deeply examine the disjuncture between the reported educational achievement of females and the 
way this is contrasted to a perceived under-achievement of males within the community. An 
examination of census data and the tracking of trends in this area will be particularly interesting 
with the release of the 2016 census. 
Secondly, more deep engagement with Somali Australians about what they believe 
constitutes violence, and gendered differences in this perception would be timely, particularly in the 
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current climate of renewed focus on domestic violence. My own research has left me with many 
questions about what Somali men and women consider violence to mean, and if measures are to be 
taken to address violence against women and children, it is crucial to understand the different 
perceptions men and women have of violence. 
Thirdly, an investigation into the collection, compilation and publication of crime statistics 
in Victoria and a comprehensive examination of the issues around racial profiling allegedly carried 
out by police may alleviate public concerns about specific ethnic groups and help to reduce media 
hyperbolation and scaremongering. This would certainly benefit the young people I spoke to, and 
improve their wellbeing. 
It would also be interesting to carry out more targeted research into what effects media 
representation has on communities such as Somali Australians. While many authors have shown 
that the overrepresentation of particular groups in the media can lead to poor settlement, economic 
and mental health outcomes, I would like to see more information about how this occurs, and what 
may be done to address this issue. 
Finally, I would encourage further research into what I identified as a tendency within the 
Somali community in Melbourne to look inward, and to be quite insular in their efforts to overcome 
problems they face. This leads them to rely on their own networks instead of accessing outside 
services which might be helpful to them. I believe it is possible to target services to better meet the 
needs of Somalis in Melbourne, and to educate service providers in some of the specific 
characteristics of the community in order to achieve better social, financial, and medical outcomes. 
Similarly, this project would require deeper engagement with members of the community to better 
understand their needs and the way they might access services, and also to educate them about the 
existence of external support networks which are there to assist them. 
 
 
Concluding reflections 
 
Throughout this project, I have often wondered about the hierarchy of migrants as described by 
some of the respondents. Do they feel that they are at the lower end of some scale because of the 
relatively small numbers of refugees from Somalia, or is it because there are too many differences 
that need to be bridged between Somali culture and Australian culture? What does the future of the 
Somali community in Australia look like?  
I am reminded of an anecdote told to me at a multicultural forum I attended at the 
Immigration Museum. There had been a call to migrant and refugee communities to donate some 
culturally significant artefacts for an exhibition, which were then to be kept as documented 
evidence of the different cultural groups residing in Melbourne. I asked the woman organising this 
whether she had reached out to the Somali community in Melbourne, as in my view, they would 
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have very interesting artefacts and information to contribute. She told me that she had done so 
numerous times, but although they were very polite and at first seemed interested, the interest 
quickly waned. She said she had the feeling that they were ‘too busy looking forward to look back’. 
It seems that the Melbourne Somali community has yet to attain a safe cultural space in 
which they can celebrate their heritage in the knowledge that others will accord them respect rather 
than suspicion. Given the current political climate, and the demonstrated disparity between the 
expression of young Somali identity in Melbourne and the dominant representations of them, it 
seems that further research in this area will be more and more relevant.  
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APPENDIX A – List of all interviews and focus groups 
 
 
*All names are codenames to protect anonymity 
*This table includes recorded and transcribed interviews. It does not include follow up phone calls, 
emails, or more informal chats at other times or community events.  
 
Individual Male Interviews Date Follow up sessions 
Iman 13-Feb-14 27-Apr-14 
Suleiman 20-Feb-14 24-Apr-14 
Mansuur 17-Mar-14 
 Mohamed 20-Mar-14 24-Apr-14 
X 9-Aug-14 
 Individual Female Interviews 
  Aaliya 1-Jun-12 12-Sep-12, 21-Jun-13 
Amal 21-Jan-14 
 Bilan 19-May-13 16-Sep-14 
Filad 19-May-14 
 Geni 2-Jun-14 
 Hani 20-Jan-14 22-Sep-14 
Layla 3-Feb-14 22-Sep-14 
Muna 3-Feb-14 
 Naado 6-Jun-14 
 Nafiso 25-Jan-14 
 Sumaya 5-May-13 29-Nov-14 
Ismahaan 4-May-13 3-Dec-14 
Male Group Interviews 
  Abdinoor + Omar 11-May-14 25-Aug-14 
Ishaar + Said 17-Aug-14 
 Mohamed + Ali 28-May-14 
 Mohamed + Cabaas 25-Aug-14 
 Focus Groups 
  Absame + Ali + Suleiman + Kadiye 10-Feb-14 
 Amal + Bilan + Hani + Bashir + Ismahaan + 
Sumaya + Suleiman 2-Nov-12 
 Ismahaan + Sumaya + Hani + Amal + Muna + 
Layla + Nafiso 15-Jan-14 
 Mansuur + Said + Kadiye + Cabass + Naado 10-Nov-12 
 Other   
Focus group with mothers 30-Mar-14 
 Interview with Social Worker 8-Dec-14 
 Interview with President 13-Nov-12 
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APPENDIX B – Ethics Attachments 
 
 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION  
Project Title: Identity Construction of Generation 1.5 Somalis residing in Melbourne 
Investigators:  
Ms Elizabeth Lakey: BA (hons), S3317152@student.rmit.edu.au 
 
Supervisors: 
Dr Yaso Nadarajah: (PhD) 99253542, yaso.nadarajah@rmit.edu.au 
Professor Pavla Miller: (PhD), 9925 8257, pavla.miller@rmit.edu.au 
 
 
Dear …………., 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by RMIT University. Please 
read this sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents before deciding whether 
to participate. If you have any questions about the project, please ask one of the investigators.  
Who is involved in this research project? Why is it being conducted?  
• This is a student research project being conducted by Ms Elizabeth Lakey.  The project’s 
principal supervisor is Dr Yaso Nadarajah and the secondary supervisor is Dr Pavla Miller. 
• The research is being conducted to fulfil the requirements of Doctor of Philosophy at the 
Globalism Research Institute at RMIT. 
• The project has been approved by the RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee. 
Why have you been approached?  
You have been approached because you are in a good position to understand the life experience of 
Somalis in Australia and speak about it with me. 
What is the project about? What are the questions being addressed?  
• This project will investigate the identity of generation 1.5 Somalis living in Melbourne. The 
aim is to build knowledge of this generation’s identity in relation to their experiences in 
Somalia, their travel to Australia and their experiences of living in Melbourne.  
• The secondary aim of this project is to challenge the idea that is often in the popular media 
and in academic papers and books that Somalis are a violent group of people. 
• Elizabeth will interview 20 young Somali women and 20 men across Melbourne. 
If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do?  
Elizabeth will require research participants to take part in an in-depth interview. The interview will 
take approximately 90 minutes. Once Elizabeth has analysed the findings of the interview she might 
need to clarify questions that have come up in relation to your interview information. This will 
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involve a second interview which might take up to another hour and could be done by email, phone 
or in person. 
Elizabeth will then write up her thesis and will make a summary of the relevant sections available to 
you to read. You will have another opportunity to make corrections if you would like, or to add 
information. This process would take another hour to two hours if you chose to do so and might 
require a follow-up meeting. 
The interview questions will be focused on your life as you remember it in Somalia, your journey to 
Australia and how you find living in Melbourne. They will be open-ended questions and you can 
answer them however you want. There is no right answer to these questions; the research is 
interested in your personal experiences. 
Here are some example questions: 
Life in Somalia 
Which part of Somalia are you from?  
Which part of Somalia are your parents from? 
Did you live in a city, or in the country before you left? 
What was your hometown like? 
 
Journey to Australia 
How did your family come to the decision to leave Somalia? 
Was Australia your destination from the beginning? 
 
Life in Australia 
Where and with whom do you live? 
Is your family here? 
Can you think back over the time you have lived here and describe some moments or a time when 
you felt really ‘at home’ here? 
 
What are the possible risks or disadvantages?  
• The interview questions might raise sensitive issues or memories for you including your 
time in Somalia your travel to Australia.  
• If you find the interview process distressing, Elizabeth will be able to provide you with 
contacts of free counselling services in your area if you wish to discuss the matters with 
someone appropriately qualified. 
• Given that you will be able to decide what and how much information you would like to 
give Elizabeth, it is not anticipated that participating in this project will cause you undue 
risk or disadvantage. 
• If you are unduly concerned about your responses to any of the interview questions or if 
you find participation in the project distressing, you should contact Dr Yaso Nadarajah 
(Elizabeth’s primary supervisor) as soon as convenient. Dr Nadarajah will discuss your 
concerns with you confidentially and suggest appropriate follow-up for you if necessary. 
  
What are the benefits associated with participation?  
It is not anticipated that there will be direct personal benefit to you from participating in this project. 
It is hoped, however, that this project will contribute to a better understanding of the Somali 
community in Melbourne and help to better represent Somalis in the media and in academic 
publications. 
What will happen to the information I provide?  
• The information you provide will be treated as strictly confidential. It will only be seen by 
Dr Nadarajah, Professor Miller, and Elizabeth Lakey. 
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• Any information that you provide can be disclosed only if (1) it is to protect you or others 
from harm, (2) a court order is produced, or (3) you provide the researcher with written 
permission.  
• The results will be disseminated through Elizabeth’s doctoral thesis and in any publication 
of that thesis. This could be a paper or journal article. Elizabeth will use pseudonyms to 
protect your identity. The research data will be kept securely at RMIT for a period of 5 
years after publication and then it will be destroyed. 
 
What are my rights as a participant?  
• The right to withdraw from participation at any time 
• The right to request that any recording cease  
• The right to have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed, provided it can be 
reliably identified, and provided that so doing does not increase the risk for the participant.  
• The right to have any questions answered at any time.  
Whom should I contact if I have any questions?  
• Elizabeth’s supervisor Dr Yaso Nadarajah – yaso.nadarajah@rmit.edu.au 
What other issues should I be aware of before deciding whether to participate?  
• Elizabeth will, with your permission, make an audio recording of the interviews. This data 
will be securely stored at RMIT University for 5 years after publication and then destroyed. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Elizabeth Lakey 
 
 
If you have any complaints about your participation in this project please see the complaints 
procedure on the Complaints with respect to participation in research at RMIT page 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
CONSENT FORM 
1. I have had the project explained to me, and I have read the information sheet  
 
2. I agree to participate in the research project as described 
 
3. I give my permission: 
to be interviewed and/or complete a questionnaire   Yes  No 
to be audio taped       Yes  No 
for my name or identity to be used     Yes  No 
 
4. I acknowledge that: 
 
(a) My participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from the project at any 
time and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied (unless follow-up is 
needed for safety). 
(b) The project is for the purpose of research.  It may not be of direct benefit to me. 
(c) The privacy of the personal information I provide will be safeguarded and only 
disclosed where I have consented to the disclosure or as required by law.  
(d) The security of the research data will be protected during and after completion of the 
study.  The data collected during the study may be published, and a report of the 
project outcomes will be provided to …………….. (researcher to specify).   Any 
information which will identify me will not be used unless otherwise specified above. 
 
Participant’s Consent 
 
Participant:  Date:  
(Signature) 
 
Witness: 
 
Witness:  Date:  
(Signature) 
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Interview Questions 
 
Life in Somalia 
• Which part of Somalia are you from?  
• Which part of Somalia are your parents from? 
• Did you live in a city, or in the country before you left? 
• What was your hometown like? 
• Who were the members of your household? 
• How big is your family? Did you all live together, or just with your immediate family? 
• Do you belong to a particular clan? Which clan are you part of? 
• Can you describe this clan in comparison to other clans? 
 
The Journey to Australia 
• How did your family come to the decision to leave Somalia? 
• Was Australia your destination from the beginning? 
• By what transport did you come from Somalia to Australia? 
• Were there long stopovers? 
• Were you 'at home' anywhere else on your trip? Were there any other countries where you 
stayed for a long time? 
• How long did the entire trip from Somalia to Australia take? 
• departure date - 
• arrival date- 
• Do you think this is your final destination, or do you think about moving again? 
 
Life in Australia 
• Where and with whom do you live? 
• Is your family here? 
• Are you close to your family? 
• Do you work/study? 
• Are you part of any groups? 
• What sort of activities do you do? 
• How much do you consider yourself a religious person? 
• How important is your religion to you? 
• Can you think back over the time you have lived here and describe some moments or a time 
when you felt really ‘at home’ here? 
• Can you think back over the time you have lived here and describe some moments or a time 
when you did not feel accepted here? 
• Do you think that Somalis are portrayed as a violent group of people? Why/Why not? Can 
you give any examples of this that you or someone you know have experienced? 
• The media in Australia often describe Somalis as violent people. What do you think is the 
real story? Can you give some examples to explain what you mean?  
• Can you tell me some other stories that can make people understand what you mean? 
• Is there anything else you want to tell me about your life here? 
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